

SECRET CIA DOCUMENTS ON MOSSAD

COUNTERSpy

The Magazine For People Who Need To Know

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May-June 1982

**Fueling
Counterrevolution
in Nicaragua**

**Resuming the
Vietnam War**

**U.S. Green Berets
Torture
in El Salvador**

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March 1979

Israel

**Foreign
Intelligence
and
Security
Services**



secret

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The United States emerged from World War II as the world's dominant political and economic power. To conserve and enhance this power, the U.S. government created a variety of institutions to secure dominance over "free world" nations which supply U.S. corporations with cheap labor, raw materials, and markets. A number of these institutions, some initiated jointly with allied Western European governments, have systematically violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of people in this country and the world over. Prominent among these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947.

Since 1973, CounterSpy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its facets: covert CIA operations, U.S. interference in foreign labor movements, U.S. aid in creating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporation-intelligence agency link-ups, and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view has been that while CIA operations have been one of the most infamous forms of intervention, the CIA is but one strand in a complex web of interference and control.

Our motivation for publishing CounterSpy is two-fold:

- People in the U.S. have the right and need to know the scope and nature of their government's abrogation of U.S. and other citizens' rights and liberties in order to defend themselves and most effectively change the institutions.
- People in other nations, often denied access to information, can better protect their own rights and bring about necessary change when equipped with such information.

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FROM THE EDITORS

This is the first issue of CounterSpy that was prepared under the so-called Intelligence Identities Protection Act - the first issue under U.S. government censorship. As we go to press, the Senate is about to vote on the bill, which was approved by the House several months ago. Therefore, there is a good chance that the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" will be law as you receive this issue. Needless to say, CounterSpy magazine

will continue to publish, and we will actively fight the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act."

Beginning with this issue, CounterSpy will appear five times a year, instead of four. (This does not affect your subscription which covers five issues or one year already.) We believe that it is more important than ever to publish CounterSpy, and growing sales and subscriptions seem to confirm that.

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News NOT in the News

Classify Acid Rain

The Reagan administration's efforts to in-
crease secrecy ("when in doubt, classify")
have an obvious goal: restrict public ac-
cess to embarrassing or indicting informa-
tion. President Reagan is now considering
a new and far-reaching Executive Order on
the classification of so-called national
security information. The order would even
allow "reclassification" of already de-
classified documents. In addition, the ad-
ministration wants to give the Environ-
mental Protection Agency new "classifica-
tion authority" so that, as Steven
Gorfinkel of the Information Security
Oversight Office said, it can classify in-
formation on issues such as "acid rain in
Canada." Gorfinkel did not explain the
connection between acid rain in Canada and
U.S. national security.

Chemical Warfare in Laos

Just who has been using chemical weapons
in Laos? An unpublished U.S. Air Force
history obtained by the National Veterans
Task Force on Agent Orange under the Free-
dom of Information Act reports that the
"United States secretly sprayed herbicides
on Laos during the Vietnam war." The State
Department opposed the release of this re-
port because it "would cause identifiable
damage to the national security." Accord-
ing to the Air Force history, spraying in
Laos began in December 1965 "at the urging
of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander
of U.S. military forces in Vietnam." Over
the next seven months, 200,000 gallons of
herbicides were dumped over Laos." (Inter-
national Herald Tribune, 1/26/82)

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration
continues to accuse the Soviet Union of
using outlawed biological and chemical

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weapons against the Hmong people in Laos. (Some of the Hmong tribespeople worked for the CIA in the 1960s and early 1970s.) The State Department comes up with "the final proof" of these charges about once a month. (See also "General Haig's Yellow Rain," CounterSpy, vol.6 no.2.) However, wrote journalist Gene Lyons in "What Rain?," it is "hard to fathom what the administration is up to with its repeated charges of Soviet chemical and biological atrocities in Asia - other than justification for its program to spend \$4 billion to \$7 billion on... nerve gas-weapons." He concluded that "for all its shrillness, the Government's case would not suffice to convict a purse snatcher." (New York Times Times, 3/3/82)

Lyons quotes two biochemists, Chester Mirocha of the University of Minnesota and James Bamburg of Colorado State University, who investigated government claims of "yellow rain" in Laos. They say that the amounts of "yellow rain" the State Department claims kills people would need to be multiplied more than ten-fold to be lethal. Fred Swartzendruber, a Mennonite Central Committee worker in Laos from 1979 to 1981 travelled freely in Laos during that time. And he says that he couldn't find a single person in all the Hmong villages he visited who knew anything about "yellow rain."

Redirecting the RDF

U.S. officials now admit that the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is not primarily directed against a "Soviet invasion" of a Middle Eastern or African country. The administration is "redirecting its military efforts in the Middle East in the belief that internal subversion is more of a threat to friendly countries, and their oil, than Soviet attack" (emphasis added). The RDF is to police and prop up shaky pro-U.S. regimes in the region. U.S. officials point out that the "near toppling of the pro-Western government in Bahrain in December [1981]" was the latest example that convinced the Pentagon that "the biggest threats to western oil supplies in the Persian Gulf [are] internal."

The example of Bahrain indicates that the Reagan administration will use the RDF in support of blatantly repressive re-

gimes. Bahrain, a small island nation in the Persian-Arabian Gulf has been ruled by a one-family dictatorship since the British withdrew in 1971. It harbors a U.S. naval base, and has been periodically shaken by demonstrations in support of democratic rights for decades. The ruling Sultan is using his Western-trained police and intelligence services to counter such democratic movements. With the RDF, he has gained a powerful backup force.

BOSS Gets Caught

It would be a "pushover," Michael Hoare told his fifty or so mercenaries before they went to the Seychelles on November 25, 1981 to overthrow the government of Albert Rene. Hoare was dead wrong. When his party landed in Victoria Airport, where they were expected by an advance party of several mercenaries, troops of the Seychelles quickly surrounded them. At least one mercenary was killed in the battle, but most of them managed to escape by hijacking an Air India plane to South Africa. Six others were subsequently arrested on the island.

Back in South Africa, most of the mercenaries were quickly released in spite of the tough anti-hijacking laws of the country's government. Five, including Hoare, were charged with kidnapping (which, unlike hijacking, does not carry a mandatory sentence) and were released on bail. South African police minister Louis Le Grange justified this unusually lenient treatment of the mercenaries and hijackers by saying that they "only shot out some windows and ran around in the bush. You tell me what laws they broke in South Africa." (Some of the mercenaries have now reportedly been rearrested.)

Interrogation of the captured mercenaries in the Seychelles soon established South African involvement in the attempted coup. Not only were the mercenaries recruited in South Africa, one of them even confessed to being a South African intelligence officer: "I am Martin Dolinchek from the South African National Intelligence Service and I am a senior officer." Former BOSS (Bureau of State Security,

previous name of South Africa's intelligence agency) agent Gordon Winter confirmed Dolinchek's statement. He said that he had worked with Dolinchek - alias Martin Donaldson, alias Anton Lubic - when Dolinchek was the head of BOSS' Yugoslav Section at BOSS Headquarters in Pretoria. According to Winter, Hoare, the leader of the expedition, is also a "South African military intelligence man," and several other members of the mercenary group are members of the Reconnaissance Squad, a "crack unit of... specially trained commandos." The Reconnaissance Squad is also the sector of the Army from which BOSS used to recruit members for the "Z" or assassination squad.

Hoare's Seychelles enterprise was intended to replace Albert Rene with former Prime Minister James Mancham. Mancham, as Gordon Winter told a press conference before the attempted coup, is a BOSS agent who "spied for BOSS at the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the United Nations." Hoare had a tape recording with him by Mancham which was to be played in the radio if the coup was successful. Winter's claim that Mancham was paid by BOSS was confirmed by Eschel Rhoodie of Information Scandal fame. Rhoodie admitted handing government money to Mancham, and told the South African paper Argus this was "old news."

Mancham, one-time head of the "Seychelles Democratic Party," is a close friend of the U.S. and Britain, the former colonial power. In the early 1970s, Mancham campaigned against a movement for an independent Seychelles arguing that the country still needed "British protection."

Western powers have "good reason" to oppose Albert Rene's government even though he has allowed a U.S. satellite tracking station to remain on the island. The U.S. government obviously wants more - especially landing rights in Seychelles ports. These rights do not exist because the U.S. Navy refuses to declare whether its ships are carrying nuclear weapons. Rene is a vocal advocate of making the Indian Ocean a nuclear free zone.

The November 1981 mercenary attack on the Seychelles was not the first such attempt. In April 1979, Rene ordered the deportation of a Belgian mercenary, Alfred Lefevre. Lefevre was accused of being an associate of mercenary Bob Denard, who

staged a successful coup in another Indian Ocean Island nation, the Comoros, in 1978. More attempts may be in the offing for the Seychelles; but the defeat of Hoare and his South African backers this time shows the strength of a people willing to fight against terrorist aggression.

Civilian Internment Camps

The Canadian government gave itself some far reaching powers last year in a May 21, 1981 "Emergency Planning Order." These include the authority to "establish, administer, operate civilian internment camps" and "facilitate the selective reduction of prison populations to provide for the establishment of civilian internment camps." This order, some parliamentarians charge, "was drawn up in secrecy" and suddenly appeared in Canada's official Gazette. Federal officials are trying to play down its significance, saying it is not a law, just a planning order.

Céline Hervieux-Payette, Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General, defended the order in parliament. She said that it was intended for situations such as "war,... a breakdown in public order preceding the outbreak of war or in case of terrorist acts." This definition is undoubtedly fairly wide since the federal government defines "a breakdown in public order;" but Hervieux-Payette said it was all in the public good. "The purpose of this order," she said, "... will, in fact, be to prevent occurrences such as those that took place during the last World War, which were mainly due to a lack of staff and regulations...." In other words, the internment of thousands of Japanese-Canadians as such was not the problem, the internment became problematic because of the lack of regulations on how to proceed with it in an orderly fashion.

CORRECTIONS: In our last issue, three mistakes were made: The nation of Cyprus became independent in 1953 and not in 1960; and Greece did not join the common market in 1980 but in 1981. Finally, the South African town of Brandfort is not a five mile but a five hour drive from Johannesburg. Our apologies.

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Public Relations

In its efforts to win the hearts and minds of the U.S. Congress and the Guatemalan people, that country's military regime is making use of Luis Pellecer, a Jesuit priest who was captured by the government last year. Pellecer is compelled to appear on national television and in international press conferences to denounce the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP, a principal guerrilla organization in Guatemala). Moreover, Pellecer is "renouncing" his membership in the Jesuit Order, saying that it is engaged in "subversive" activities in Guatemala. Friends of Pellecer claim that they are sure Pellecer has been brainwashed to make these statements, and there is concern that the government will kill him when he is no longer useful.

According to a statement by Emeterio Toj Medrano, the Guatemalan military is indeed using brutal torture, drugs, and threats that it will wipe out whole villages to compel individuals to perform such "public relations" speeches. Toj is one of the founders of the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), the largest union for farmworkers in Guatemala. CUC is part of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), a formal alliance of all revolutionary groups in Guatemala. Like Pellecer, Toj was captured and then forced to denounce Guatemala's revolutionary groups over TV and radio. Unlike Pellecer, however, he was eventually liberated from prison by the EGP on November 26, 1981.

Toj was kidnapped in Quetzaltenango on July 4, 1981 and taken to various police, army and air force detention centers. Toj was brutally tortured and constantly given drugs to make him talk. Military interrogators threatened to kill his family and assassinate the inhabitants of whole villages. On August 6, government soldiers, some of them dressed in civilian clothes, indeed massacred the people of the village Estancia de El Quiche.

They told Toj that they were prepared to drop napalm on other villages in western Guatemala if he did not collaborate. States Toj: "In this manner they obliged me to publicly accept my recalcitration from my revolutionary militancy.... They showed me off to a group of senators from the United States as a deserter from my

organization.... Then they prepared me for the famous press conference of October 22 A prefabricated conference with some pseudo-journalists who beforehand had been delivered the questions, as with me, as I was given the questions and the text of my declaration." Toj was also forced to appear on TV and radio, and the military took him around in helicopters to speak to some villages from the air.

After he was freed, the EGP took over three radio stations in Guatemala City and aired statements by Toj informing the people about the real reason for his "denunciations" of the revolutionary organizations. In his statement, Toj also reported military actions he had witnessed as a prisoner. Toj learned that high-ranking government officials, including General Benedicto Lucas Garcia (the president's brother), Army Chief of Staff, participated in massacres of civilians. He also learned that government soldiers often participate in military operations while dressed in civilian clothes.

The liberation of Toj and his statements about how he was forced to "testify" against the EGP were virtually ignored in the U.S. media. Luis Pellecer's "denunciations" were given much more room.

EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

"This book fills a vital need in bringing to bear a wealth of relevant factual material on the El Salvadorean situation. Its account of the nature of the social and political order and U.S. policy provides essential documentation for the burgeoning opposition to the Reagan Administration."

James F. Petras

"This book... provides accurate and relevant information, hitherto not readily accessible, and should be widely distributed and read."

Noam Chomsky

Order from: Central America Information Office, 1151 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. 148pp., \$5. Write to CAMINO for discount schedule.

Sinister Disinformation

Napoléon
Duarte
vu par
Ramly

On February 18, 1982, a group of rightists in the U.S. announced the formation of the Coalition for Free Elections in El Salvador. The Coalition's members are corporate officials with financial interests in Central America, retired U.S. diplomats and leaders of rightwing organizations such as Young Americans for Freedom and the Council for Inter-American Security. "Besides working for a consensus in this country (sic) backing the Salvadoran elections," the Coalition's first press release states, it also aims to counter a "disinformation campaign being waged by the Salvadoran Marxist guerrillas... and their supporters." Behind this campaign, the Coalition argues, are "the sinister (sic) forces which keep Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet peoples under the totalitarian iron heel." However, as it turns out, the Coalition for Free Elections in El Salvador itself may be part of a "sinister" disinformation campaign.

A look at the histories of some of the Coalition's members will explain why. The press release lists Daniel James as the Coalition's secretary. James has considerable experience with disinformation, according to the New York Times (12/25/77). "One of the most intriguing CIA disinformation campaigns of recent years was its attempt to discredit the Cuban revolution in the eyes of other Latin American nations by planting the suggestion that it was controlled to some extent from Moscow. ... Asked how the agency had disseminated its fabrication [that Tamara Bunke, an associate of Che Guevara, was a high official of both the KGB and East German intelligence] the [CIA] official recalled that it [CIA] had provided 'material and background' to Daniel James, an American author and former managing editor of [the CIA-funded] The New Leader, living in Mexico, who published a translation of Major Guevara's Bolivian diaries in 1968."

"In his introduction, Mr. James noted that Miss Bunke, who had taken the nom de guerre of Tania and who is scarcely mentioned in the diaries, had nonetheless been identified a few months earlier by a low-level East German defector as an agent of the East German security agency. Mr. James did not provide any support in his book for the assertion that, during her time



with Major Guevara's group, Miss Bunke was 'attached to the Soviet KGB.' He said in an interview that that had been his own conclusion."

Still, James acknowledged that he "did get information" from the CIA for his book. James said that he had been acquainted with the CIA's Mexico City station chief, and that he had asked him for "anything that they [CIA] could get for me or help me with." However, James refused to say whether "the agency had supplied him with any of the material concerning Miss Bunke."

Another member of the Coalition for Free Elections in El Salvador, Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick (husband of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick) brings a background in "Latin American elections" to the group. Evron Kirkpatrick was the founder and president of Operations and Policy Research, Inc. (OPR) of which Jeane was a member. According to Evron Kirkpatrick himself, "in 1963, 1964 and 1965 OPR, Inc. received CIA money." This money, says Kirkpatrick, was "'principally" for studies of Latin American elections." (The Nation, 2/27/67)

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U.S. Green Berets Torture in El Salvador

by Ruth Fitzpatrick

On a sunny day in October 1981, nineteen religious leaders from Canada and the U.S. sat around a large table in Cuernavaca, Mexico taping and photographing a slight young man from El Salvador. He was describing how Green Berets from the United States taught him torture tactics when he was a military draftee in El Salvador. "Aren't you afraid for your life to tell us this?", one of us asked. "I am wanted dead or alive in El Salvador as it is now.", was his quiet reply.

The young man's name is Antonio. The place was the Cuernavaca Center for International Dialogue for Development (CCIDD). We were a group of religious leaders on the first leg of a study tour of Mexico, Nicaragua, and Cuba. What we heard confirmed our worst fears of direct U.S. involvement in torture in El Salvador. Antonio's eyewitness report was that American advisors were not only advising, they were teaching and participating in torture.

Even before meeting Antonio I had suspected that U.S. advisors were more involved than the government was admitting. Only a months before I had visited La

Virtud refugee camp on the Honduran-Salvadoran border. I brought back with me several photographs of U.S. Green Berets wearing camouflage fatigues and with M-16 rifles slung over their shoulders. Then in February 1982, Cable News Network TV filmed U.S. advisors also carrying M-16s, this time in El Salvador. A Lieutenant Colonel was ordered to leave the country for that violation, and now the Pentagon reportedly wants to change the rules forbidding the advisors to carry M-16s.

When our study group returned to the U.S., a number of us quietly circulated our tapes of the interview with Antonio - a simple young man who wanted no part in the fighting but was caught in circumstances beyond his control. We cautioned that we were not able to prove any of his allegations and hesitated to focus international publicity on this man who already had gone through so much.

Then on January 11, 1982 the New York Times published Raymond Bonner's four column story about Carlos Antonio Gomez Montano, a "21-year old who asserts that he is a former Salvadoran soldier. [He] says that United States military advisors were present at two 'training sessions' early last year when two suspected guerrillas were tortured by Salvadoran Army instructors." Bonner wrote that although Gomez's story cannot be independently corroborated, and Salvadoran military officers claim he was never in the army, unidentified "military sources" confirmed Gomez's recruitment and desertion. In addition, Bonner states, Gomez "revealed knowledge of military life in El Salvador that lent credibility to his story."

The story on our tape and that in the New York Times are almost identical. We are sure it is the same person. However,

(Ruth Fitzpatrick is a free lance writer working on a book about her life as the wife of an army colonel and her development into activism for justice. She is now a member of the Steering Committee of the Religious Taskforce on El Salvador.)

Who says we gent
Christian
Democrats?
We put up
crosses all
around the
country.



Lateinamerika Nachrichten

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there is a key difference. Antonio told us that one United States advisor himself tortured and taught how to torture while the New York Times said the advisors were merely present. I have no reason to believe that Antonio fabricated the story he told us.

The following is a slightly edited transcript of Antonio's story which was simultaneously translated into English.

My profession is repairing watches. In El Salvador I was summoned to report to the barracks. At the same time, my brother was involved with the guerrilla struggle. Before I entered the military, my brother was a guerrilla fighter. He asked me many times, why did I not incorporate into the guerrilla struggle, for the people? I said, "No, I didn't like those sorts of things." A few months later I got a summons from the army that I had to report in February to the barracks. I did not answer the summons in February, was summoned again, and finally had to go in December of 1980. So I went and presented myself.

After we were there, they taught us how to handle rifles, different types of formations, and working the streets. They brought us out to the different towns to carry out searches. After a month, they taught us a course in anti-guerrilla warfare. Many of my friends went on a course in Panama, but I didn't go. After they returned, there was another course that I took which was for paratroopers. After that course, they taught us a lot of tactics - advancing, retreating, military tactics. After that they gave us camouflage uniforms and boots that came from the U.S. Then they gave us classes about the war in Vietnam - how we should act on the battlefield. What they told us was that we shouldn't have mercy on anyone. Whether it be children or women or men, you have to kill them all.

Many times we would go to the mountains. I saw many things regarding officials, and the officers. They took the young men and women from the houses and brought them to the barracks where they tortured and killed them.

Later we had a welcome for the Green Berets. That day was the day of the soldier. They lined us up in columns. We had an homage for those who had fallen and for those still alive. They got us up for this to greet the Green Berets who came from the U.S. The officers said they would be able to teach us a new tactic. We didn't have any idea what this new tactic was. The first time they brought us to the slopes of a volcano where we went into combat with the guerrilla fighters. The Green Berets didn't go into combat; they were just behind teaching us how to do these things. They would criticize us as to what was good and what was bad. We passed five days on this volcano. There were many who did not return. There were lots of soldiers who were killed.

Six days later we returned to the barracks, and then they began to teach us how to torture. One evening they went and got nine young people that were accused of being guerrillas and brought them to where we were. This was more or less the last time that I had to see the type of torture they carried out against the guerrillas. The first one they brought was a young fellow around 15 or 16 years old.... This young fellow said all sorts of things that they might let him go. The officers said, "We are going to teach you how to mutilate and how to teach a lesson to these guerrillas." The officers who were teaching us this were the American Green Berets. They didn't speak Spanish, so they spoke English and then another officer - Salvadoran - translated it into Spanish for us. They began to torture this young fellow. They took out their knives and stuck them under his fingernails. After they took his fingernails off, then they broke his elbow. Afterwards they gouged out his eyes. Then they took their bayonets and made all sorts of slices in his skin all around his chest, arms and legs. Then they took the hair and skin off his scalp. When they saw there was nothing left to do with him, they threw gasoline on him and burned him. The next day his dead body was found by people in the streets.

The next day they started the same thing with a 13-year old girl. They more or less did the same, but they did other things to her, too. First, she was used, raped by all officers. They stripped her and threw her into a small room, they went in one by one. Afterwards they took her out tied and blindfolded. Then they began the same mutilating - pulling her fingernails out and cutting off her fingers, breaking her arms, gouging out her eyes and all that they did to the other fellow. They cut her legs and stuck an iron rod into her womb. The last one they killed that day suffered more, because they stripped him naked at mid-day. Then they put him on this hot tin and made him lie there - he was like cooking. After about a half an hour, when they finally took him off, he was all covered with blisters - like wounds. They did different types of torture to him. Then they threw him out alive at 14,000 feet from a helicopter. He was alive and tied. They go and they throw them out over the sea.*

This was the last that I saw of the participation of the Green Berets. Twenty-five days after they arrived, they put me into the brig. I was put into jail in the barracks because while I was on guard duty thousands of rounds of munitions disappeared. That was when I began to suffer - from that day on. They tortured me in a somewhat similar manner as the guerrillas. They didn't cut me, but struck lots of blows. They broke my hand, my wrist with kicks - my left leg. They blindfolded me and

*This "interrogation procedure" was practiced by the CIA and Green Berets in Vietnam during the war according to sworn Congressional testimony.

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they threw me into a cell with others who were accused guerrillas. Four days later other guerrillas arrived and were thrown into the cell. (Afterwards I realized that one of the officers was working in coordination with the guerrillas.) I suffered a lot in the barracks and the jail. I never wanted to be a soldier. I never liked fighting, period. After being there for a while and talking with the young people that were there, they convinced me that I should try to escape and try to help them. I asked "How?". Because I was unarmed and I was in prison just like they were....

Some days later, I don't know how many, I received bad news. I didn't believe it at first. This news that they brought - it was around six o'clock in the afternoon - the news was that they had killed my mother and my father and my brother. A lady told me who was a good friend of my mother. I didn't believe it. I knew she had a son who was a guerrilla fighter; I thought it was a ploy to get me to leave the jail. Afterwards an official came and said, "I am an official, you are just a private." He said, "Have confidence in me and in yourself, that you are going to be able to leave here." I told him, "What is this all about?" He said, "You're the brother of one of the guerrilla fighters." He gave me the name of my brother and I said, "Yes, that was true." He said, "You are going to escape. If they kill you, you'll die fighting, but against the imperialists, not against the people." He told me, "They have killed your mother, your father and two of your brothers." It was a big surprise for me and I felt very angry. That's when I said, "What do I have to do to escape?" He said, "Well, you'll see this evening. We'll let you know. You are not the only one; there will be eight others who will go with you." How was I going to know who the others are who are going with me? He said, "One will bring you a rifle, and if you have to - the sentinel who's guarding you - you will have to take away his rifle and kill him." Since they didn't bring me the rifle, I had to take the rifle away from this other soldier whom I had known - a soldier like me. I didn't kill him as such, but we tied him and put a grenade in his mouth so that if he shouted, he would kill himself. We didn't kill him but one of the other soldiers did.

We left the barracks and it was 7:30 P.M. in the evening.... While we were leaving, we met the guard and he shot at us. He gave the alarm and all the others came after us. Very quickly there were all sorts of soldiers. We began shooting at them, too. We all had hundreds of rounds of ammunition with us, German sub-machine guns, M-16s. Before we got out of the barracks, one of the nine of us was killed. Another one, a corporal, died soon after and another corporal was badly wounded and I also was wounded. They had us pinned down. About 2:00 in the morning we still hadn't been able to escape the barracks. They were shooting at us from land and air. But we finally managed to break through and made our way toward the Department

of Chalatenango. The guerrilla army was awaiting us. They knew that we were deserters. The officer already had communicated, so we weren't in danger really that they were going to kill us. We arrived there on a hill, a mountain; they cured my wounds, bound them and also the corporal. After that we slept there that evening.

The following day was the day that I told them that I couldn't continue staying in the [guerrilla] army. They told me if I wanted I could stay but I didn't have to. I told them no, I didn't want to stay. The others stayed. They brought me to a city, then I went to my home town. I wanted to say goodbye to my sister. I didn't tell her that I had deserted because I didn't want her to be more worried. I told her I had a three-day pass. In those three days I made believe, so she wouldn't be worried but after seeing her, I left the country.

One night at the border of Salvador-Guatemala (the repression was very bad that day), so I went across the border over the mountains. I wasn't able to go through the streets. They would have captured me because all of the barracks had been notified that I had deserted. The people in general didn't know it; it is not convenient for them to say that people have deserted. The following day after we left they said the barracks had been attacked by the guerrillas, but it wasn't the guerrillas; it was us who had the power struggle with the other soldiers.

I arrived in Guatemala, but there I was very much afraid. The Guatemalan army is practically the same thing as the Salvadoran. I was also wounded, and the wound in my leg was bleeding a lot; so I went through Guatemala and finally got to Mexican soil. I was around 15 days in Tapachula. From there I arrived in Mexico City. From Mexico City I ended up in Cuernavaca.

Can you give a better description of the Green Berets?

I don't know their names, but there were eight. The officers knew. There was only one of the eight that could speak Spanish. They were all white.... The eight U.S. Green Berets... dressed themselves the same as any soldier. One of them sort of gave orders, but they did not have any indication of their rank....

Did they do the fingernail pulling?

It was one of the Green Berets doing the teaching. The Green Beret did the torture on the first one and then the others did the torture on the others.

Were drugs given to the Salvadoran army?

What they gave us was marijuana and most of them went into battle drugged with marijuana. The officers said that those who don't want to smoke don't have to. The officers said instead of bringing food, "you can bring this because it gives you the courage to kill," but they only said this for the soldiers. They didn't smoke, they brought food. The helicopters ar-

rived to drop food for the officers, but not for the rank and file.....

Are you aware of U.S. helicopters machine-gunning the campesinos?

Before I deserted, 14 American helicopters arrived, armored helicopters with 50 and 30 caliber machine guns. I went five times out in the battle, they were bombing the houses.

Did they strafe the campesinos in the fields?

They strafed the fields. First, they dropped the bombs and afterwards, since those planes are very fast, they immediately leave. The machine guns fire 1,600 rounds a minute. First they bombed and then they strafed - both the helicopters and the planes strafed.

Counterrevolution in Nicaragua: The U.S. Connection

by Jeff McConnell

In spite of official claims to the contrary, the United States has never had a non-interventionist position toward the Nicaraguan revolution. Since the assassination of newspaper publisher Pedro Chamorro in January 1978, when the revolution became a large-scale insurrection, the U.S. government has viewed developments in Nicaragua as a difficult dilemma that required some kind of U.S. manipulation. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations have tried to influence events in Nicaragua by building up two social groups there: the so-called "private sector" (the bourgeoisie) and the military (that is, the National Guard while it existed, and later, its remnants). What is surprising about these American efforts is not that they have been occurring, but the openness with which they are occurring, compared with the true covertness of similar efforts in the Philippines, in Greece, in Brazil, and in Chile in the years from Truman through Nixon. In Nicaragua, Americans have kept a high profile while trying to manipulate events to suit U.S. government ends. This is a new trend in the history of U.S. intervention.

The Carter-Vance-Brzezinski policy, both before the Sandinista victory and after, was to contain the revolution: to maintain a favorable climate for U.S. business and to keep "radicals" out of power - in short, to block the creation of "another Cuba." The objective was to "foster plu-

ralism," codewords for bolstering two minor sectors of Nicaraguan society: the business sector and the National Guard. Ronald Reagan has continued this policy. He has also expanded it - by renewing U.S. reliance on former National Guard members and increasing U.S. aid to the business sector - into a policy intended to roll-back the revolution. The revelations about CIA involvement reflect the Reagan administration's latest refinements of this rollback policy.

I. CARTER'S POLICY TOWARD THE NICARAGUAN INSURRECTION

Carter's approach to the Sandinista insurrection went through four phases.¹ Initially, in response to growing unrest in Nicaragua in 1977, the U.S. pressured Nicaragua's dictator Anastasio Somoza to lift the state of martial law under which he had governed the country for three years. It also encouraged Somoza to negotiate with the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a centrist coalition of opposition groups.

The administration's strategy was to cut losses - by channeling the new political currents in Nicaragua in ways the U.S.

(An extended version of this article is available after April 10, 1982. Send \$5 to Jeff McConnell, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139.)

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could accept. But President Carter was not ready to abandon Somoza, since there were no guarantees that Somoza's successor would adequately support U.S. aims in the region. U.S. ties were closest to the most pro-American sectors of the FAO: business groups, American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)-established labor unions, and conservative political parties. When even these groups had abandoned Somoza, however, (largely because of his stranglehold on the economy through corruption and his vast wealth) it signalled to Carter that a government centered around Somoza was no longer in America's "national interest."

In January 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of Nicaragua's leading daily La Prensa and an important opposition figure, was assassinated. There were demonstrations and a general strike. The Sandinista guerrillas made their broadest attacks yet against National Guard garrisons. The National Guard responded with savagery. The insurrection had begun.

As the year progressed, all the opposition forces, including some sectors of the Sandinistas, came increasingly to hope that Carter, the "human rights" president, would abandon Somoza. But although he cut back most military aid, Carter released economic aid to Somoza in May 1978. When Carter sent a letter to Somoza in August 1978 praising Somoza's efforts to improve the human rights situation in Nicaragua, the opposition's hope vanished. The guerrillas launched their largest offensive, and the National Guard responded by bombing several Nicaraguan cities into rubble. Thousands of civilians died.

By 1979 it was no longer politically possible for Carter to openly support Somoza. In conjunction with the Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. put together so-called "mediation" talks between Somoza and the FAO, excluding the Sandinistas and their broad-based political fronts. The eventual outcome of these negotiations was envisioned by the U.S. to be a plebiscite, and the replacement of Somoza by a government of private-sector moderates. Somoza rejected the plebiscite in January 1979. When the U.S. responded by proposing a compromise acceptable to Somoza, the FAO walked out.

Still, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Viron Vaky, later wrote that the mediation effort had

a very positive effect, by helping to "strengthen contacts among important moderate sectors of the Nicaraguan polity. It is true that some of the member groups of the FAO quit the organization during the negotiation process, but the fact is that most of them stayed the course. Indeed, the FAO picked up additional support from a broad cross section of the private sector (COSEP) [Superior Council of Private Enterprise, the congress of leading Nicaraguan business organizations; today at the forefront of opposition in Nicaragua and heavily funded through AID] which, while not formally joining the FAO, did provide broad support to their negotiating effort and endorsed the mediators' final proposal with the FAO." Elsewhere Vaky wrote: "Thus the effort in effect catalyzed the moderate opposition elements into a relatively cohesive group capable of functioning."²


In early 1979 the several Sandinista factions united and joined a wide spectrum of Nicaraguan groups to form a very broad political front which approved a political program for a pluralist post-Somoza Nicaragua, and carried out more crippling strikes. The Sandinistas achieved significant military victories in late spring of 1979 as the entire country rose against Somoza. In an OAS meeting in Washington, Cyrus Vance initiated the Carter administration's third strategem for Nicaragua: he proposed that the OAS call for an interim government drawn from all segments of Nicaragua (including the supporters of Somoza) and consider deploying a "peace-keeping" force that would in effect block a Sandinista victory. The OAS rejected Vance's proposal and called for Somoza's ouster and an interim government drawn from the opposition.

By now, the opposition front had formed a provisional government. The Carter administration, in its final gambit, tried to arrange a ceasefire. It proposed that Somoza resign and that a successor picked by the Somoza-dominated National Assembly appoint a group of prominent Nicaraguans to mediate among Somoza's Liberal Party, Somoza's National Guard, and the opposition forces to form an interim government. The opposition rejected this. Then Washington attempted to force the opposition to add more conservatives to the provisional government and to guarantee the survival of the National Guard. In ex-

change, Carter offered Somoza's resignation and threatened to hold back postwar reconstruction assistance. Again, the opposition refused. Finally on July 17, Somoza saw that defeat was inevitable. He resigned and fled to Miami.

II. CARTER'S POLICY DIRECTLY AFTER THE WAR

The high command of the National Guard fled to Miami with Somoza. The National Guard itself disintegrated and its members fled to foreign embassies in Managua, Red Cross centers, Honduras and Costa Rica. Many who did not succeed in finding refuge were arrested. The U.S. government offered political asylum to National Guard officers,³ although Somoza was encouraged to leave the U.S. and did. These officers



were not subjected to criminal proceedings for the hundreds of My Lais in which they had been involved. These same people later set up training camps for counterrevolutionary exiles in Florida in the last months of the Carter administration.

In late 1979 and early 1980, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on Carter's plan to give Nicaragua \$75 million in postwar aid. Several witnesses argued against the plan. One witness was Dr. Cleto DiGiovanni, introduced respectfully as a "special consultant on foreign affairs to the private sector in Central America."⁴ Three months later when his testimony was published, DiGiovanni's biographical sketch indicated that after leaving college, he "served three years with the U.S. Navy in the Special Opera-

tions Group in Viet Nam, then entered the Central Intelligence Agency. With CIA, he served in the Far East, in Europe, and in South America in a variety of operational and managerial assignments, including station chief abroad and clandestine operations chief of one of the geographical divisions at the headquarters level. He left CIA at the end of 1978, and since early 1979 he has spent considerable time in Central America" as consultant.

DiGiovanni testified that he did not think it "realistic to believe that unconditional aid given Nicaragua, even if it should reach... moderate elements, would be used by them in any way not consistent with the goals and traditional orientation of the frente [Nicaragua's ruling body] and its members," which DiGiovanni viewed as Marxist. "Under these circumstances..., why not withdraw aid... rather than provide money to [the government] which would help it solidify its power within the country.... The credibility of anti-Somoza, anti-Communist Nicaraguan exile forces seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government has yet to be established. What could happen in the foreseeable future is that the population within the country, without outside intervention, becomes disenchanted with its government's policies, and we should be prepared to take advantage of that situation should it occur."

But DiGiovanni's recommendations were not immediately followed by the U.S. After intense White House lobbying, Congress eventually followed the line advocated by Viron Vaky.⁵ Vaky argued that aid was the best leverage available to the U.S. for keeping Nicaragua nonaligned, "pluralistic" and "moderate." He testified that the assistance "will go a long way toward strengthening the survival, and the capacity to operate, of elements which can contribute to pluralism. That is, the private sector.... If we do not participate and assist those elements, such as the private sector, such as many of the moderate democratic elements in the government itself ..., we will abandon the field to other nations, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union...."

The administration was not yet proposing direct subsidies of those private sector organizations, such as COSEP, with direct political objectives, but instead was allocating 60 percent of its loan money for use by the Nicaraguan government through

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private companies rather than public agencies. Moreover, at this point private sector organizations still exercised restraint in criticizing the government and were still part of the government. To assure the committee, the administration stated it had privileged information of exchanges between COSEP and the Nicaraguan government, probably obtained from COSEP contacts, in which COSEP voiced concerns and which were said to have been "frank and [have] covered a wide variety of subjects, both of a political and economic nature."⁶

Agency for International Development (AID) documents repeat Vaky's themes. The "U.S. interests" in offering the \$75 million reconstruction package to Nicaragua were put this way: "Nicaragua's Government of National Reconstruction faces enormous problems as it attempts to rebuild and restructure its shattered economy. U.S. assistance can accelerate reconstruction, bolster moderate economic policies, and help to create a positive relationship with the new Government."⁷ The package consisted of \$70 million in long-term, low-interest loans, and a \$5 million grant. The AID director for Nicaragua testified that over 60 percent, or about \$45 million, would be "made available to private sector enterprises for the purposes of importing equipment, raw materials, farm machinery, and so forth from the United States" - that is, as export subsidies to U.S. companies. The remaining loan money would be channeled by the Central Bank into various construction and agricultural projects throughout the country."⁸

Even more interesting, though, is the \$5 million grant, about which little has been said publicly. The allocations from this \$5 million grant appear in Table I. The scholarships under category 6 were administered under the LASPAU program. Prior to this, LASPAU funding had come entirely out of regional funds. AID used an ongoing program in this case to create a special program for Nicaragua. Notice also the "operational program grants" under category 2. The money for "agricultural cooperatives" was intended to offer "technical and financial assistance... [to] benefit 96,000 small farmer cooperative members." Of particular importance is the \$300,000 grant to the Social Action Committee of the Moravian Church (headquartered in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania) which would

"reach some 40,000 low-income people in the Atlantic zone" - that is, Miskito Indians. These points will gain importance when compared with later AID grants.

The final part of the AID package was a "publicity campaign." "Extensive publicity will be given to the program loan and the activities it will finance. In addition to television, radio, and press coverage of the basic loan agreement, there will be similar coverage of sub-agreement signings. Forms and contracts used in the various programs will identify the U.S. Government as the source of the funds.

THE \$5 MILLION GRANT

The \$5 million grant will finance:

1. Agricultural technical assistance (title XII).....	\$1,500,000
2. Operational program grants for private and voluntary agencies..	1,400,000
a. Rivas Agricultural School (CARE).....	(440,000)
b. Agricultural cooperatives:	
(Moravian Church).....	(300,000)
(CARE).....	(285,000)
(Technoserve).....	(210,000)
c. Preschool education: (CEPAD—Church World Services).....	(180,000)
d. Salvation Army activities.....	(85,000)
3. Technical assistance in municipal development.....	1,000,000
4. Technical assistance fund to finance U.S. experts.....	500,000
5. Assistance to the Central American Institute of Business Administration (INCAE).....	300,000
6. Scholarships for poor students at the American School.....	300,000
Total	5,000,000

- Table 1 -

Signs will be placed at all construction activities identifying the project as U.S.-financed. And plaques will be affixed to public buildings (e.g., the agricultural school.)"⁹

III. NICARAGUA RECOVERY PROGRAM II: A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY

By November 1980, when AID's Congressional presentation for fiscal year 1982 was written, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua had undergone a marked shift. Aid to the private sector was now to become more focused. And its aim was no longer simply companies but also business organizations. The "U.S. strategy and interests" for Nicaragua was now put this way: The principal U.S. interest "is the evolution of a pluralistic society with a mixed economy, not hostile to the United States.... The AID strategy is to assist in establishing the economic framework within which Nicaragua's forces of moderation can operate and prosper.... The program also supports the private sector, which is the strongest force of democratic pluralism in Nicaragua, activities of other private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) and people-to-

people projects which strengthen contacts between the United States and Nicaragua."¹⁰

According to the document, the FY1980 AID program, detailed in Section II and at the time just being completed, "concentrated on the recovery of the economy through support of both private and public sector organizations (including PVOs) which encouraged political and economic moderation.... The \$5 million grant for the Nicaraguan Recovery Program I... provides support to private sector organizations for cooperative development, agricultural institutional development, scholarships for low-income students, and technical assistance and training." AID was "continuing its strategy initiated by FY1980" for the next fiscal year, but placing "a greater emphasis on support to key private sector organizations."

The new \$7.5 million Nicaragua Recovery Program II grant planned for FY1981 was designed to "strengthen private sector organizations by funding technical assistance to the confederation of business associations [COSEP] and its member organizations, lending capital to the independent cooperative association (FUNDE), assisting Red Cross and church community development projects, supporting independent labor unions through the American Institute for Free Labor Development, reinforcing the Central American Business School (INCAE), and funding U.S. professional exchange activities [LASPAU]...." It is important to note that AIFLD, like LASPAU, was an ongoing program under the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Program. These new funds under Nicaragua Recovery Program II were funds targeted toward Nicaragua over and above the traditional share of AIFLD money going to Nicaragua.

IV. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Carter administration planners were certainly aware that many organizations they were targeting for assistance were now political organizations - not simply organizations with business interests. After all, U.S. officials had been in contact with COSEP for well over a year, and the Managua embassy had been substantially upgraded. Ambassador Pezullo's testimony in Congress revealed detailed knowledge of Nicaraguan organizations and trends.

The Reagan administration quickly became aware of this fact. Although Reagan had

called for a cutoff of aid to Nicaragua during his campaign, when the new administration did suspend assistance several days after assuming office, it spared the \$7.5 million grant program. No better testimony of its importance could have been made than that of Alfonso Robelo, a business executive and leader of the Nicaraguan opposition party, MDN, in a Caracas speech on January 25, 1981. "The U.S. government," he said, "should continue trying to aid the Nicaraguan people, and should be creative in looking for channels parallel to the Sandinista government, such as cooperatives and other private sector groups."¹¹

Reagan's position paper during the Presidential campaign called the Nicaraguan government a "totalitarian Marxist regime." Clearly, Reagan and his advisors did not see themselves as "containing" the revolution by continuing the grant money but rather by rolling it back. In fact, officials of several of the organizations that have received U.S. money were taken into custody by Nicaraguan security forces in late 1980 and charged with plotting to overthrow the government.

Reagan's program quickly came to have three facets. Underlying the economic facet of cutting off loans to the government, and blocking loans from international lending institutions of which the U.S. was a part, was the rationale that Nicaragua supported "terrorism" in El Salvador and was thus not eligible for U.S. economic aid under the law. The military facet of the program consisted in ignoring the camps in Florida and, later, California in which Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries were being trained. There were also reports that administration officials made contact with counterrevolutionaries based in Honduras. The political facet was to bring new faces and much money to the U.S. embassy in Managua to bolster America's friends in Nicaragua.

V. OUR MEN IN NICARAGUA

Much as the U.S. embassy in Tehran became an important hub for espionage against the new government after the Iranian revolution, so the Managua embassy took on a new importance after the Nicaraguan revolution. In the rating of embassy assignments by the State Department, the Managua embassy went from lowest to highest. The CIA moved a large number of officers into the

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embassy, and the fact that the Subcommittee on Evaluation of the House Intelligence Committee has had an ongoing study of intelligence on Nicaragua since late 1978 reveals a high level of U.S. concern.¹²

The AID grant money is distributed out of the Managua embassy. It is useful to look at five recipients.

- FUNDE, the independent association of cooperatives in Nicaragua, receives "operational support." U.S. officials hope the money to FUNDE will offset the power of the Sandinista organization of cooperatives.

- COSEP also receives "operational support." It is unknown how these funds are used. In November 1980, the Vice President of COSEP, George Salazar, was killed by security officials when he resisted arrest for involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the government. In late 1981, four top officials of COSEP were arrested for agitating and violating civil emergency laws when they accused the government of adhering to "a plan to transform this revolution into a Marxist-Leninist adventure" and of "preparing a new genocide," even though 60 percent of the economy remains private and 80 percent of foreign credit and exchange goes into private hands.¹³ They were released in early February 1982. Nicaraguan government officials regard COSEP as counterrevolutionary. Yet as it represents Nicaragua's business community, they need its cooperation in rebuilding Nicaragua. An official at the U.S. embassy in Managua says that "COSEP is the internal bellwether for our policy. Its survival is key to our role here."

- The Chamber of Industry is another business organization which receives AID "operational support." Then-vice president Leonardo Somarriba was implicated in the plot broken up in November 1980.

- AIFLD has represented the AFL-CIO in Nicaragua since 1965. Most of its funds have come from AID, about \$1.6 million between 1965 and 1979; \$824,000 of that between 1973 and 1979.¹⁴ AIFLD was involved in setting up both the Confederation of Labor Unification (CUS) and the National Confederation of Labor (CTN), both of which received AIFLD money before and after the war. Both have taken public positions against government policy. More importantly, they are alternatives to the unions organized by the Sandinistas among

urban and rural workers, which are by far the strongest in the country. U.S.-sponsored unions clashed head-to-head with Sandinista unions in many council elections and thus represent a source of non-government power. In late 1981, Richard Martinez, who once organized Brazilian workers in preparation for the 1964 CIA coup there, identified an AIFLD representative in Nicaragua as a "conscious CIA agent."¹⁵ He also found the activities of AIFLD and the unions it sponsors to be similar to activities he had organized in Brazil.¹⁶ Thereafter the Nicaraguans refused to renew the visa of the AIFLD representative, and now AIFLD and the AFL-CIO are gradually pulling out of Nicaragua.

- The Wisconsin Partners is described as a health and educational program of the Social Action Committee of the Moravian Church with the Miskito Indians in eastern Nicaragua. The Social Action Committee has received AID money for this program since 1980. A clergyman arrested for aiding some Miskitos and Somocistas in insurgent activities testified that he had obtained money for arms and supplies from the Social Action Committee. The U.S. embassy maintains close contacts with these Americans in the isolated Atlantic coastal region.

VI. MILITARY PRESSURES IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1981

In addition to the ongoing political operations, the military pressures continued, now disguised as diplomatic negotiations. In mid-August 1981, the State Department's chief of Latin American affairs, Thomas Enders, proposed in Managua that the U.S. and Nicaragua hold discussions to overcome differences. According to the Washington Post, the Reagan administration asked that the Sandinistas stop funneling arms to the guerrillas in El Salvador; that the size of the Nicaraguan army be expanded no further than the 15,000 to 17,000 troops that the Sandinistas officially acknowledged to be in uniform, and that Nicaragua stop importing heavy weapons from Cuba and the Soviet Union and permit some international body to verify this.

In return the U.S. made two offers. First, the administration would enter into a non-aggression pact with Nicaragua. Second, it would close down the camps in

Florida where Nicaraguan exiles were training to overthrow the Sandinistas.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. offers were not well-received. The Sandinistas responded that the U.S. was merely offering to do what it ought already to be doing: to refrain from attacking Nicaragua and to close down the training camps. The Sandinistas themselves unilaterally pledged not to attack the U.S., independently of any pact. They pointed out the administration's past public statements that it did not have jurisdiction over the training camps under U.S. laws. Either it did or it did not, and if it did, it should enforce the laws.

The Nicaraguan government further stated that what equipment Nicaragua was receiving and what efforts were being undertaken to expand its army and militia were necessary to protect the revolution from the United States, from Nicaragua's Central American neighbors, and from the former National Guard members in Honduras. Moreover, the U.S. was told that Nicaragua was not helping the guerrillas in El Salvador militarily, although it was Nicaragua's duty to aid the revolution in ways short of military aid.

Finally, in responding to the U.S., the Sandinistas listed several complaints: that the U.S. was joining Honduras in naval maneuvers to practice intercepting arms coming into Central America for Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas; that the columnists Evans and Novak had been fed the lie that 600 Cuban soldiers had arrived in Nicaragua; that the State Department had not repudiated the lie; and that the Reagan administration opposed the Nicaraguan proposal for a negotiated settlement of the Salvadoran conflict.

VII. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS

Secretary of State Alexander Haig took these Sandinista responses of late October 1981 to be a rejection of the U.S. proposals and revived public attacks by accusing Nicaragua of renewing its support for the guerrillas in El Salvador. The Nicaraguan government responded that the U.S. administration was inventing the evidence and doing so to justify American military intervention in El Salvador. About a week later, Haig spoke publicly for the first time about mounting evidence of the "to-

talitarian character of the Sandinista regime." Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in late November, Haig refused to rule out a military blockade of Nicaragua or assistance to Nicaraguan exiles trying to overthrow the Sandinistas.

Haig's remarks were carefully orchestrated and immediately followed the first decision by the National Security Council (NSC) in mid-November to implement a large-scale program to deal with opposition to U.S. policies in the "Caribbean Basin." The program included increased subversive operations inside Nicaragua, support for paramilitary operations against the Sandinistas from the outside, economic pressures, military threats, contingency planning for military intervention, increased intelligence activity, propaganda efforts,



more military aid to El Salvador and more pressures on Cuba, and joint planning with America's friends in Latin America.

The Reagan administration had already canceled direct loans to Nicaragua, but even greater economic pressures were possible. The U.S. could oppose loans and debt renegotiations for Nicaragua by international lending bodies. Nicaragua reportedly received several hundred million dollars in such loans during Carter's last year and renegotiated a debt of about \$490 million. The Reagan administration has already attempted to block several multilateral loans to Nicaragua. It is also known to have considered certain trade sanctions against Nicaragua.

A number of direct U.S. military mea-

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asures have been approved. The Pentagon reportedly began contingency planning against Nicaragua in August and has been ordered to continue.¹⁸ These plans are said to involve naval blockades to stop arms shipments to Nicaragua or to strangle its economy. In addition to the maneuvers with Honduras, in November the U.S. and other NATO countries held large Caribbean maneuvers codenamed READEX-1 as a warning to Nicaragua and Cuba.¹⁹ Haig continues to refuse to rule out direct military actions against Nicaragua, although it is generally acknowledged that actions like blockades would be ineffective. More maneuvers like READEX-1 are planned.

To make more intelligence activity possible, it was reported in mid-February that CIA stations in the region have been increased in strength "in recent weeks."²⁰ Aerial reconnaissance was increased. The destroyer Deyo carrying surveillance equipment was deployed off the western coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador in November and has since been replaced by another such ship.²¹ The Pentagon is planning to reopen the Naval Air Station in Key West, Florida, as a command center for intelligence gathering in the Caribbean Basin,²² and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has been secretly negotiating with the governments of Honduras and Colombia to establish U.S. bases there for use in "regional emergencies."²³

Propaganda efforts were approved to create a perception in the U.S. of a threat from Nicaragua to the rest of Central America. To this end, the State Department has released "facts and figures," said to have been classified to bolster Haig's accusations about growing "militarization" in Nicaragua.²⁴ A campaign of "disinformation" was also reportedly approved by the NSC.²⁵ Accusations that the Sandinistas are aiding the rebels in El Salvador may be part of this campaign.

The Nicaragua decisions are thought, apart from their long-term aims of making Nicaragua more amenable to U.S. policies, to have the important short-term aim of assisting the increasingly unsuccessful U.S. policy in El Salvador. American planners probably hope that intimidating Nicaragua, and perhaps gaining some concessions, will demoralize the guerrillas in El Salvador. The elections there, not surprisingly, are said to be jeopardized by the on-going war, and the CIA has informed

Reagan that the Salvadoran government cannot win without outside troops.

Argentina and the U.S. are reportedly training Salvadoran soldiers in "infiltration" techniques that sound a bit like Operation Phoenix techniques of the Vietnam war.²⁶ And although Leopoldo Galtieri, Argentina's new president, has denied that he made any offers, El Salvador's Defense Minister Garcia has stated that he would accept Argentine troops in El Salvador.²⁷ It has been reliably reported that Galtieri made the offer to traveling ambassador Gen. Vernon Walters, former deputy director of the CIA in September.²⁸

Another joint effort being pushed by the U.S. is the creation of the "Central American Democratic Community," consisting now of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador, which Nicaraguans and many other observers believe will take on a military character. Venezuela, Colombia and the U.S. have become observer members. It is reported that Guatemala will be asked to join soon.²⁹ Already there have been joint meetings of military representatives from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador that indicate coordinated military planning. The U.S. is reportedly backing these meetings.³⁰

VIII. CONSTANTINE MENGES AND COVERT POLITICAL OPERATIONS

According to the Washington Post, the CIA has proposed "a secret \$19 million plan to build a broad political opposition to the Sandinista rule in Managua, and to create 'action teams' for paramilitary and political operations and intelligence gathering in Nicaragua and elsewhere."³¹ Just several weeks after the first NSC decisions, the Boston Globe reported that the NSC had decided to "press covert action in Nicaragua and El Salvador to infiltrate hostile elements both to gain intelligence and try to destabilize" the Sandinista government and Salvadoran insurgent forces. The Washington Post did not know if the CIA proposal had been implemented but noted that U.S.-backed paramilitary operations along the Honduran border had reportedly begun.

Outside the evidence of the AID grant program discussed above, very little is known about what specifically this \$19 million would be used for. Neither is it clear where AID would stop and the CIA would step in. The CIA figure, however, is nearly three times the size of the Nicara-

gua Recovery Program II and nearly twice the \$10 million Nicaragua Recovery Program III. This \$10 million program appears to have been partially implemented. Sources at AID report that \$2.4 million of the FY1982 budget has been spent as of February 1982. They say that no public documents exist on these latest AID efforts as the program is "in constant flux."

The Globe reported that while "no one will talk about the details of the covert activities, it was pointed out that one of the lessons of Vietnam was that the Viet Cong thoroughly infiltrated the South Vietnamese government and armed forces and were able to exploit their inside knowledge and positions to considerable advantage." The Post stated: "As reportedly contemplated by the CIA, non-Americans would be used for the most part in implementation of its plan, but the possible use of American personnel to undertake unilateral paramilitary actions against some unspecified 'special Cuban targets' also was envisaged."³² Baltadano, in his public confession of anti-government plotting (see box), claimed to have met with Reagan advisors while preparing the plot.

Perhaps playing a key role in the CIA plan is Constantine Menges who, according to a public relations officer at CIA headquarters, is the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America at the CIA and formerly of the Hudson Institute.³³ In 1981 he wrote, citing the "lessons of Portugal," that there is "an urgent need for a program of increased support for the genuine democratic groups in Nicaragua,"³⁴ and that throughout Central America there is "a need to work with transnational groups such as parties, trade unions, civic, business, and religious organizations to strengthen those genuinely democratic and moderate forces which exist within each country."³⁵

Menges claimed that although "the Communist and radical left groups have made a hidden but nevertheless intense effort" to consolidate power in the Sandinista ruling council, "the much more loosely organized democratic groups represented by various independent political parties, non-Communist business and labor associations, most of the Catholic Church, and most of the population have been steadily weakened by a strategy of ambiguous but unremitting harassment and persecution. As a result, Nicaragua today is nearly under the con-

trol of the Communist groups."

"After the revolutionary victory in July 1979," Menges wrote, the "obvious next question was whether the Cuban-supported Marxist-Leninist groups or the genuinely democratic forces would prevail in Nicaragua." Menges derides Mexico and social democrats for ignoring their "revolutionary experiences." "Many Latin American social democrats also shared in the 'Cuban mistake:' endorsing Castro without establishing a separate power base... and many European social democrats... would have cause to remember... the Portuguese experience. There, following the 1974 revolution which ended the five-decades long Salazar/Caetano regime, the Communist Party with strong covert Soviet support moved quickly to dominate most government organizations, trade unions, and communications, and seemed to be heading inexorably toward dictatorial power. Only the failure of a Communist coup attempt in 1975 and a concerted effort by democratic parties and governments in Europe to help both the Christian Democrats and the social democrats and oppose the Communists resulted in the free elections of 1976 and the functioning democracy that Portugal has today." Paying heed to their "revolutionary experiences" would have meant, "in Nicaragua, an effort on the part of Mexico and the social-democratic parties to strengthen the genuinely democratic groups and to prevent the covert Cuban strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist groups."

"This did not happen," Menges concluded. But the U.S. appears willing to put its hand in the pie if Mexico and the social democrats do not. Importantly, Menges neglects to mention the rightwing political domination in present-day Portugal. Nor does he mention the crucial role that Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, played in rolling back the Portuguese revolution.

IX. U.S. BACKING FOR PARAMILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NICARAGUA

In mid-December, the Reagan administration reportedly informed Congress that the CIA was involved in paramilitary covert action aimed at Nicaragua. The U.S. was also providing assistance to Argentine advisors, perhaps fifty of them, working with the Somocista counterrevolutionaries in Honduras.³⁶ About this time attacks on Sandin-

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ista positions escalated dramatically. Exile leaders in Honduras told reporters that "the war against Nicaragua has begun."³⁷ A number of sources indicate that the Somocistas are being aided by the Honduran military, which has essentially regained power in Honduras despite the recent cosmetic election there in which civilians were elected to government offices.³⁸ Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto alleged that the U.S. was arming 6,000 Somocistas in twenty camps in collusion with Honduras, Guatemala and Argentina.

About this same time, a possible scenario for a naval blockade was reported. Contingency plans were said to have been drawn up to support Somocista attackers in Honduras and Costa Rica. If they succeeded in controlling a small piece of territory, the U.S. could set up a blockade around Nicaragua in conjunction with other Latin American nations to "prevent foreign interference." White House officials pre-

dicted this would be possible within several months. "Senior intelligence sources" were said to expect support from Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. One official reported that "Venezuela would like to see the government of Nicaragua removed. Venezuela already is supporting a [rebel] group in Costa Rica."³⁹

X. STEADMAN FAGOTH AND THE MISKITO INDIANS

The Indians of eastern Nicaragua have traditionally been isolated from the rest of the society. The Sandinistas tried to impose central authority on the east, upgraded their military presence, and brought Cuban doctors, teachers and soldiers into the area. These measures created much hostility. Relations with the central government plunged when it was disclosed that the Indians' representative on the national governing council, Steadman Fagoth, had been an informer for Somoza and he was arrested. He was released after

Terrorist Attacks

Counterrevolutionary groups failed in an attempt to blow up a Nicaraguan jetliner, and a sabotage plot directed against key industrial plants was exposed by State Security during December and January. Meanwhile, attacks by armed bands in remote regions along the Honduran border cost the lives of more than 20 Nicaraguans and nearly 30 soldiers are missing in action.

A timebomb exploded under a seat in an AeroNica 727 jet blowing a two foot hole in the fuselage while the plane was sitting on the ground in Mexico City on December 12, 1981. The captain and two flight attendants were injured. The plane had been delayed, and had the bomb exploded in flight a crash with more than 100 persons aboard would have been a near certainty. [A second bombing at Managua airport in late February 1982 killed three people and injured four others.]

After investigations by Nicaraguan and Mexican authorities, Nicaragua's security chief, Lenin Cerna, declared that the bombers were connected with the Cuban exile group CORU, also responsible for the

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sabotage of a Cuban plane in 1976 costing 73 lives.

In a live TV presentation on January 12, Cerna and Interior Minister Tomas Borge showed the local and foreign press the evidence of a plot to blow up Nicaragua's only oil refinery and cement works. The leader of the team aimed at the cement works, William Baltodano, a Nicaraguan civil engineering student, told how he had crisscrossed the Americas seeking support for his organization, the Nicaraguan Democratic Union - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Nicaragua (UDN-FARN). In one trip to the U.S., he and his brothers, Fernando and Edmundo Chamorro Rappacholli, held press conferences in Miami announcing their intent to fight against the Nicaraguan government. In Washington, they had meetings with unnamed government officials to explain their intentions. In another trip to Argentina he claimed that after three meetings with high military officers they were given \$50,000. This money and more raised among wealthy exiles in Miami was used to finance the plot and to supply

demonstrations by Indian supporters. The belief that Fagoth thereafter began to plot with Somocista counterrevolutionaries was confirmed when Fagoth was discovered to be among the survivors of the crash last year of a Honduran military plane transporting top Honduran military leaders. The Sandinistas have since charged that Indian groups were joining Somocistas in raids from Honduras. After 26 people were said by the government to have been killed in these raids around the first of the year, Sandinista soldiers began evacuating Indians from the border area, sometimes forcibly.⁴⁰

As has been shown, the Moravian Church project with the Miskitos has been funded through AID. The latest disaster relief plan put out by AID indicates that there are fifty "locals" of the Moravian Church on the Atlantic Coast. Not surprisingly, former U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezullo stated: "We have very close communication with our people over

there."⁴¹

Nicaraguan officials have charged that Moravian Church leaders were working with Fagoth, Somocistas, Honduran officer Major Leonel Luque Jimenez and unnamed Argentine officers, to foment an uprising and declare independence for the eastern part of Nicaragua.⁴² Ten clergymen had been arrested or were being sought in mid-February 1982. Vice Interior Minister Rene Rivas stated: "The Moravian Church, as a church, was involved in counterrevolutionary action. The pastors persuaded the young people to go over into the [training] camps, preaching a primitive brand of anticommunism."⁴³ As stated above, the Social Action Committee, funded by AID, was used by these clergymen as a source of money for the insurgency.

Fagoth reportedly sought contact with U.S. officials in Miami and Washington immediately upon being released from jail in early 1981. It is not known what contacts took place. However, in "recent

military training camps for UDN-FARN in Honduras.

Upon entering Nicaragua in early January with a Honduran passport supplied by a Honduran military officer, Baltodano was spotted by Nicaraguan security who followed him for several days before arresting him and other members of the plot. Timing devices, arms and 312 sticks of dynamite were captured and in following days 14 were arrested.

The most alarming aspect of the plot was the cooperation of four diplomats - three Venezuelans and one Salvadoran - in the conspiracy. According to Baltodano, the plot was planned in the Salvadoran consulate in Costa Rica. In Nicaragua, it was coordinated with the Venezuelan military attache and two other diplomats. Further testimony about this was given by Julio Gonzalles Ferron, a Spaniard with Venezuelan citizenship who owns a Managua pickle factory. A videotaped confession of his participation was shown and a search of his house turned up fake rubber stamps for altering passports and an ID card naming him as a member of Venezuelan military intelligence.

Borge said he was sure that the government of Venezuela had nothing to do with the plot and felt that the CIA had to be behind something like this. The foreign minister flew to Venezuela to confer with

President Herrera Campins. Relations with Venezuela are very important to Nicaragua both for inexpensive oil and for political support against U.S. intervention. Venezuela supports the Salvadoran junta and opposition parties in Nicaragua but has opposed U.S. attempts to isolate Nicaragua. Incidents like this could be used to divide the two nations.

A rising number of attacks by counter-revolutionary groups along the Honduran border has resulted in many deaths and growing tensions in border areas. The worst hit area was the remote northeastern region inhabited by indigenous Miskitos. A military post was overrun before Christmas leaving seven soldiers dead and 27 missing. Health workers, teachers, and grain buying agents have been targeted too, in an apparent effort to terrorize anyone cooperating with the government.

The Sandinista response is to increase the number of troops in border areas and encourage factory workers to watch over their plants. Borge warned Nicaragua's enemies, "we are sleeping with one eye open." A Christmas amnesty for 540 of the 4,000 ex-National Guardsmen serving jail terms was cancelled after others that had been previously pardoned were implicated in the increasingly frequent counter-revolutionary moves.

- by Larry Boyd, via APIA -
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weeks several United States military officers stationed [in Honduras] have visited the Honduran Army command post in Puerto Lempira [where exile groups provided paramilitary training for Miskitos], while the local United States mission [in Honduras] appears to have established direct contact with Mr. Fagoth and other anti-Sandinista leaders."⁴⁴

Fagoth came to Washington on February 22, 1982 to speak with the press and the government. His trip was sponsored by the American Security Council, but his schedule was handled by the State Department. He was introduced at an American Security Council briefing by an aide to U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick. In his appearances Fagoth falsely charged that the Sandinistas are guilty of genocide, had set up concentration camps, and had carried out massacres and other atrocities against the Miskitos. In response to questions about his spying for Somoza and being on the Honduran military aircraft, he demanded proof that he had done these things. He claimed to be involved in a political and not a military struggle. When asked why then he had in a January 1, 1982 radio address over Radio 15 September (a clandestine radio station operated for Miskitos from Honduras) praised those who had in 1981 died "fulfilling a noble mission for the liberation of our fatherland" and had vowed that 1982 would be the year of liberation, he denied having made the address. However, the speech was translated and printed in the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.⁴⁵ Fagoth later repeated his charges to a U.S. Congressional committee.

"Sandinista repression of the Miskitos" is now a recurring theme in U.S. government statements about Nicaragua. President Reagan used it in his February 1982 speech to the OAS; Jeane Kirkpatrick told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March that the Sandinista "assault" on the Miskitos is "more massive than any other human rights violation that I'm aware of in Central America today," and assured the Senators that Somoza, even though a "perfectly clear cut dictator" was less repressive than the Sandinistas. Secretary of State Haig cited a photograph of burning bodies published in the rightwing French Le Figaro as evidence of "atrocious genocidal actions" against the Miskitos. The photo was captioned "The massacre of

fiercely anti-Castro Miskito Indians... last December." Steadman Fagoth had used the same photograph in his Washington press conferences. However, as it turns out, in reality the photo was taken in 1978, when Somoza was still in power, and depicts Red Cross workers burning bodies of war dead as a hygienic measure. Figaro editor Henri-Christian Giraud later acknowledged that the caption under the photograph had been a "deplorable mistake."

An American Indian Movement (AIM) delegation which visited the Miskito region in late 1981 publicly supports the relocation of the Miskitos away from the border area, for their own safety. This is the first time that AIM has endorsed the relocation of an indigenous people. AIM charges that the real danger to the Miskitos comes from the U.S. government which wants to use the Miskitos in its war against Nicaragua, as the CIA used the Hmong tribe to fight the U.S. war in Laos.⁴⁶

XI. THE WAR WILL GO ON

Nicaragua should be prepared for a long fight. For the stakes are quite high for the Reagan administration, should it give in. As a "senior State Department policy maker" explained: "We're on a collision course.... If we do nothing there will be another communist regime in this hemisphere and they [the Republicans] won't be reelected. If we do something it undoubtedly will cause a negative public reaction, particularly among liberals in this country who are still suffering from the post-Vietnam syndrome."

"The administration is going to have to face up to a fundamental decision in the next six months: whether to allow Nicaragua to consolidate its Marxist-Leninist regime, which already has become a base for subverting the whole hemisphere, or act to stop it."

FOOTNOTES:

1) See Richard Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua: The End of the Affair," Foreign Policy, Fall 79, pp.178-191; Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, 1979, pp.283-296. William LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?," Foreign Affairs, Fall 79, pp.28-50.

2) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Foreign Policy Toward Nicaragua, June 79, pp. 59, 73.

- 3) New York Times (NYT), 7/1/80.
- 4) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assessment of Conditions in Central America, 5/20/80, pp.77-89, see CounterSpy, vol.5 no.2, pp.54-55.
- 5) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Central American Economic Assistance, 11/27/79, pp.43-44, 50.
- 6) Ibid., p.62.
- 7) AID Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1981, p.260.
- 8) cf supra, #5, p.30.
- 9) Ibid., pp.32-33.
- 10) AID Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1982, pp.208-210, 218.
- 11) NYT, 1/26/81.
- 12) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of the Presidential Certification of Nicaragua's Connection to Terrorism, 9/30/80, p.16.
- 13) NYT, 11/17/81; 11/30/81.
- 14) cf supra, #5, p.26.
- 15) The Guardian (New York), 12/2/81, p.13.
- 16) "La CIA es Como un Cancer," Sobriana (Managua), Oct. 1981, pp.43-46.
- 17) Washington Post (WP), 12/10/81.
- 18) Miami Herald, 11/26/81.
- 19) Ibid.
- 20) WP, 2/14/82.
- 21) NYT, 2/25/82.
- 22) WP, 2/13/82.
- 23) WP, 3/2/82.
- 24) Boston Globe (BG), 12/4/81.
- 25) New York Post, 2/15/82.
- 26) NYT, 12/2/81.
- 27) NYT, 2/23/82. Los Angeles Times (LAT), 2/18/82.
- 28) The Nation, 1/30/82.
- 29) Latin America Weekly Review (LAWR), 2/5/82, p.7.
- 30) WP, 10/27/81.
- 31) WP, 2/14/82.
- 32) Ibid.
- 33) In a phone interview with the author on 3/1/82; Menges was also identified as a CIA officer in SAIS Review, winter 1981-82, p.229.
- 34) SAIS Review, summer 1981, p.31.
- 35) Commentary, August 1981.
- 36) LAT, 2/5/82.
- 37) The Nation, 1/23/82, p.70.
- 38) LAWR, 2/5/82, p.7.
- 39) San Francisco Examiner, 12/20/81.
- 40) WP, 2/5/82.
- 41) Saul Landau memo on Nicaragua, Institute for Policy Studies, 1/25/82.
- 42) LAWR, 2/12/82, p.12; FBIS, 2/8/82, pp.P8-P11.
- 43) WP, 2/5/82.
- 44) NYT, 2/21/82.
- 45) FBIS, 1/4/82, p.P7.
- 46) "All Things Considered," National Public Radio, 3/4/82.

Resuming the Vietnam War

by John Kelly

El Salvador won't be America's next Vietnam. Vietnam will, if the Vietnam National Salvation Committee (VNSC) has its way.

In recent testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, the VNSC laid out its conspiracy to resume the Vietnam war, which it claims is in accord with the Reagan administration's worldwide "offensive," "roll-back" strategy. Quite simply, the Committee admits that it is aimed at "overthrowing" the Vietnamese government through "psywar [psychological warfare] and armed operations, combined with diplomatic and political (sic) actions abroad."

Taking it upon itself to speak for the U.S. government, the VNSC told the Subcommittee that "it is obvious that the United States can no longer stick to the traditional policy of containment, whereas the front line now passes in Latin America, in

El Salvador i.e. at the doorsteps of the United States. Washington has chosen a resolutely offensive strategy in order to solve the dilemmas of the policy of containment. The roll-back strategy applies above all to the areas which are not covered by the Yalta [Agreement]."

While it is not known whether the U.S. government supports the VNSC, the Committee says that it "looks forward naturally to moral support and material assistance from the great powers of the Asia Pacific area namely China, the U.S., Japan and ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations]...." It is significant that the U.S. Justice Department has not prosecuted the VNSC despite its apparent violation of

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the U.S. Neutrality Act. At a minimum, the Reagan administration's inaction allows the VNSC to use the U.S. as a base of operations.

The Chinese government, according to the VNSC, fully supports resumption of the Vietnam war, and VNSC spokesperson Truong Nhu Tang says he was recently invited to the People's Republic of China (PRC) where he met with Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang and Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Afterwards, the VNSC claimed that "China now has chosen to destabilize pro-Soviet Indochina by arming all anti-Hanoi resistance movements, communist and anti-communist alike, and also separate ethnic minority groups."

Truong Nhu Tang, once a Comptroller General of the Vietnam Industrial and Commercial Bank and former Director General of the National Sugar Factory, testified before the House Subcommittee on October 15, 1981. His submitted written statement was a potpourri of buzz words sure to warm the cockles of the heart of any Reaganite. Referring to Vietnam alternatively as a "new East Germany" and a "new Cuba," Tang asserted baldly that Vietnam "had become an integral and organic part of the Soviet Union" with the will and the means for "exporting the revolution beyond the borders of Indochina." Laos and Cambodia, said Tang, "are thus destined to be absorbed by Vietnam in a kind of Indochina pact, a miniature model and tropical version of the Warsaw pact." A la General Haig, Tang claimed that "Hanoi used toxic gas and chemical weapons to exterminate the Hmuong in Laos." For good measure, Tang threw in a Libya connection and the charge that the Vietnamese-Soviet friendship "directly endangers the commercial and military fleets of the West, chiefly Japan and China (sic)."

The fighting for independence of a country first belongs to the determination and decision of that people, and second depends on foreign assistance.

Truong Nhu Tang

With this philosophy as a preface, Tang told the Subcommittee that the U.S. should "view the supporting of resistance movements in Afghanistan, in Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Laos as the global strategy of the allies fighting against the common

enemies." More specifically, "the U.S. this time should support the opposition and peoples' movements" in Vietnam immediately. For "now is the best time with the greater chance of success for the West."

In the same breath, Tang urged and denied that he was urging the U.S. to become involved in a second Vietnam war. "I am not coming here to urge you to be involved in the new war, but it is a unique way to stop Soviet hegemonists less expensively and most effectively."

A serious contradiction running through Tang's presentation was his contention that Vietnam was no longer a sovereign country because of its alliance with a foreign power, the Soviet Union, and yet, the way to restore Vietnam's sovereignty, he proposed, was through identification with the United States. Ironically, Tang himself observed that "during the war years in Viet Nam, many of us had admired Hanoi's role, independent from the China-Soviet conflict." Now he proffers U.S. assistance to the VNSC's war as a means to keep China allied with the U.S. and away from the Soviet Union which, said Tang, "must be more important than keeping Hanoi from Moscow. The U.S.-China relationship is therefore the decisive factor...." It would thus appear that by its own admission the VNSC's war of independence is directed towards making Vietnam dependent on the United States, and not a war for independence at all.

If the U.S. helps the resistance movement in Vietnam, the Vietnamese will stay in the country to fight for their own independence and liberty; they will not risk their lives to leave the country any more. It is the best and most effective way [to stop the refugee flow]."

A second VNSC witness at the Subcommittee hearing was Doan Van Toai, author of the book, The Vietnamese Gulag. Toai is presently doing research at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts. Like Tang, Toai went to great lengths to present himself and the VNSC as former supporters of the National Liberation Front (NLF) who subsequently "saw the light." Toai wrote about Truong Nhu Tang that "there is no one whose revolutionary credentials are more secure...." About him-

self, Toai wrote: "During the war years, as a Saigon student leader I supported the National Liberation Front (NLF - Viet Cong) and opposed the American intervention in Vietnam.... I was arrested many times by the Thieu regime." Toai asserted further that the "list of former prominent Communist and Viet Cong leaders who have fled [Vietnam] is extensive." He also dismissed descriptions of Vietnamese "dis-sidents" as "CIA lackeys," adding that they "are beyond the charge of CIA complicity."

Toai, who even insinuated that he was a leftist, failed to mention that he was a U.S. agent during the Vietnam war, and that his arrests were staged to establish his leftist credentials - a standard CIA ploy.

In a secret file kept by the Thieu regime - obtained by CounterSpy magazine - Toai's occupation is denoted simply as U.S. agent. Toai first worked in 1966 as a translator for one Terry Rambo of the Social Science Research Project which was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense. On December 25, 1969 he was arrested for participating in a cultural performance entitled "Sing for my People" - which Thieu's police considered anti-war. Within a few days, Toai was released. In a 1979 interview in the Vietnamese newspaper Doan Ket, Huynh Tan Mam claimed that the arrest had been staged.

Throughout this period (1969-70), the secret file reports that Toai was meeting with U.S. political officers (Moore and Collins) in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and it repeats that "the party in question" (Toai) was an agent working for the U.S. government. The file also reveals that Toai met with Nguyen Thien Nhon, special advisor to Thieu's vice president, who extended his "spiritual support" to Toai.

In sum, Toai was an agent for a foreign invader and in that capacity was surreptitiously working against his fellow compatriots and students. Undoubtedly, Toai, as was once recommended by former CIA official, Richard M. Bissell through "indoc-trination," "money," and "training" developed "a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff." In this regard, it is of interest to note Toai's summary of the damage of the Vietnam war. In his submitted written statement, he said it was "a tormenting war

which cost the U.S. 350 thousand casualties, 300 billion dollars and an untold amount in lost pride; a war which marked America's first military defeat, a war whose heroes [emphasis added] have been disdained rather [than] honored by their people, a war that is only now being reassessed." He said not a single word about the damage done to the Vietnamese people and land by the American invaders whom Toai called "heroes."

It is this Doan Van Toai who presents, indeed flaunts, himself as the new champion of Vietnamese independence and who asserts that "both left and right-wing must respect the principle of independence and liberty... [and] must oppose any kind of invasion." At the same time, VNSC's official Position Paper, which reads like it



was written at CIA headquarters, dismissed China's invasion of Vietnam as "the armed lesson of february (sic) 1979."

It is this Doan Van Toai who asked the House Subcommittee: "Why today does the United States not want to spend a very little money in supporting the anti-Communist people? Why today does the U.S. not want to help the Vietnamese who are fighting against the Communists, while in the past many Vietnamese were forced to fight against the Communists by the Americans?"

While it is not known whether or not the Reagan administration is militarily supporting VNSC actions, U.S.-supported mercenary forays have occurred recently in Laos which the VNSC says is "occupied" by Vietnam. One such raid, reportedly organized by the CIA, was carried out by Lao-tian mercenaries who became involved in a firefight. In November 1981, the newly-

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formed Counterterrorist Task Force of the Pentagon, with the apparent knowledge of U.S. Representative Robert K. Dornan (R.-Ca.) provided former Green Beret (U.S. Special Forces) Lieutenant Colonel, James G. Gritz, with \$40,000 and special equipment for two teams of Laotian mercenaries of former CIA agent and Lao Major General, Vang Pao. This operation also involved five other Americans including ex-Green Beret, Vincent W. Arnone, a security consultant from Malden, Massachusetts. The two teams invaded Laos from Thailand on November 15, 1981. It is not known whether or not they are still in Laos. The supposed mission of the raid was to gather intelligence on American prisoners of war allegedly still alive in camps in Laos. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has accused the U.S. of using the POW issue as a "political weapon" against Vietnam. It should also be recalled that CIA-directed paramilitary intelligence forays - as the CIA likes to call them - into North Vietnam in the 1950s helped provoke the first Vietnam war.

Ex-Green Beret Gritz told the Boston Globe that the Counterterrorist Task Force had also planned two more incursions into Laos and into Vietnam on December 10, 1981. As part of the operation, Gritz was to return to active duty "as the Washington, D.C., project officer and front man for the (intelligence group) working Operation Eagle (sic)." If Gritz is correct, this means there was U.S. government support of the raids. On December 9, 1981, CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman was briefed about the pending raids by Gritz whom Inman described as "a colorful guy with a lot of good stories."

According to the Globe, the December 10th raid was cancelled because of apparent bureaucratic infighting between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Counterterrorist Task Force. However, Gritz continues to organize the private efforts he began in 1979 to invade Indochina to supposedly rescue American POWs. In this endeavor, he had been provided with full access to DIA-generated intelligence from U.S. agents, satellites and reconnaissance planes. As we saw, he also has the ear of the CIA. Representative Dornan's comment to the Boston Globe about Gritz' efforts was that: "I think the government should leave no stone unturned in finding out if we still have prisoners

alive over there, and that includes use of the private sector if appropriate."

The Counterterrorist Task Force, for its part, generates its own intelligence and apparently has a virtually free hand to undertake paramilitary actions in conjunction with mercenaries and the so-called private sector. Its ability to engage in provocative, war-like actions was demonstrated by its predecessor group which undertook the military incursion into Iran to "rescue" the American hostages.

More recently, Business Week reported that the "Front Unifie Pour la Lutte des Races Opprimees" (FULRO, Unified Front for the Struggle for Oppressed Races) had initiated military actions in the southern highlands of Vietnam with U.S. arms and weapons from the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese. Reportedly consisting of Jarai, Rhade and Bahnar tribespeople, the FULRO claims to have a clandestine government with Y Chok Nie Krieng as president and Y Drun Nie as foreign minister. These military actions conform to the stated tactics of the Vietnam National Salvation Committee and are the war-like actions the Committee is urging the U.S. government to support.

Lucha

struggle

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Interview with Noam Chomsky

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

The "Intelligence Identities Protection Act," after some delays due to public opposition to the far-reaching provisions of the Act, is approaching a vote in the Senate as we go to press. The Act, as it stands now, will make it a crime to provide information that identifies CIA and FBI agents and officers if one has "reason to believe" that the identification would "impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." (For the full text of the Act, see CounterSpy, vol. 6 no.2).

The following interview with MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) professor and peace activist Noam Chomsky places the Act in a wider context and analyzes its historical roots. The interview was conducted by David Schaller in January 1982.

CounterSpy: How do you view the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in terms of the current political situation: the new cold war?

Noam Chomsky: First of all, speaking rather narrowly and to the most specific point, the bill is a direct attack on the First Amendment. I think there can be no question about that. It aims to penalize free expression, the use of public sources; and if such an act is passed in Congress and holds up in the courts, that in itself will be a very significant step toward the gradual destruction of the system of democratic liberties that is based ultimately on the Bill of Rights. I find it hard to believe that this would hold up in the courts, but we'll see.

More generally, I think the Act should be regarded as a threat, not only to CounterSpy, but to all of the media, and the articulate intelligentsia as a whole. The context to consider is that which developed out of the Vietnam war - the immediate context. During and after the Vietnam

war there was a great deal of outrage among mainstream, elite circles over the fact that the media had, to a very slight extent, deviated from their general subservience to the state ideological system. One should emphasize that this deviation was extremely small; the media, to the very end, continued to accept the basic framework of government propaganda with complete loyalty. So, for example, I've never found a case where anyone in the media, or for that matter in scholarship, has described the American invasion of Vietnam as what it was: American aggression, an American invasion of South Vietnam. It was certainly that in 1962, when the U.S. Air Force began the bombing of South Vietnam, then extending to a full-scale invasion a couple of years later, finally to the rest of Indochina.

In fact to the very end of the war, the media, both in their news reporting and in their editorial comment, accepted the basic framework of government propaganda. Virtually the only question that was raised was the question of tactics: "Can we win or can't we win?" By early 1968, substantial business circles had turned against the war, and had decided that it probably was an enterprise that was no longer worthwhile. Shortly after that, segments of the press also very timidly raised similar questions. That's the extent of the deviation.

On the other hand, there was very good reporting. There are a lot of foreign correspondents who are real professionals, and they just described what they say happening in Vietnam. That was important and significant - and very threatening to people in power.

By the early Seventies, and since, there was a great deal of concern expressed over the fact that the press has a degree of independence, for example, in the Trilateral Commission report on the "Crisis of

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Democracy."* Their description seems to me almost hysterical in its inaccuracy. What they say is that the press has emerged as a new force of national power antagonistic to the state, and that unless the press begins to behave responsibly it will be necessary to find some way to control or constrain it. That's the liberal side of the establishment, that point of view.

To take another case, there was quite a remarkable study, published by Freedom House, a two-volume study written by Peter Braestrup**, who had been a journalist in Vietnam. The purpose of this book was to demonstrate, in effect, that the press had lost the war. The press, by mis-reporting the Tet offensive, had undermined the American war effort. And the question arouse, "What should we do about this? How should we prevent the press from undermining national policy, and from acting as traitors" ... and so on.

The commentary on the book was itself quite interesting. For example, John Roche, who is the Academic Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, wrote an ecstatic commentary. He described the book as one of the major works of scholarship of the past quarter century, and said that it should spark a congressional investigation into the behavior of the press. Even what might be called "critical" reviews regarded it as a credible exposure and indictment of how the press had misinformed the public, and had contributed to undermining American policy.

Well, actually I wrote a long review of the book. Parts of it appeared in MORE, the alternative journalism review [June 1978], and the whole article appeared in Race and Class [vol.XX, No.1, 1978]. I did the obvious thing. There's one volume of analysis and one volume of documents: I compared the analysis with the documents, and the first thing I discovered was that Braestrup had fabricated much of his evi-

* M. Crozier, S. Huntington and J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, New York University Press, 1975.

** Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 2 Volumes, Praeger, 1977.

dence. He claimed that things were said that weren't said. He seriously misrepresented his own documentary evidence, and omitted much relevant evidence. So it's hardly a work of scholarship.

More interesting, however, is the nature of Braestrup's critique of the press. His critique of the press was that it was too pessimistic. That's what the treachery was. In other words, he never considered the question..., in fact it probably didn't occur to him to do so... whether the press did or did not accept the basic premises of government policy. Of course it did. If you read his own documents and relevant documentation that he excluded, what you find is that the press, almost without exception, accepted the assumptions of government policy. When American troops were destroying villages in South Vietnam, for example, the press described that as "defense" of South Vietnam. That's the way it went consistently. So the essence of Braestrup's criticism is that it is not enough for the press to accept government propaganda slavishly, they also have to be optimistic and upbeat about it. That's the criticism.

Well all right, that may be enough in itself, but if we take a step further, we ask: By what criteria was the press too pessimistic? The obvious standard is the internal analyses given by the government - and we know about those. A number of them appear in the Pentagon Papers, for example. If you look at them you discover that the press was more optimistic than the government was itself. The CIA analyses, intelligence analyses, were considerably more pessimistic than the press. The government was putting on a bold face publicly, and the press, as usual, was repeating anything the government said as Gospel truth.

But the government had to be more in touch with the realities of the war?

The press was reacting to the public image presented by the government. They didn't know about the internal image, or, if they did, they suppressed it. So the fact is, the Freedom House criticism, which according to Roche should inspire a congressional investigation, amounted to saying that the media, though completely servile in their acceptance of the framework of government propaganda, were not sufficiently optimistic - even though they

were more optimistic than the government was itself. That's the nature of the criticism.

The fact that an organization like Freedom House, or the liberal press, can regard that as a criticism of the press, shows how constrained and limited is the press' sense of its own independence. I'm now taking the strongest case for the claim that the press was free and independent, the very example selected by the critics to prove their case. And even this case collapsed when we look at the facts of the matter. We find quite a different story.

Still, the fact is that the very small degree of independence that was shown, minimal though it was, was regarded as too much of a threat to established power. Through the 1970s there have been continuing attempts to try to overcome the minimal, limited degree of independence that appeared to be developing.

This has been true not only with regard to the press. It is just a part of a much more general effort to overcome what people now call the "Vietnam syndrome," that is, the fact that large parts of the population escaped from the control of the ideological system - which is very threatening and dangerous. A parallel threat is the "crisis of democracy" - the fact that large parts of the population became politically mobilized and active - which is again quite unacceptable. The liberal wing of the establishment's concept of democracy is that the population must be passive and obedient, occasionally coming forth to vote.

Much of the propaganda effort of the 1970s - including, for example, the Carter "human rights" campaign - has been an attempt to try to overcome these maladies, the "Vietnam syndrome" and the "crisis of democracy," and in particular, to constrain the limited degree of press freedom that did in fact begin to materialize as a result of popular movements in the country.

How does the Intelligence Identities Protection Act fit into that effort?

It is just another step in this process. It simply poses a very clear and explicit threat to free expression, which will be understood by the media, by the intelligentsia, as a warning. If they go too far, then the force of the state will

be used to crush them. This is very consistent with the entire drift of the Reagan administration policy. It is described as "conservative," but that's a gross falsification. There's little that is conservative about Reagan's policy - not his economic policy or his social policy. His economic policies involve a program of considerable expansion of, in effect, the state sector of the economy; namely, the state-guaranteed market for high technology production, which is the Pentagon system. Also corresponding to that are increasing state controls and interference in the lives of individual citizens. It would be more accurate to describe the Reagan administration's policy as proto-fascist, rather than conservative.

Apart from the vindictiveness of picking on CounterSpy, I think that the agent identification act should be understood as a symbolic gesture towards building up the system of state power - which is to coerce, control, and constrain the behavior and expression of private citizens who are not sufficiently obedient to the prevailing system of ideology, or who actually may act through the political system to challenge it, creating a "crisis of democracy."

There are several contradictions in the agent identities bill that I wondered if you would comment on. One is that it defines "covert agent" in such a broad way as to include people in the press, academics, businesspeople, foreigners, etc. So it seems to me that the bill actually formally defines as state operators people who are in, well it used to be called "civil society." In other words, one of the effective ways that people who work for the CIA - through the New York Times or at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] - have operated is to say, "I'm just working on my own as a private citizen. I have no connection with them." By establishing this legal connection, the bill seems to formally extend the state in the way that you are talking about.

I think again there's a much more general context. Business and corporations have a love/hate relationship with the state. And there is a real contradiction there. On the one hand, they don't want a state which is so powerful that it acts as a competitor or constrains their freedom

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of action. On the other hand, they want a state which is powerful enough to repress dissent, to control foreign countries in their interest, and to organize the market. There have always been initiatives within the business community to increase and centralize the powers of the state in their interests, and also to cut down and weaken the state in their interests. There is never any solution to how to deal with this problem, because it is contradictory.

This shows up very clearly among people who call themselves "conservatives." They want a powerful and violent state to use instrumentally. On the other hand, they don't want the state to be engaged in, say social welfare programs. They don't want the state to interfere with their prerogatives and their wealth - but they do want the state to enhance their power. To try to create a state which will meet both these conditions is not very easy, and I think this is a case in point. In a state capitalist society like ours, there is of course no sharp separation between the "state" and "civil society." Infiltration, provocation, control and coercion have long been a part of the relation of the state to the citizens - increasingly so since World War II. And I think that we are facing another step.

The sections of the bill you mention presuppose that the state has the right to infiltrate, and to work secretly within the civil society, the institutions of civil society. At least as I read the bill, it states that, for example, if I discover, in an organization that I'm part of, that there are government infiltrators, it is illegal for me to expose them. I mean, not only is the state allowed to infiltrate and send agent provocateurs into my organization, but I'm not allowed to expose them. This is no small thing.

During the Sixties, a good deal of the violence and provocation that was attributed to the anti-war movement was in fact directly traceable to government agents who were infiltrated into organizations, and ordered to provoke violence. You knew right away that if there was somebody in your organization who was saying, "Let's off the cops," and so on, he's probably going to show up as a government witness in the next trial. And in fact, every serious organization learned how to try to separate out people who were encouraging

violence and irrational action, because there was a very high probability that they would be the government agents. And of course if they could be discovered, they would be exposed. Well, the current legislation makes it illegal to expose them. So they're permitted to interfere with your organizations, and to put you under surveillance, and to work their way into your defense team if you're in a court case, and so on, and you're not allowed to expose them. Now that's a new step, a significant step, towards increasing the power of the state to interfere with, and control political activity. It's another step towards the general "Brazilianization" of American society, which increases the power of the coercive state in the state capitalist mix.

How much importance should we place on analyzing the contradictions or the struggles between different factions within the ruling class? For instance, often it's talked about in terms of the financial capital of the East versus the Sunbelt new industrial capital. Is this bill itself a weapon to be used by the newly dominant faction against...

The Eastern liberals?

Right.

There may be something to that. I think there have been valuable insights from that kind of work, by Carl Oglesby, Mike Klare, Kirkpatrick Sale, and others. On the other hand, I don't think they would push that kind of analysis too far, and I don't think anybody else should either. The interactions and connections between these groups within the ruling class are rather tight, and while one can maybe identify tendencies, and maybe one can discover conflicts on an analytical level, I'm not convinced how much it means with regard to the real problem.

Given the fact that this bill is likely to pass, and given the fact that the bill is written so very arbitrarily, how is it going to affect your work?

This kind of legislation, and the whole system that it represents, will succeed to the extent that people submit to it. Now take the McCarthy period, I mean the so-called "McCarthy period," a very misleading term because it had its origins in the programs of the liberals of the Truman ad-

ministration, but let's refer to it by that name. That was very effective in stilling dissenting opinion and creating a subservient population, and leaving the way free to people with power to exercise it in whatever way, however violently they wished. A large part of its success was due simply to the collapse of the opposition, the unwillingness to face up to it.

Bills of this sort, or what they represent, can only be combatted by popular

movements that are willing to face them directly, to disregard them, to struggle against them, to continue the work of exposure and activism that's necessary. You don't win your rights because somebody writes it down in a law, and you don't lose your rights because somebody writes it down in a law. You win your rights by struggle, and you maintain your rights by struggle.

British Intelligence and Iran

by M. Richard Shaw

Iran has been the target of interference by foreign powers through their intelligence agencies for decades. The ongoing Iranian revolution has made such interference more difficult, but also, from a corporate point of view, more necessary. Western governments are anxiously watching for their chance to turn events in Iran around as they did in 1953. First a reminder from history, and then a look at what might be ahead.

After the close of World War II, in 1946, the Director of Britain's new Joint Intelligence Bureau, Sir Kenneth Strong, visited Washington and had extensive talks with General Eisenhower on plans for intelligence cooperation with the U.S. This was the start of what was to become a "special relationship," which manifested itself in numerous parts of the world, including Iran in the early 1950s.

Iran had become dependent on its wealth of oil, extracted by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Fifty-one percent of AIOC's shares were owned by the British government.³ Between 1915 and 1950, AIOC realized a profit of \$613 million; the Iranian government only \$316 million.² The exploitative nature of such dealings helped fuel a nationalist upsurge in Iran.

In 1951, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, leader of the newly-formed nationalist coalition

party, the National Front, swept into power. As Prime Minister, he immediately presented a bill to the parliament for the nationalization of AIOC. The bill was passed unanimously, and the young Shah, even though he earlier had opposed it, signed it into law. The British government was dumbfounded, and a newspaper predicted: "Mossie Grabs Britain's Oil - But Navy to the Rescue." Secretly, the British government prepared a plan for the invasion of Iran, called Operation Buccaneer. In the meantime, AIOC organized a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil, resulting in serious financial problems for Iran.

Riots broke out, described by Mossadegh as "the natural reaction of the people to generations of looting by the British."³ The British government responded by evacuating all British women and children, and dispatching a parachute regiment to Cyprus. British troops in Iraq went on alert. In September 1952 Mossadegh served notice on all AIOC employees to leave. Iran and instructed Iranian troops to occupy the oil refinery in Abadan. Britain sent in a cruiser, the Mauritius, to join smaller ships off the Iranian coast, with a view of shelling Abadan. By October the British embassy was closed.

Nine months after it had been nationalized, AIOC approached the British government proposing the toppling of Mossadegh

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and oil de-nationalization under an operation codenamed AJAX.⁴ The plan was fully supported by Prime Minister Winston Churchill.⁵ According to CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, when he passed through London in November 1952, he was approached by AIOC and met the spokesperson for the AJAX group, General (later Sir John) Sinclair, the deputy head of MI6 (British intelligence - external). It was explained to Roosevelt that what the AJAX group had in mind was the overthrow of Mossadegh. "They wanted to start immediately."⁶

MI6 officials then journeyed to Washington to urge the adoption of a detailed AJAX plan. In February 1953, a British delegation went to Washington for a series of formal planning meetings which CIA Director Allen Dulles attended. Dulles supported AJAX, and plans were laid to realize AJAX with the British government/intelligence as "the driving force."⁷ When it was time to act, U.S. and British agents were in place in Iran.

- The U.S. still had a military mission attached to the Iranian Army.⁸

- Britain's agents were said to have "very close relations with the palace,"⁹ and AIOC had established communication channels for the CIA and the principal Iranian collaborators of AIOC via MI6 in Cyprus.¹⁰

- The Iranian police force had been the most successful area of infiltration by U.S. agents. Aware of pro-U.S. elements in the police, Mossadegh's newly-appointed police chief, General Ashfar Tus, gave orders to fire them. However, on April 19, 1953 Tus was kidnapped and "killed by an agent on MI6's behalf."¹¹

It was not yet clear whether the Shah would concur with Operation AJAX. British intelligence set up a meeting between U.S. Army Lt. Col. Stephen Meade and the Shah's twin sister Ashraf, who reportedly had great influence over her brother. Meade was to inform her that Roosevelt was about to go to Iran. CIA Director Dulles also visited Ashraf.

U.S. General Norman Schwartzkopf traveled to Iran to see some of his "friends." They included General Hassan Arfa, a bitter opponent of Mossadegh who had a well-trained private army on his estate in Larak outside Tehran; General Fazollah Zahedi, described as "just the man one would choose to set up a coup - he was ruthless and manipulative, and had twice

been Chief of Police in Tehran;"¹² several police officers; and the Shah himself.¹³

In the meantime, AJAX was approved by the British and U.S. governments.¹⁴ Having slipped across the Iranian border on July 19, 1953, Roosevelt had an audience with the Shah. They agreed that Mossadegh should be replaced by General Zahedi. The Shah and Roosevelt were concerned about Mossadegh's plan to abolish the parliament (which he described as "a nest of thieves"). Mossadegh had also asked for power to deal with "sinister elements in the army, the police, and with other brainless agents of international reaction."¹⁵ The latter phrase was a thinly-veiled reference to the Shah, who decided "to call a halt" and issued a decree for the dismissal of Mossadegh.

The Shah entrusted to General Nassiri the task of serving Mossadegh with the decree of dismissal. However, Nassiri, when he arrived at Mossadegh's residence, was flung into jail. Mossadegh announced over the radio that he had refused to obey the royal decree. Another decree appointed Zahedi as Prime Minister. The following day, because of massive anti-Shah demonstrations in Tehran, the U.S. ambassador suggested that the Shah leave Iran. The Shah agreed, and flew to Switzerland.

Back in Iran, a civil war threatened. On one side was the mass-supported Mossadegh, and on the other side pro-Shah elements in the police, the army and landowners backed by U.S. and British intelligence agencies. The CIA organized armed gangs with clubs, knives and occasionally a rifle or pistol,¹⁷ and Roosevelt's Iranian agents were ready to bribe various thugs into action.

Then it all broke loose. Crowds of armed "peasants" suddenly emerged from the direction of General Arfa's estate at the southern entrance of Tehran, and "bribed crowds of prostitutes, swarmed up..., led by a rightwing bazaar leader named Shaaban Jaafari." They headed into Parliament Square, to be joined by army and police NCOs. Suddenly thousands of anti-Mossadegh leaflets appeared, and "delirious crowds... .. shouted continuously: 'Shah! Shah!'" Then the army, led by Zahedi, marched into Tehran. Mossadegh was arrested, and the Shah was restored as ruler of Iran.

Twenty seven years later the Shah was ousted by a peoples' movement with

Ayatollah Khomeini as its most visible figurehead. Soon cold war propagandists were warning of alleged links between Khomeini and the Communists, thus red-baiting Khomeini, just as Mossadegh had been portrayed as being "pro-communist," which he was not. And the U.S. and British governments were plotting again.

Since 1979 there has been a rapid build-up of U.S. forces with broadening U.S. government access to "facilities" in several countries in the Middle East.¹⁸ Moreover, the U.S. government has developed a plan code-named Tripwire providing for a U.S. invasion of southern Iran "in the event of Soviet intervention."¹⁹ These plans have been overt.

Covert moves have been made by the British government, still largely unreported in the British media. In mid-1981, the British government, at the request of the Sultan of Oman, sent General Sir Timothy Creasey to Oman, ostensibly to reorganize Oman's armed forces. However, intelligence sources indicated that Creasey's real task was - and is - to "prepare for intervention... in Baluchistan"²⁰ with Iran as the target.

When previously stationed in Oman, Creasey worked in close cooperation with Iranian soldiers (the Shah had sent thousands of soldiers to assist Sultan Qabus in defeating the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in Dhofar.) In the words of Colonel Tony Jeapes, Creasey was "just the sort of man the Iranians admired." Evidently, Qabus is eager to play his part in the overthrow of Khomeini and is included in the U.S. plans as well. Omani-linked Baluchi soldiers have been employed before in Iran: Baluchis serving in the Omani Armed Forces were infiltrated into Iran to prepare the desert airstrip used when the U.S. attempted to rescue the American hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.²¹ In addition, the CIA is

training other Baluchis in Oman for espionage and sabotage missions in Iran.²²

Many of the Iranian soldiers who previously served in Oman - particularly the imperial guard paratroopers - have fled from Iran and some are now in Oman. They could be used as the main part of a Western-backed force to intervene in Iran. These are the soldiers with whom Creasey had worked in close cooperation. Given his expertise in guerrilla warfare gained in Kenya and Aden, and actions in Ireland and Oman (Fleet Street called him the "Victor of Oman," after forces under his command won the war in Dhofar), Creasey is ideally suited to oversee interventionist incursions from Baluchistan into Iran.

FOOTNOTES:

- 1) Leonard Mosley, Power Play, London, 1973, p.16.
- 2) Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, London, 1974, p.472.
- 3) cf supra, #1, p.165.
- 4) Kermit Roosevelt, Counter coup, 1979, p.3.
- 5) The Guardian, 7/28/80.
- 6) cf supra, #4, p.107.
- 7) cf supra, #5.
- 8) cf supra, #1, p.172.
- 9) cf supra, #4, p.108.
- 10) Ibid., p.15.
- 11) Chapman Pincher, Inside Story, London, 1978, p.90.
- 12) Margaret Laing, The Shah, London, 1977, p.131.
- 13) cf supra, #1, p.175.
- 14) cf supra, #4, p.135.
- 15) cf supra, #1, p.175.
- 16) Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's Story, London, 1980, p.56.
- 17) CounterSpy, vol.4 no.4, p.4.
- 18) See "Further U.S. Involvement in Oman," The Gulf, no.3, Jan. 1982; "U.S. Bases in Oman," CounterSpy, vol.5 no.2; "The Gulf: Target for U.S. Intervention," MERIP Reports, No.85; "The Carter Doctrine and U.S. Bases in the Middle East," MERIP Reports, no.90.
- 19) Sunday Times, 12/13/81.
- 20) Sunday Tribune (Dublin), 8/30/80.
- 21) Ibid.
- 22) Ibid.

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What Begin and Reagan Didn't Want You to Know

Secret CIA Documents on Mossad

The secret CIA and State Department documents printed here have come a long way. They were discovered by the Iranian students who took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Some were complete, others which had gone through a shredding machine were painstakingly pieced together.

These documents, made available to CounterSpy by journalists Randy Goodman, Terri Taylor and William Worthy, are only a fraction of a 13 volume paperback set (complete with commentary) readily available for sale in Iran. The three journalists picked up a set at an airport on their way to Shiraz. In late November 1981 they had completed their assignment for CBS and flew home. The FBI and Customs officials seized their luggage and confiscated the documents - with the active assistance of Lufthansa (West German) Airlines.

But a second set of the books - sent by another route - was overlooked by customs and reached the U.S. intact. (Some of the volumes were supplied to the Washington Post which analyzed them in a series running from January 31 to February 6, 1982.)

The 13 volumes of documents are a goldmine. They expose covert CIA operations in Iran (an attempt to recruit former Prime Minister Bani Sadr, for example), reveal the CIA's use of corporate covers, and detail former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's attempts to establish ties with U.S. intelligence.

The documents supplied to CounterSpy deal with the triangle of U.S.-Israeli-Iranian relations. A careful reading of the documents illustrates that the Washington Post's analysis was narrowly focussed on the "U.S. angle." Other disclosures were simply glossed over - systematic Israeli suppression of domestic dissent, for example, or Mossad (Israel's CIA) and Israeli military intelligence support for repressive regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and even Mossad's "psychological warfare projects."

The main document reprinted here is an in-depth CIA analysis of Israeli intelligence, written in March 1979 and classified secret. Other documents are cables between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, most of them discussing U.S.-Israeli-Iranian relations (documenting the close collaboration between Mossad and the Shah's intelligence agency SAVAK).

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March 1979

Israel

**Foreign
Intelligence
and
Security
Services**



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SECRET

NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON

This Foreign Intelligence and Security Services survey is prepared and published by the Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff and coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is the successor to the National Intelligence Survey, Section 56, Intelligence and Security and it will be revised and reissued at approximately the same intervals as was the National Intelligence Survey, or as developments may warrant.

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GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	EXPLAN
Haganah	Irgun HaHaganah	Defense Organization
Herut	Tnu'at HaHerut	Freedom Movement
Hutadnut	Hutadnut Haklali	General Federation of Labor in Israel
IDF	shel Ha'odim Be'erets Yara'el	Israel Defense Forces
ILP	Tnu'at Hagannah LeYara'el (Zahal)	Israel Labor Party
Irgun	Miflegat Ha'Avodah HaYara'elit	Israel Workers' Party
MAKI	Irgun Tnu'at Le'umi	National Military Organization
MAPAI	Me'achshav HaChachar	Research Division
MAPAM	Machshava Modim	Political Intelligence
MI	Miflegat Komunistit Yara'elit	Israel Communist Party
Mossad	Miflegat Po'ale Erets Yara'el	Israel Workers' Party
	Miflegat Po'alei Me'uhedet	United Workers' Party
	Agaf Modim (Sherut Modim)	Military Intelligence
	Mossad Leta'kidim Meyushadim	Secret Intelligence Service (Literally Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Duties)
Palmach	Plugot-Hahatz	Spearhead Groups
RAFI	Rachut	Clandestine Collection and Production
RAKAH	Rachmat Po'ale Yara'el	Israel Workers' List
Shay	Rachmat Komunistit Hadash	New Communist List
SIAH	Sherut Yediot	Information Service
Shin Bet	Smo' Yara'el Hadash	New Israel List
	Sherut Bitachon Sheti	Counterespionage and Internal Security Service
	Sherut Modim Shel Masa Arzi	Police Branch of Military Intelligence
	Sherut Modim ve Betachon Kahol Ha Yam	Naval Intelligence and Security Service
	Va'adat	Committee of the Heads of Services
	Va'adat Rachut HaChachar	

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Intelligence and Security

A. General

Israel's principal intelligence and security authority is the *Va'adat Raset Hasherutim* (the Committee of the Heads of Services), generally known as *Va'adat*. It coordinates the operations and activities of its members. *Mossad Letafkidim Meyouchadim* (the Secret Intelligence Service) or Mossad, its common name, has the primary responsibility for foreign operations and is subordinate to the Prime Minister. *Sherut Bitachon Klali* (Counterespionage and Internal Security), popularly known as Shin Beth, is responsible for security and is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. *Agaf Modim* (Military Intelligence) has the main responsibility for strategic military intelligence and communications intelligence and is under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides support in research and political planning to the Israel Intelligence community. The Ministry of Interior assists the National Police with police investigations and the maintenance of border security.

1. Background and development of services

In 1948, when the British Mandate ended, the Jewish population of Palestine established the State of Israel. Among the agencies of government to emerge was the intelligence and security unit known as the Information Service (*Sherut Yedioth*—popularly known as Shay). This organization, which was the intelligence arm of the Zionists' underground resist-

ance force, the Haganah, during the years of the British Mandate, had begun to engage in operations on a worldwide scale with the founding of the Jewish Agency in 1929 at the Zionist Congress in Zurich, Switzerland. At that time, the Jewish Agency was composed of both Zionists and non-Zionists, including a strong American participation. The Jewish Agency, which was created to aid and support distressed Jews and to sustain the Palestine Jewish community, has been effectively under Zionist control over the years. It has also served as a cover for Shay, which extended its covert operations into Western Europe and the United States.

From 1923 to 1948, Shay's objectives were to promote the establishment of an independent State of Israel; infiltrate Mandatory installations in order to apprise Zionist leadership of British attitudes and proposed actions; collect political intelligence that could be used in Zionist propaganda; penetrate Arab and anti-Zionist factions in Palestine and peripheral nations; monitor and control all extremist groups—left and right—among Jewish communities in Palestine and abroad; provide security for the arms smuggling and illegal immigration programs of the Haganah; and finally collect information on Nazi Germany to guarantee the security of the Jewish underground and escape channels throughout Europe before, during and after World War II.

Shay consisted of the following components: Political Intelligence (*Machlakit Medinit*); Counterespionage and Internal Security (*Sherut Bitachon Klali*); Military Intelligence (*Sherut Modim*); Police Branch of Military Intelligence (*Sherut Modim Shel Mate Artst*); and Naval Intelligence and Security (*Sherut Modim ve Betachon Kohot Ha Yam*). These services worked independently on behalf of the different ministries to which they were individually responsible. This intelligence and security community was com-

petitive and frequently acted on its own, a product of the general postwar chaos which required the accomplishment of many urgent tasks wherever and whenever they might arise. In some of the West European capitals all services were represented and competed for the same agents and sources.

By April 1951, the Prime Minister and cabinet, seriously alarmed by the atmosphere of mutual jealousy and mistrust prevalent among the services at the increasing cost of their uncoordinated efforts in the field, decided to reorganize completely the basic structure of Israel's intelligence and security community. The dynamic force behind the plan was the late Reuven Shiloah, who reorganized the services according to functions and responsibilities and established a mechanism to coordinate their activities. Shiloah was chairman of this authority, the Committee of the Heads of Services (*Va'adat Raset Hasherutim*, called *Va'adat*). He integrated the Naval Intelligence and Security Service and the embryonic air intelligence unit into Military Intelligence (*Agaf Modim*). The Political Intelligence Service was made independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reorganized as the Secret Intelligence Service (*Mossad Letafkidim Meyouchadim* or Mossad). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained Research Division (*Machleket Hack-eker*). Shin Beth remained intact except for internal changes. The Special Tasks Division in the Investigation Department of the police became a part of the new apparatus. Shiloah's reorganization of the intelligence and security structure produced an efficient and well-coordinated community.

The Israeli intelligence and security services retained this structure relatively unchanged throughout the Arab-Israel War in October-November 1956, the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. During the early and mid-1960s, however, the Israeli Government had considered

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The principal targets of the Israeli intelligence and security services are: (1) the Arab states - their capabilities and intentions toward Israel, their relations with the USSR and other powers, their official installations and representatives throughout the world, their leaders, internal and inter-Arab politics, morale, military preparedness and other order of battle; (2) collection of information on secret U.S. policy or decisions, if any, concerning Israel; (3) collection of scientific intelligence in the U.S. and other developed countries; (4) determination of government policy toward Israel in the USSR and East European nations and the problem of Jewish emigration from these areas; (5) close monitoring of anti-Zionist activity throughout the world; and (6) collection of political and economic intelligence in other areas of interest to them, such as Africa.

changes in the structure and duties of the components of the intelligence and security community. Despite Shiloah's earlier reorganization, much of what happened in the Israeli services at this time depended on the personal relationships between Ben Gurion and the directors and chiefs. In early 1963, just before his retirement, Ben Gurion appointed a committee to review the situation. He was concerned that the intelligence and security establishment which, by virtue of his serving both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, usually functioned satisfactorily, might deteriorate when he left office. He also was reported to be dissatisfied with the lack of clarity in the community's chain of command and functions and ordered the committee to define the subordination and tasks of these bodies.

In July 1963 the committee submitted its report to a new Prime Minister, the late Levi Eshkol. The committee stated that, while the functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense did not necessarily have to be concentrated in the hands of one person, the Prime Minister must know about all the activities of the national intelligence and security services and be given objective intelligence evaluations balanced and based on different viewpoints from more than one source. To accomplish these aims the committee recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Division be strengthened so that it would be capable of presenting independent political evaluations, both on Middle East issues and other political subjects. By upgrading the Research Division, the committee believed that a certain balance would be created for security and political evaluations, which were handled almost solely by the Military Intelligence Production Department. The committee also observed that the existence of Mossad, which controls secret foreign information gathering assets, facilitated to some extent the possible formulation of another independent evaluation unit. The committee also regarded as a matter of vital importance the appointment of a special adviser, subordinate only to the Prime Minister. He would be a person of high caliber who would aid the Prime Minister in keeping in touch with and monitoring the activities of the intelligence and security services. The committee's principal recommendations were not implemented at the time except for the establishment of the adviser position and the shift of responsibility for Shin Beth from the Minister of Defense to the Prime Minister. There was a brief interlude from September 1965 to July 1966 when Isser Harel, the former Chairman of

the Va'adat and Director of Mossad, served as a special adviser to Prime Minister Eshkol on intelligence and security matters. Harel resigned as a result of internal policy disputes within the community and he was not replaced at the time.

Following the alleged "intelligence failure" in the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Government established the Agranat Commission in November 1973 to investigate matters relating to the hostilities and the performance of the intelligence and security services. The commission in its *Partial Report* in April 1974 proposed reactivating and strengthening the post of special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence and security matters. The commission also recommended changes in the intelligence and security forces through the establishment of a research and evaluation unit in Mossad and the elevation of the Research Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The object of this modification was to avoid relying exclusively on Military Intelligence for major estimates and assessments. The commission also emphasized the need for better operational coordination in the field of collection between the services but it opposed the coordination of their finished intelligence judgments. A full or final commission report, if there ever was one, was never made public.

From 1974 to 1976 the recommendations of the *Partial Report* of the Agranat Commission were implemented. The Prime Minister appointed Reserve General Rehavam Zeevi as his intelligence adviser, a position that was purely advisory and carried no executive authority. Zeevi assumed this new job in addition to serving as the Prime Minister's adviser on counterterrorism. Zeevi was also to be the Prime Minister's liaison with the Director of Military Intelligence and was also to keep the Prime Minister alerted to differences of views among the intelligence and security services. In October 1976, however, Zeevi resigned from this post and was replaced by Brigadier (Ret.) Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former Director of Military Intelligence. The Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into operation in January 1975. Changes in the Military Intelligence structure were being carried out. A new research and evaluation unit for assessing information was established within Mossad. New appointees had taken over in most of the intelligence and security components. In June 1977 the Israeli Government established a Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs.

2. Objectives and structure

The principal targets of the Israeli intelligence and security services are: (1) the Arab states—their capabilities and intentions toward Israel, their relations with the USSR and other powers, their official installations and representatives throughout the world, their leaders, internal and inter-Arab politics, morale, military preparedness and other order of battle; (2) collection of information on secret US policy or decisions, if any, concerning Israel; (3) collection of scientific intelligence in the US and other developed countries; (4) determination of government policy toward Israel in the USSR and East European nations and the problem of Jewish emigration from these areas; (5) close monitoring of anti-Zionist activity throughout the world; and (6) collection of political, and economic intelligence in other areas of interest to them, such as Africa. The Israeli services also make special efforts to counter Arab propaganda and to neutralize anti-Zionist activity. Within recent years the Israelis have devoted much operational activity to combating Arab terrorism, which has grown over the years from isolated cross-border raids by Palestinian Fedayeen to daring and deadly attacks, often international in scope, on Israeli personnel and property. The Israelis also have undertaken widescale covert political, economic and paramilitary action programs—particularly in Africa.

Authorization for foreign intelligence and internal security organizations, while not defined by specific charter, is in Israeli legislation. Paragraph 29 of the Basic Law states: "The Government is authorized to carry out on behalf of the State, in accordance with any law any act whose implementation is not lawfully entrusted to any other authority." This implies that the government is entrusted with the management of intelligence and state security affairs since no other authority is empowered to act in this sphere by any other law. Attempts have been made over the years by officials within the government and the community to have an act passed defining the status of foreign intelligence and security organizations and their operations, but nothing has come of these efforts.

Internal security, on the other hand, is more clearly defined in law. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (established during the British Mandate), the Military Law of 21 June 1955 and the Penal Revision (State Security) Law of 31 July 1957, the Israeli equivalent of the British Official Secrets Act, all are concerned with internal security. The Emergency Regulations of 1945 gave the military administration the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements and to designate certain locations as "closed areas," thus requiring local inhabitants to possess travel permits to transit such places. While the regulations originally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine, they are now used largely to monitor the Arab community in Israel. Administration of the regulations was transferred from the military to the police in 1966. Internal security organs reportedly increased their agent activity to meet this responsibility.

Israeli laws require severe punishment ranging from the death penalty or life imprisonment for treason or

The Israeli services also make special efforts to counter Arab propaganda and to neutralize anti-Zionist activity.

assistance to the "enemy," to terms of incarceration from three to 15 years for espionage, contact with foreign agents, aiding and abetting a crime against state security and unauthorized disclosure of informa-

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tion by a public servant. There is no statute of limitations regarding the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

The central body in Israel's intelligence and security community is the Va'adat, which has as its primary function the coordination of all intelligence and security activities at home and abroad. The Va'adat consists of the Director of Mossad, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Director of Shin Beth, the Inspector General of Police, the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Director of the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the political, military, intelligence and antiterrorist advisers of the Prime Minister. The Head of the Special Tasks Division in the Investigations Department of the Police also occasionally attends the meetings with, or in place of, the Inspector General of Police. Meetings must be held biweekly but may be held more frequently. At these meetings each director usually provides a briefing on the key activities of his service during the preceding two weeks. The Director of Mossad chairs Va'adat and in this capacity is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The members of Va'adat are quasi-equal in status and the term *memune* referring to the Director of Mossad as chairman is designed to denote a concept of preeminence among equals. In actuality, however, the Director of Military Intelligence now overshadows the Director of Mossad in power and importance. This development resulted from the continuing Israeli reliance on military preparedness for national survival.

Mossad is charged with the collection of foreign intelligence and the conduct of covert action programs outside Israel.

Shin Beth is responsible for counterintelligence and internal security. It functions as the governmental authority on personnel security matters. It is also responsible for the personal safety of the Prime Minister and other high ranking Israeli officials. Shin Beth is in charge of physical security for ports, airports and key military/industrial installations in Israel and for Israeli missions and El Al operations outside Israel. Shin Beth does not have the power of arrest, this function being performed by the Special Tasks Division of the Investigations Department of the Police, which works in close collaboration with Shin Beth in Israel. Within the Administered Territories, which are controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces, Shin Beth applies to the military to undertake arrests and searches. A special component under the Inspector General of Police is the Border Guard, whose mission is that of guarding the cease-fire lines against Arab infiltration and of detecting and running down Fedayeen terrorists. In recent years Border Guard units have been used increasingly to control and suppress riots and demonstrations in the West Bank area.

Military Intelligence, in addition to its responsibility for strategic and tactical intelligence, prepares the national intelligence estimates and evaluates all information dealing with the Arabs. It also is responsible for developing and protecting communication codes and ciphers for all the services and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and for communications intelligence.

The Research and Political Planning Center, which was formerly the Research Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, analyzes raw intelligence from various sources for officials on the policymaking level.

Other Israeli Government organizations that provide support to the intelligence and security community are the Ministries of Finance (Customs and Excise, Investment and Securities) and Tourism, the national airline, El Al, and the national shipping line, Zim. Unofficial Zionist organizations based in Israel and Jewish communities throughout the world also give aid to Israel operations when needed.

There are between 1,500 and 2,000 personnel in Mossad, of whom about 500 are officers. Shin Beth has about 1,000 members of whom some 550 hold officer rank. In Military Intelligence there are about 7,000 personnel, of whom 450 are officers, the others being

enlisted personnel and civilian clerks. The number of officials in the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ranges between 75 and 100. The police number about 12,000 and the Border Guards around 6,000.

Since the financing of the intelligence and security services is a closely held secret, it is very difficult to

The Emergency Regulations of 1945 gave the military administration the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements and to designate certain locations as "closed areas," thus requiring local inhabitants to possess travel permits to transit such places. While the regulations originally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine, they are now used largely to monitor the Arab community in Israel.

get accurate information on the total amounts expended for these purposes. The funds are concealed in the defense budget, and known to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, one or two of their top assistants, the Minister of Finance, the State Comptroller and his Defense Services Inspectorate. The Comptroller deals directly with the directors of the services, who request funds at the beginning of the fiscal year in April. The estimates of expenses by the directors, who have established reputations for honesty and integrity, are usually acceptable as a starting point for budget negotiations. The Ministry of Finance,

however, does require a 10-year projection of expended financial needs (an impossible task which is not taken seriously). The Comptroller holds a series of meetings with the various service directors and their staffs, reviewing their programs in detail. These sessions continue throughout May and result in a careful redefinition of the entire intelligence and security effort and its cost. By October, the determination of specific budget needs is completed, based on the program analysis completed in May. This is then submitted for higher approval and the planning and budgeting cycle is, upon budget approval, completed just in time to begin again.

Much of the administrative support for the services is handled by the Ministry for Defense. Various types of cover are provided for and funded by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). There is close professional cooperation between the civilian intelligence and security services and military intelligence. These services, like all government offices, are subject to inspection by the State Comptroller's office. An Assistant Director-General is in charge of inspecting the defense and security services, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the police. The annual inspection covers bookkeeping, financial management and handling of administration. The Comptroller is required to see that the services are operating economically, efficiently and with irreproachable morality.

Israeli governmental offices and departments are continuously borrowing money, personnel, equipment and material from one another and salaries are paid by the office to which the individual is assigned. An intelligence officer or a Ministry for Foreign Affairs official stationed in New York and assigned to the Jewish Agency is paid salary and allowances by the Agency but loses neither seniority nor retirement status while serving in that capacity.

3. Political aspects

a. Relationship between the government and the services.—The intelligence and security community enjoys a strong position in the government, and their affairs are well integrated into more general operations. Members of the generation which worked for the establishment of the state were companions of longstanding and joint veterans of such enterprises as illegal immigration and arms-running. Many of the current leaders came up through the ranks of the military in a series of wars with the Arabs and entered politics through affiliation with one of the major political parties. All of them had some experience in clandestine matters and have been personally con-

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vinced by stern lessons of the value of good intelligence and security.

The intelligence and security services receive excellent support from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Many senior diplomats are former intelligence officers and therefore conversant with intelligence problems and operations. With their experienced observations and manifold talents, they serve as valuable auxiliaries to their covert colleagues, whose diplomatic cover is diligently sustained by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, almost every Israeli diplomat abroad has good foreign language and area knowledge or some specialization which enables him to pursue a much broader social life, with its resultant contacts, than is the case in most foreign services. In many instances, embassy officers, including chiefs of diplomatic missions, were former citizens of the countries to which they are accredited. Information developed by Israeli diplomats is made available to the intelligence and security community for immediate use of operational intelligence or inclusion in archives. As a final boon to covert intelligence personnel, the vigor and variety of a normal Israeli diplomat's life outside his installation usually renders detection of intelligence officers by the host country extremely difficult. The same kind of effective support regarding operations is given by the Ministry of Defense and the Jewish Agency.

The Israeli intelligence and security services play an important role throughout the government and private sector. Many leaders in both the civil service and industry have at some time in their careers been directly or indirectly involved with the intelligence community. Service assignments are not regarded as the end of a career, as persons with intelligence and security backgrounds frequently are selected for other jobs in the government. Thus the services are supplemented by persons who know and continue to relate their missions to intelligence and security responsibilities, in senior posts in both the public and private sectors. Officially, the services are nonpolitical and members of the community are not encouraged to enroll in any party or engage in political activity. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset is normally the government's point of discussion for the review and resolution of sensitive policies and activities. The Director of Mossad and the Director of Shin Beth are often present at sessions which are of concern to them.

b. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SERVICES AND THE POPULACE—The current state of relations between the services and the populace is good as a result of the present position of the services as protectors of the Israeli state and people in the forefront of the struggle against Arab terrorists and military forces. Most Israelis are acutely aware of this situation and therefore support the services and their operations. The historical development of Israel and the long continuing struggle against the Arabs have contributed to this harmonious atmosphere.

At times in the past as a result of political rivalries and disagreements on the kind of order that was to prevail in Israel, there have been occasional verbal and journalistic attacks against the services as instruments of a police state. In several instances, service representatives had to appear in closed court sessions to defend the intelligence and security community against accusations of kidnapping, brutality and illegality. Although debates in the Knesset occasionally have reflected probably illegal practices or procedures by the services, the intelligence and security community is completely loyal and if the government requested the execution of a certain task, legal and illegal, it would be accomplished.

Confidence in the intelligence and security community also received a boost after the Six-Day War in 1967. The part played by Military Intelligence, Shin Beth and the police in contributing to the victory and controlling the newly-occupied Arab areas taken by Israel was followed by a plethora of praise in all Israeli media. The so-called "intelligence failure" in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, however, weakened popular trust in the services. The subsequent work of the

Agranat Commission, undertaken to evaluate the community and its shortcomings and to improve cooperation among its members, contributed to a partial renewal of public confidence. The continuing battle by the services against terrorism has also kept Israelis loyal to the community. The Entebbe raid in July 1976, which resulted in the rescue of hijacked Israeli hostages, was one action in recent years which fired the public imagination and served as an example of a well-coordinated and well-executed Israeli operation. This raid and its success buoyed up the moral of the Israelis as nothing else has in recent years and certainly showed the intelligence and security community in a good light.

communities, and other sources throughout the world. Israel's intelligence capabilities give it a significant advantage over the Arab states—an advantage which was an important factor in the 1967 war.

Those members of the intelligence and security community who were identified with the Information Service and other components of the Haganah, before and during World War II, developed a high standard of efficiency and level of competence. The organizations succeeded in recruiting a core of capable and highly-educated individuals from Europe and the Middle East whose equal has been difficult to find, let alone attract, since the founding of the state. The corps

Many senior diplomats are former intelligence officers and therefore conversant with intelligence problems and operations. With their experienced observations and manifold talents, they serve as valuable auxiliaries to their covert colleagues, whose diplomatic cover is diligently sustained by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

4. Professional standards

a. INTEGRITY—The directors and senior staff members of the intelligence and security community conform to the highest professional standards of integrity and honesty and impose these standards on the lower echelons. There is relatively little difference between the basic salary of a new employee and the staff member who enjoys a top position. The insignificant disparity has resulted in the granting of compensatory amenities and privileges such as expense accounts, purchasing of foreign goods that enter the country through devious tax-free channels, and "protektsia," a magic word in Israel, which means that one can get items, housing or privileges at low cost through influential governmental connections. This is common practice throughout the government establishment, however. Because the intelligence and security services, especially Shin Beth, maintain a very tight cover within their own community, information on personnel, budgets and accounts is closely held by a few top people in the government and not subjected to widespread bureaucratic perusal and control. The higher echelons scrutinize the expenditure of funds by the lower ranks, and if financial dishonesty is discovered, the guilty individual receives very severe treatment.

b. EFFICIENCY—Israel's intelligence and security services are among the best in the world. Their expert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made them highly effective, and they have demonstrated outstanding ability to organize, screen and evaluate information obtained from recruited agents, Jewish

of the "old guard," for example, is fluent in four or five languages, an accomplishment which alone raises their general average of efficiency. The younger generation has been given intensive training, including study abroad, to assist them in gaining these qualifications. It is not uncommon for students to engage in clandestine operations while pursuing their course of studies.

Israeli signal intelligence successes against the Arabs in the past were of such high order that the Israelis had less need than at present for good agent operations against the enemy. Part of this success was due to poor Arab communications security. The Israelis now face some problems since Arab communications security is gradually improving. The Yom Kippur War intelligence failure is an example of inadequacies in their communications intelligence capability at that time. In recent years, as well, there also have been indications that Israeli intelligence on the Arabs, other than communications intelligence, has been somewhat inadequate in quality and their agent operations lacking in success.

One of the principal weaknesses of Israeli's intelligence and security system appears to be that the production of most finished intelligence and the preparation of national estimates is done by Military Intelligence rather than by an independent service. Inherent in such an organizational arrangement is the danger that the armed services will not be objective in observing and reporting foreign developments and in making national intelligence estimates—a major problem in the Yom Kippur War—and their vested interest

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in military operations will influence intelligence assessments. The Agranat Commission has recognized this problem and recommended changes.

c. **Security**—The physical security of the civilian and military intelligence and security headquarters in Tel Aviv is reported to be excellent. Two services—Mossad and Military Intelligence—were formerly located within a general army compound in the heart of the city. The buildings were protected by high wire fences and military guards. Military Intelligence remains in this location but Mossad now occupies a wing of a multistory commercial office building across the street from the compound. Shin Beth, which was formerly located in a rundown building in Jaffa, occupied new quarters just north of Tel Aviv in June 1970. This new building, which was designed for their use, is fenced in and contains a technical laboratory as well as regular offices. Guards control the entrance and badges bearing a photograph of the employee are worn within the compound.

stimulating considerable doubt about the reliability of recanted Marxists. The services have devised internal security systems to expose ideological weaklings by more thorough periodic security checks. The Israelis believe such individuals constitute a possible long-term security threat. Israeli citizens are subjected to stringent registration requirements and must carry identification papers. Within the intelligence and security community great pains are taken not to reveal the identities of personnel even to the average Israeli employed in the government at large. Compartmentation is strictly maintained between services with only designated individuals, usually members of the "hard-core," crossing lines. Intelligence and security personnel widely use and frequently change pseudonyms. The national practice of Hebraicizing European or Yiddish birth names also makes the identification of some Israelis difficult. Visiting foreign officials and agents never use the same car twice when meeting clandestinely with Israeli officers within the country. Certain unlisted official and personal telephone

computer printout four times a year listing all Top Secret material for which each unit is responsible. Electrical communication is handled entirely by teleprinter and other communication security devices. A record is made of documents to be destroyed and security officers must witness the destruction of all Top Secret and Secret material.

All personnel requiring a clearance must complete a personal history statement and undergo a routine investigation. For higher clearances the investigations could include the applicant's entire family and a full field investigation. New immigrants from the USSR and East European countries are normally denied access to classified information for a minimum of four or five years. This ruling is not always possible to enforce because of "protektzia." Within the IDF security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closely supervised by the unit security officer, who is required to make periodic reports on the individual's activities. To stimulate and evaluate the security consciousness of the IDF cadre, Field Security personnel circulate among the troops and attempt to elicit military information.

d. **MORALE AND DISCIPLINARY METHODS**—Mossad and Shin Beth are components of the Israeli civil service structure and applicants must pass a civil service examination. Those in their twenties with a university degree are preferred, although other individuals who have especially desirable qualifications are accepted. The intelligence and security services, in direct competition with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the rapidly expanding business community, are at a disadvantage. Most young Israelis do not like the anonymity of the secret service and prefer the more remunerative pay scales of the business world.

Intelligence and security personnel who do not or cannot subscribe to the circumscribed life limited by security restrictions and operational considerations are either dropped or, if their actions should jeopardize the service or the state, are severely punished. To boost the morale of staff intelligence officers, the services in the early 1960s sought and secured from the Knesset a 30 percent annual bonus for their personnel to compensate for the risks and the anonymity involved (Figure 2).

B. Mossad—Secret Intelligence Service

1. Functions

Mossad is responsible for foreign intelligence collection, political action and counterterrorism. In carrying out its mission to collect positive intelligence, the principal function of Mossad is to conduct agent operations against the Arab nations and their official representatives and installations throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe and the United States, where the national interests of the Arabs in the Near East conflict with Israeli interest. Mossad collects information on the disposition, morale, armaments, equipment and state of leadership of every Arab Army that could be called into action in the case of another round of fighting; and all the information that illuminates Arab internal politics and relationships among the principal Arab leaders and the diplomatic activity of all countries in the Arab world. Mossad monitors Arab commercial activity, particularly in the field of arms purchases in the West, and attempts to counteract Arab recruiting of military, economic and political experts. In this case the principal desire is to recruit these persons as intelligence agents, or failing that, either to dissuade them from aiding the Arabs or to discover their precise functions. Mossad also is charged with inciting disturbances calculated to create mutual distrust among the Arabs and to draw Western sympathy away from the Arab cause, and monitoring and counteracting Arab propaganda and detecting and countering Arab terrorism. In the area of counterterrorism, at times the Israelis have carried the fight to Arab terrorists by taking executive action against them, especially in parts of the Near East and Western Europe. In particular, the fact that Lebanon has a mixed Christian, Druze and Moslem population has made that country attractive for intelligence projects. The Israelis have covert assets and run operations in their northern neighbor. In the past they have mounted paramilitary and executive action operations

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There is an elaborate protected government "guest house" for the training and accommodation of visiting foreign intelligence officers, foreign dignitaries and sensitive agents.

There are a little over 1,000 persons working as staff officers for Mossad and Shin Beth, all of whom have been given a long, thorough security check. If there is the slightest doubt raised against an individual, the application is rejected. Personnel with leftist backgrounds generally are not trusted by leading members of the intelligence and security services. This attitude did not always apply to former members of European Communist parties, some of whom were eminently qualified for clandestine service, especially if they had renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated with the Israeli Labor Party. This exemption, however, has not applied since the exposure of several high-level espionage cases in governmental and political circles in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The cases of Aharon Cohen, a MAPAM party expert on the Middle East, and Israel Beer (Figure 1), a Defense Ministry contract employee and IDF Reserve lieutenant colonel, who spied for the USSR, and Dr. Kurt Sitte, a Gentile professor of physics at Haifa Technion, who worked for the Czech Service, caused Shin Beth to reconsider its own security procedures while

numbers are known only to relatively few people. This type of professional demeanor at home provides excellent daily training for intelligence and security personnel before receiving foreign assignments.

Classified information may not be discussed over the telephone. Despite their relatively high standards of security, however, Israeli officials reportedly are occasionally careless in observing this restriction. They also have "an old boy network" much like the British. Israelis in the "network" are willing to discuss classified subjects whether or not there is a need to know. The Israelis also have problems dealing with overseas Jewry whose support they need but whose security is questionable because of the possibility of divided loyalty.

Installations and storage containers must conform to rigorous security standards. Classification terms Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted (comparable to For Official Use Only) are used. Top Secret and Secret documents are transmitted by courier only in double envelopes and two receipts are required—one for the package and one for the contents. These documents are logged in and out by date, document number, title or subject, and the office accepting responsibility for them. At least three periodic inventories are held each year. A registry produces a

against Palestinian terrorist leaders, personnel and installations in Lebanon. They have also provided support to Christian rightists in the Lebanese civil war.

In addition to running operations against the Arabs, Mossad collects political, economic and scientific intelligence in both the Eastern and Western worlds for the protection of the State of Israel, Zionism and Jews generally. Their collection efforts are especially concentrated in the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as at the United Nations, where policy decisions could have repercussions on Israel and Zionist goals.

Intelligence objectives in the USSR and East Europe consist of determining governmental policy toward Israel and the problem of Jewish emigration; recruiting persons strategically located in Soviet and East European bureaucracies who, motivated either by conviction or corruption, are willing to assist Zionist action in those countries; and ascertaining the degree and quality of assistance made available to Near Eastern groups, whether in Israel or the Arab nations, by Soviet and East European Governments.

Objectives in Western countries are equally important to the Israeli intelligence service. Mossad collects intelligence regarding Western, Vatican, and UN policies toward the Near East; promotes arms deals for the benefit of the IDF; and acquires data for use in silencing anti-Israel factions in the West.

2. Organization

Mossad has eight departments: (1) Operational Planning and Coordination; (2) Collection; (3) Political Action and Liaison; (4) Manpower, Finance, Logistics and Security; (5) Training; (6) Research; (7) Technical Operations; and (8) Technology (Figure 3).

The Operational Planning and Coordination Department is concerned with the management of Mossad resources and responsible for interdirectorate operational and administrative coordination within the organization and interservice liaison within the Israeli intelligence and security community. This department also deals with requirements and the development of overall collection plans.

The Collection Department is responsible for foreign covert operations and the processing and production of reporting from clandestine sources. This component is the largest unit in Mossad. The department has offices abroad under Israeli diplomatic and nonofficial cover and is active mainly in Europe, where it concentrates on Arab targets through third-country operations.

The Political Action and Liaison Directorate is in

There is also a Psychological Warfare or Special Operations Division, probably in the Political Action and Liaison Directorate, which runs highly sensitive covert operations against Arab terrorists and ex-Nazis, and sabotage, paramilitary and psychological warfare projects, such as character assassination and black propaganda.




Figure 2. Organization of Israeli Intelligence and Security Services, 1977

charge of political action and relations with friendly foreign services. This component also maintains contact with those nations and political groups with whom Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations (that is, African countries, Lebanon and/or Lebanese Christian rightist factions and Indonesia).

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In the absence of the Director of Mossad, the Director of the Operational Planning and Coordination Department now becomes acting Director, whereas in past years the Director of the Collection Department acted for the Director of Mossad. With the drive for greater and improved coordination within the intelligence and security community, the Director of the Operational Planning and Coordination Department has apparently taken precedence over the Director of the Collection Department.

In headquarters, the department directors direct the various area, functional, administrative, and financial controllers. The area departments under the control of the Collection and Special Political Action and Liaison Departments are: (1) Central America, (2) South America, (3) Eastern Europe including the USSR, (4) Africa, (5) Asia and Oceania, (6) the Mediterranean and Near East areas, (7) Europe, and (8) North America. Under each controller there are branches or desks which are responsible for one or more countries.

Positive Intelligence and counterintelligence reports are sent back to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, evaluated by the Research Department, and disseminated to various government offices. Intelligence reports on the Arabs are forwarded by Mossad to the Research Department of the DMI while counterespionage reports are sent through Mossad to Shin Beth, where they are given special processing by counterintelligence investigative departments.

Mossad controls Israeli foreign intelligence activities except for operations launched from Israel against military objectives in peripheral areas of surrounding Arab countries, which are under the jurisdiction of DMI. Mossad operations abroad fall into two principal categories: those in the Near East, as a first line of defense, and those elsewhere. The Israelis have designated Egypt as the main target area for establishing intelligence networks. In 1970 the Israelis estimated that about 50 percent of their operational effort was directed against Egypt. The next priority is Syria. Much of this activity against the Arabs in the Near East is based on deep cover operations by Israeli

illegals or the recruitment of Arabs in third countries followed by their dispatch or normal rotation back home to an Arab area. Two good examples of Israeli deep cover illegal operations are the Cohen and Lotz cases.

Elihu Ben Shaul Cohen was an Egyptian-born Jew who was involved in Israeli sabotage operations against American and British installations in Egypt in 1952. Cohen succeeded in escaping detection, when most members of the ring were arrested by the Egyptians, and went to Israel. Eventually, Mossad recruited Cohen for an illegal operation designed to develop intelligence networks and acquire political and military information in Syria. He received intensive training, adopted the identity of the late Kamil Amin Thabet, a Syrian-born merchant, and emigrated to Argentina, where he became an active member of the Arab emigre community. Cohen eventually went to Syria, where he was assisted by two Arabs who had previously been recruited by the Israelis. From 1961 until 1965 Cohen was active as an illegal in Damascus, where he succeeded in making numerous contacts with political and military personalities in the Syrian establishment. He made occasional trips to Europe and Israel for extensive debriefings. Eventually, in January 1965, the Syrians did detect and locate Cohen while he was in the act of transmitting information to Tel Aviv. One cause of his downfall was that he was using hand morse radio equipment and had been on the air for an hour when he was caught (Figure 4). A Syrian court tried Cohen and found him guilty of espionage. He was publicly hanged in Damascus in May 1965.

Johann Wolfgang Lotz (also known as Zeev Gur Arie), was an officer in Military Intelligence. In 1959 during a Va'adat meeting, Mossad announced its need for a man to be a new illegal resident agent in Cairo under cover as a former Nazi officer. Lotz accepted the assignment, which was directed primarily against special weapons activity by German scientists in Egypt. He received intensive training in Israel, including equestrian instruction, and in early 1960 he went to Germany and surfaced as an East German refugee and former African Corps officer. Although Lotz had a wife in Israel, he eventually married a German woman to develop his legend. In 1961 he went to Cairo, where he opened a riding academy. Through his activities Lotz made a variety of contacts in the German community in the Egyptian capital and in time made the acquaintance of a number of prominent and well-placed Egyptians. He made a number of trips from Egypt to Western Europe for debriefings. Finally, in 1964 Lotz began to mail threatening letters to selected German experts in Egypt. In February 1965, he was arrested by the Egyptians, who tried and imprisoned him. Eventually he was released and returned to Israel in 1968. The Israelis have stated that the operation cost them about

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


Figure 3. Organization of Mossad, 1977

\$250,000. They have also admitted that errors by Lotz in handling his communications and his use in executive action operations may have led to his downfall. During his captivity Lotz was also forced to reveal the whole operation (Figure 5).

Mossad stations outside of the Arab areas in the Near East are generally under diplomatic cover within the embassies and consulates of Israel. There are stations in the United States, most of the European capitals, Turkey, Iran and strategic centers in Latin America, Africa and the Far East. Operations range from formal liaison exchanges with host services through unilateral projects to special executive actions directed against Arab terrorists. There are also smaller stations, which run mostly unilateral operations and handle local liaison on such matters as Arab terrorists.

The Collection Directorate and the Political Action and Liaison Directorate are separate components of Mossad and are carefully compartmented at headquarters. Collection and Political Action and Liaison maintain separate permanent staffs outside Israel in larger stations. There are thus either two Mossad stations or two compartmented components in each station in some countries—one for unilateral clandestine collection and one for liaison. For example, at present in Paris the Israelis have an Embassy, Consulate-General and Ministry of Defense Mission. Under embassy cover, Mossad has a Collection Directorate regional controller and a Political Action and Liaison Directorate regional controller in the French capital, which has more or less over the years remained the fulcrum of Israeli intelligence activity on the continent of Europe.

In Switzerland the Israelis have an Embassy in Bern and a Consulate-General in Zurich which provide cover for Collection Department officers involved in unilateral operations. These Israeli diplomatic installations also maintain close relations with the Swiss on a local level in regard to overt functions such as physical security for Israeli official and commercial installations in the country and the protection of staff members and visiting Israelis. There is also close collaboration between the Israelis and Swiss on scientific and technical matters pertaining to intelligence and security operations. Swiss officials have made frequent trips to Israel. There is a continual flow of Israelis to and through Switzerland. These visits, however, are usually arranged through the Political Action and Liaison regional controller at the Embassy in Paris directly with the Swiss and not through the officials in the Israeli Embassy in Bern, although the latter are kept informed.

In Spain, on the other hand, there is no known official or semiofficial Israeli installation. There have been contacts, however, between Political Action and

Liaison Directorate officials of Mossad and the Spanish service for some time. The original meeting apparently occurred in Paris in the late 1960s, since then there have been contacts in Madrid and Paris. There is a possibility that Mossad may also have a clandestine Collection Department station in Spain. In January 1973, Baruch Asher Cohen, a Mossad officer, was assassinated in Madrid by Arabs.

Special operations are mounted on an ad hoc basis. Headquarters directs the effort from Israel and employs Mossad officers and agents on special temporary duty. In July 1973, an Israeli assassination squad of 16 was involved in the murder of a Moroccan Arab in Lillehammer, Norway. Norwegian authorities captured, tried and imprisoned six of the group, the rest escaped. It became clear in the course of the trial that the squad, which was composed of Israelis, who were recruited for the mission, did much of its preparatory work in Paris and entered Norway on a specific assignment—the elimination of Arab terrorists. After the murder, two of the squad sought refuge with an Israeli Embassy security officer. The Norwegians declared the officer persona non grata, although he

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3. Administrative practices

The Israeli Prime Minister appoints the Director of Mossad. The Prime Minister does not need the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset for this appointment.

Chiefs of station and their staffs are Mossad career officers but they function abroad on behalf of all the intelligence and security services. If a member of Shin Beth or the IDF is considered the most qualified individual in the community to do a particular foreign job, he still belongs to his parent organization, but he is assigned to, and subject to the control of, Mossad as long as he remains outside the borders of Israel. This rule does not apply, however, to military attaches (army, air, navy) who remain subordinate to the Director of Military Intelligence.

Mossad does not have a logical career progression program. The organization promotes case officers who have been successful in the field to top managerial jobs. The results of this arrangement are mixed as some of the successful operators are often not necessarily the best managers or administrators.

a. **TRAINING**—The Mossad training cycle encompasses a Basic Operations course for recruits and lower ranking personnel, and Operations course and a Field Operations course. All new officer candidates are required to take the four-month Basic Operations course before actually entering on duty. The entire training cycle takes almost two years and is generally given to classes of 12. Most of the training takes place in the Tel Aviv area. The instructors in these Mossad courses are teachers on permanent assignment, intelligence officers on temporary tours of duty, and headquarters personnel, including the Director of Mossad and department directors, who give occasional lectures on their specialties.

The three services run a joint advanced school in Jerusalem that offers specialized courses of two to three months' duration on world political affairs, Israel's political and economic objectives, new technical operational aids, and the latest information on foreign intelligence services. All officers who are midway in their careers are required to attend this advanced school upon their return from a foreign assignment. As many as 40 to 50 students are reported to have been enrolled in a single running of this course. The faculty is composed of representatives of the three services and is directly subordinate to the Director of Mossad. The Prime Minister or some other high official has addressed graduating classes.

Some younger Mossad officers, who may be weak in certain fields of higher education or languages, are sent to universities abroad, where their pursuit of an advanced degree simultaneously serves as cover for their extracurricular operational activities. One of the established goals of the intelligence and security services is that each officer be fluent in Arabic. A nine-month, intensive Arabic language course is given annually in the Tel Aviv area to students from each service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sends two or three officials to each course. Mossad officers who are going into Arab operations take the same Arabic language training as Shin Beth officers. As further training, these Mossad officers work in the Administered Territories for two years to sharpen their language skills before being posted abroad. During this period they usually serve in the Sinai and often run Bedouin agents into Egypt in conjunction with Military Intelligence.

All Mossad officers are trained in the use of small arms and required to fire them at regular intervals.

b. **FUNDS AND SALARIES**—The Director of Mossad is a civil service Class 1 officer. He receives generous expense and entertainment allowances. There are reported to be several Class 2 and Class 3 officers in Mossad as well. The monthly take home pay of a ranking Mossad officer, after taxes but including bonuses and cost-of-living and family allowances, is about 114,000 per month (US\$460). They also receive expense and entertainment allowances and are provided with a car and gasoline allowance as well. Higher academic degrees place intelligence officers in

a higher pay bracket, thus a directorate director with an advanced degree makes the same as the Director. A middle-ranking officer with allowances for a large number of dependents would receive more than his seniors. In general, higher-grade civil service salaries are roughly comparable to those of higher-ranking military officers. The rather insignificant differential between grades is compensated by fairly impressive perquisites, especially in the senior ranks. Officers abroad are given generous cost-of-living allowances that conform to the allotments of the regular Foreign Affairs officers. For cover purposes these are paid by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. If, however, an intelligence officer needs a larger apartment or house for representation, operational purposes, or family requirements, his service quietly pays the difference.

Officers and their families usually travel tourist class on Israeli carriers whenever possible but the absence of a firm rule permits them to travel on any air or steamship line at their discretion. Clerical employees travel tourist class.

Each station abroad is granted funds for operational and entertainment expenses. Responsible individuals do not entertain any more than is necessary but when they do, it is done lavishly. Efforts to extend hospitality unstintingly are made at headquarters in Israel when favored agents or ranking foreign intelligence officers are guests.

4. Methods of operation

Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly-placed persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel. Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and other purposes. Mossad directs clandestine operations throughout Europe, including the USSR and East European countries; North and South America; the Near East; Africa; and the Far East, including South East Asia. Mossad activities are generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial establishments; deep cover enterprises in the form of firms and organizations, some especially created for, or adaptable to, a specific objective; and penetrations effected within non-Zionist national and international Jewish organizations.

The function of intelligence officers under cover of diplomatic establishments is to arrange information exchanges with officials of local services, manage communications, serve as accommodation addresses and funding channels, and direct agents toward targets of interest. Official organizations used for cover are: Israeli Purchasing Missions and Israeli Government Tourist, El Al and Zim offices. Israeli construction firms, industrial groups and international trade organizations also provide nonofficial cover. Individuals working under deep or illegal cover are normally charged with penetrating objectives that require a long-range, more subtle approach, or with activities in which the Israeli Government can never admit complicity.

Many Israelis have come from Arab countries where they were born and educated and appear more Arab than Israeli in speech, demeanor, and attitude. By forging passports and identity documents of Arab and western countries and providing sound background legends and cover, Mossad has successfully sent into Egypt and other Arab countries Israelis disguised and documented as Arabs or citizens of European countries.

There are numerous persons in Israel who have a thorough area and language knowledge of any area of interest to the intelligence services. These area experts can render extremely valuable assistance in analyzing intelligence information and formulating country requirements, thus contributing to the total operational potential since they enable Israeli intelligence officers to estimate rapidly the efficiency and reliability of their agents and informants. These persons are also useful for their ability to pass completely for a citizen of the nation in question. The Israeli talent for counterfeiting for forging passports

and documents ably supports the agent's authenticity.

The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various Jewish communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general information. The aggressively ideological nature of Zionism, which emphasizes that all Jews belong to Israel and must return to Israel, had had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence operations, however, since there is considerable opposition to Zionism among Jews throughout the world. Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate discreetly within Jewish communities and are under instructions to handle their missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition. Despite such precautions, the Israelis frequently experience setbacks and there have been several cases where attempted recruitments of Americans of the Jewish faith have been rejected and reported to US authorities.

Israel's program for accelerating its technological, scientific and military development as rapidly as possible has been enhanced by exploiting scientific exchange programs. Mossad plays a key role in this endeavor. In addition to the large-scale acquisition of published scientific papers and technical journals from all over the world through overt channels, the Israelis devote a considerable portion of their covert operations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence

diplomatic and journalistic cover.

Mossad recruitment, training and control of agents varies widely, depending upon the target, area of operation and the desk in headquarters. While there is a certain amount of standardization in the handling of operations, Israeli intelligence officers appear to have considerable freedom in running operations. There is no hard rule requiring specific headquarters' approval prior to the recruitment of an agent except in the case of Communist countries. Name traces are requested of headquarters' voluminous files but this is not a consistent routine. Contemplated operations against the USSR and the East European countries, however, are approached very cautiously, and entail a great deal of headquarters planning and control and a special branch composed of area experts is responsible for authorizing and directing this activity. Mossad is especially interested in early warning regarding such developments as the dispatch of Soviet military units from the USSR to the Near East. There also exists within, or affiliated with, Mossad a small unit whose sole objective is to remind the Soviets through propaganda and contacts about the Jewish question at any point throughout the world. All sorts of people, even Cyrus Eaton, have been stimulated to raise the subject. Israeli efforts must at times be effective because the Soviets often attack the Israeli service in their propaganda with detailed revelations of Israeli plots against allegedly innocent Soviet citizens.

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This had included attempts to penetrate certain classified defense projects in the United States and other Western nations.

The United Nations is a major target for Mossad penetration because it is a major sponsor of international exchanges in all fields and because of its importance in settling disputes between Israel and the Arab states. Israeli agents operate at the UN under

The Israelis select their agents almost exclusively from persons of Jewish origin. However, there are security hazards involved in cases of divided allegiance between dedication to the Zionist State of Israel and loyalty to a homeland. The recruitment of Gentiles is comparatively rare.

Many Arabs, especially walk-ins, have directly or indirectly helped the services, usually as a result of

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monetary inducements, but the Israelis do not consider these Arabs good sources of reliable information. More often, they recruit Palestinians over whom they may have more control because of bank assets frozen in Israel since the war in 1948. In certain cases these bank assets have been released for intelligence services rendered.

The Israelis are prepared to capitalize on nearly every kind of agent motivation. A substantial effort is made to appeal to Jewish racial or religious proclivities, pro-Zionism, dislike of anti-Semitism, anti-Soviet feelings (if applicable) and humanitarian instincts. Blackmail is also used. Other recruiting techniques include the proffer of money, business opportunities, or release from prison. Among the Arabs, money has been especially effective. Appeals have also been made successfully to other Arab vulnerabilities such as jealousy, rivalry, fear and political dissension.

The Israelis have used false-flag recruitment pitches extensively and successfully. In several cases they approached citizens of Western European nations under the cover of a national NATO intelligence organization for operations in Arab target countries.

While intelligence officers in the field recognize the importance of security, they tend to be careless. Although otherwise well trained, Israeli intelligence officers occasionally have been lax in their use of the telephone abroad. Also, they often have given away a considerable amount of information by confiding in agents and contacts with whom they have had only a slight relationship. Nonetheless, they periodically recall the basic principles of their profession, and for awhile complicate the lives of their agents with a welter of security regulations that they themselves eventually transgress. Occasionally a rendezvous arranged between an officer and an agent, is countersurveilled by two or more officers, both to spot possible surveillance of the meeting and to protect the officer. In the recruiting process, the officer generally uses a fictitious name, executes a secrecy agreement with the prospective agent, and provides him with a pseudo, nym or alias. Whenever money or other gratuity is given to an agent, an attempt is made to secure a signed receipt in the agent's handwriting.

Although an agent occasionally may be sent to Israel for special training, this course of action is neither easy nor inexpensive to accomplish. Therefore, the intelligence officer himself is usually responsible for training the agent in the fundamentals of tradecraft, security

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measures, and the use of radio and code communications. If the exigencies of the situation demand special training, the Israelis rent an apartment for this purpose in places like Paris and New York. Agents who have

At present Mossad... maintains liaison with foreign intelligence and security services through membership in the Kilowatt group, an organization which is concerned with Arab terrorism and is comprised of West Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Israel. ... The Israelis have over the years made efforts to break the Arab ring encircling Israel by involvement with non-Arab Moslem nations in the Near East. A formal trilateral liaison called the Trident organization was established by Mossad with Turkey's National Security Service (TNSS) and Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK) in late 1958.

been so trained were taught to mix and use secret ink; conceal documents and letters on the person; deliver information to secure hiding places; and to communicate otherwise with the case officer and/or headquarters.

The methods of communication vary greatly depending on locations and circumstances. Personal meetings between the agent and his case officer are arranged by secret writing, open mail, or oral message by couriers. The cities or towns to be used have code names and the meeting places are at specified times with alternative times and places. In case of emergency, the agent can alert the intelligence officer by use of a prearranged open code in cables or letters, or if time permits, by secret writing or courier.

The Israelis place considerable emphasis on personal relationships with their agents. They have been known to be exceedingly generous in granting personal concessions and monetary assistance to keep their agents happy. One such individual, a journalist in Paris who recruited French officials and elicited information from witting and unwitting informants in the French political world, was paid the equivalent of US\$1,000 per month. After years of steady employment and a succession of Israeli case officers, his services were gently but peremptorily terminated. Severance pay was calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each year of service to assuage any hard feelings. On the other hand, the Israelis can be absolutely ruthless to both the intelligence officer and the agent if the latter's disaffection or treachery should threaten a sensitive operation or endanger the security of the state. There are several cases of Jews in Europe who, while or after working for the Israeli service, trafficked with the Egyptians for substantial sums of money. These Jews were enticed into traveling to Israel or abducted, tried in camera, and given stiff prison terms of 10 to 14 years.

Mossad headquarters controls the acquisition, flow and dissemination of reports in a rigid manner, which contrasts with the considerable freedom allowed in running operations. An Israeli intelligence officer abroad must accept all information reported by an agent and may not change a single word. The intelligence officer receives detailed, prepared questions from headquarters and is allowed little leeway in terms of what he submits. In a meeting with an agent, many of whom are low-level, the intelligence officer debriefs him on the basis of headquarters questions. The intelligence officer must then forward all the agent says, even overt information. The intelligence officer may if he wishes add his own remarks to the report.

Mossad headquarters does not disseminate agents reports to all customer agencies. The overwhelming

bulk of the reports goes to one specific analytical unit, for example, usually reports on Arab affairs are sent to Military Intelligence, counterintelligence reports to Shin Beth. However, an exceptional agent report is disseminated to Israeli policymakers. The Mossad intelligence officer abroad does not show copies of his reports to the Israeli Ambassador, but sends them only to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv.

The Israeli services have a very keen interest in the use and development of technical equipment. As far back as 1947-1948, the Information Service conducted technical surveillance operations against Arab and British delegates to the UN. Mossad, with assistance from Shin Beth, has provided technical training to the Turkish and Ghanaian security and intelligence services. Exchanges of technical equipment and information have also been carried out with the Japanese intelligence and security services. Mossad receives support in external technical operations from Shin Beth and Military Intelligence. The technical capabilities of the Israeli services are adequate for normal demands. Moreover, the very close coordination existing between the services and the industrial concerns of the country ensure that technical equipment to support continuing audio operations is supplied and developed as needed. The existence of a limited research program, coupled with high Israeli competence in technical matters, indicates that the Israelis intend to remain abreast of advances in autosurveillance and countermeasures.

a. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SERVICES—Mossad has good relationships with Shin Beth, Military Intelligence, the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Special Tasks Division of the police. Successes like the Entebbe raid are illustrative of well-coordinated planning and execution—a testimonial to good relations among the services.

The Agranat Commission advocated greater coordination between the services and revived the post of intelligence adviser to monitor interdirectorate disputes. The exchanges between Mossad and the other services through the coordinating mechanism of the Va'adat and the use of ad hoc committees, however, continue to ensure coordination and cooperation between the services.

b. LIAISON WITH FOREIGN SERVICES—Mossad has liaison relationships with many of intelligence and security services throughout the world. With a few exceptions, the Directorate of Foreign Liaison and Political Action is responsible for relations with most foreign organizations. In most instances the point of contact is abroad in foreign capitals, although some foreign services insist on liaison in Israel.

At present Mossad, in coordination with Shin Beth, maintains liaison with foreign intelligence and security services through membership in the Kilowatt group, an organization which is concerned with Arab terrorism and is comprised of West Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Israel. The Israelis also have informal connections regarding terrorism with other European nations, including Spain, Portugal and Austria.

The Israelis have over the years made efforts to break the Arab ring encircling Israel by involvement with non-Arab Moslem nations in the Near East. A formal trilateral liaison called the Trident organization was established by Mossad with Turkey's National Security Service (TNSS) and Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK) in late 1958. Since the original agreement there has been an addition to Mossad's bilateral relationship with each service. The Trident organization involves continuing intelligence exchange plus semiannual meetings at the chief of service level.

The general terms of the original agreement with the Turks, aside from legitimizing Israeli liaison with Turkey, stated that Mossad would furnish information on the activity of Soviet agents in Turkey and those working against Turkey throughout the Middle East. In return, the Turks agreed to supply Israel with information on the political intentions of the Arab countries which could affect the security of Israel, and the activity and identifications of UAR agents working against Israel. The Israeli service has also given the Turks counterespionage and technical training.

The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the development of a pro-Israel and anti-Arab policy on the part of Iranian officials. Mossad has engaged in joint operations with SAVAK over the years since the late 1950s. Mossad aided SAVAK activities and supported the Kurds in Iraq. The Israelis also regularly transmitted to the Iranians intelligence reports on Egypt's activities in the Arab countries, trends and developments in Iraq, and Communist activities affecting Iran.

Israeli liaison in Africa has varied considerably from country to country, depending on the exigencies of the situation. Israeli intelligence activities in Africa have usually been carried out under the cover of military and police training, arms sales to national military forces, and aid and development programs. The Arab nations, in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity, have brought great pressure to bear on most African nations to break all formal ties with Israel. Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Israel and many of the African nations, the Israelis still maintain good intelligence liaison with certain African services. The Israelis also have relations with the Kenyan Service. In Central Africa the Israelis are still active in Zaire. In West Africa the Israelis trained the Liberian Security Service and police. They also helped establish the Ghanaian Military Intelligence Service. In southern Africa the Israelis have a relationship with the South African intelligence and security services.

The Israelis have been very active in Latin America over the years. One of the greatest intelligence coups, the capture of Adolph Eichmann, the former Nazi leader, occurred in Argentina. Recently, much of their liaison activity in Latin America has centered on training and antiterrorist operations. The Israeli Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, for example, provides cover for a Mossad regional station responsible for Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Officers from this post have gone to Buenos Aires to give training to the Argentines; in the course of these contacts the Israelis recommended greater involvement in joint antiterrorist operations. The Israelis also maintain liaison with security services of Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Caracas is the Regional Center for north and western Latin America and Central America.

The Israelis have operated for sometime in East Asia. They have provided intelligence training to the Government of the Republic of China and maintain

liaison with it. The Israelis also have relations with the Japanese, Thai, Indonesian, and South Korean services, especially on terrorist matters. The major Mossad regional center in East Asia is in Singapore. The Israeli station chief there frequently travels throughout the area and conducts business with services in the neighboring nations. Indonesia as a Moslem nation does not have formal diplomatic ties with Israel. The Mossad-Indonesian relationship, therefore, is very discreet. The Mossad representative in Singapore is accredited to the Indonesian service. There are also Mossad officers in Jakarta under commercial cover. The primary reason for the Indonesian liaison is to gain aid in counterterrorist efforts. The Israelis, on the other hand, are not only engaging in antiterrorist operations but also have an opportunity to collect information and engage in political action in another Moslem power.

C. Shin Beth—Counterespionage and Internal Security Service

1. Functions

Shin Beth has the responsibility in Israel for counterespionage and internal security and the service is basically internally oriented. Shin Beth is primarily responsible for collecting information on foreign intelligence organizations, both hostile and friendly, and their activities; protecting the security of Israeli officials and installations abroad; and investigating all forms of subversion directed by either internal or external forces, including sabotage and terrorism in Israel and abroad. Shin Beth evaluates all information developed, collates it with other material routinely and overtly available from both Israeli and foreign sources, and submits evaluated reports to the appropriate government agencies for action. Shin Beth operates to combat two main adversaries: the Arabs and the Soviet and Eastern European intelligence and security services.

The Israeli Consulate in Rio de Janeiro... provides cover for a Mossad regional station responsible for Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Officers from this post have gone to Buenos Aires to give training to the Argentines.... The Israelis also maintain liaison with security services of Mexico, Nicaragua [under Somoza], Costa Rica, and Panama, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Caracas is the Regional Center for north and western Latin America and Central America.

Shin Beth at one time engaged in positive intelligence operations and immigration affairs in the Balkan countries, particularly in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and in Hungary, but no longer does. Shin Beth is the government's authority on personnel and

physical security matters, is responsible for the personal security of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense.

Shin Beth does not have the power of arrest, which is the right only of the Special Tasks Division of the Investigations Department of the Israeli Police, a national force with headquarters in Jerusalem. When an arrest is desired, Shin Beth submits a detailed report on the case plus a request for an arrest warrant to the Ministry of Justice. The Legal Department transmits the request to the Special Tasks Division, which issues the warrant and makes the arrest. When more expeditious handling is justified, Shin Beth directly notifies the Special Tasks Division, which is empowered to take the suspect into temporary custody pending receipt of the warrant. On occasion a Shin Beth officer will sit in court with the prosecution staff as a special consultant.

Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Israel and many of the African nations, the Israelis still maintain good intelligence liaison with certain African services. The Israelis also have relations with the Kenyan service. In Central Africa the Israelis are still active in Zaire. In West Africa the Israelis trained the Liberian Security Service and police. They also helped establish the Ghanaian [sic] Military Intelligence Service. In southern Africa the Israelis have a relationship with the South African intelligence and security services.

2. Organization

Shin Beth is organized into eight operational and functional departments: (1) Arab Affairs; (2) Non-Arab Affairs; (3) Protective Security; (4) Operational Support; (5) Technology; (6) Interrogation and Legal Counsel; (7) Coordination and Planning; and (8) Administration. Regional departments in the field are located in the Gaza/Sinai area with headquarters in Ashqelon; the Northern area with headquarters in Haifa; and the West Bank area with headquarters in Jerusalem. A unit within Shin Beth national headquarters in Tel Aviv serves as the fourth regional department. These regional departments are broken down into subdivisions identical to but smaller than those of the parent organization (Figure 6).

The Arab Affairs Department is responsible for counterespionage, antiterrorist operations, control of political subversion, research and the maintenance of a counterintelligence index on Arabs. The components handling these activities are organized into offensive and defensive sections. This department operates through field offices controlled by regional officers. These officers report to the regional commanders but rely on the Arab Affairs Department for guidance and

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support, which includes aid in counterespionage, countersabotage and surveillance as well as research and records support. The overall headquarters function is that of determining doctrine, systematizing work and supervising.

The Non-Arab Department handles counterintelligence operations dealing with all other countries, countersubversion (one component dealing with Communist subversion, the other with non-Communist New Left subversion), foreign liaison and research. Each unit dealing with these activities has offensive and defensive sections. The Non-Arab Department investigates and counters espionage activity by foreign powers, both hostile and friendly, by all known methods, including the penetration of their intelligence services and diplomatic installations in Israel. Operations against foreign missions within Israel were formerly conducted by Military Intelligence, but with the evolution towards greater centralization and professional specialization since the reorganization of 1951, this function has been the responsibility of Shin Beth.

The Non-Arab Affairs Department engages in the penetration of extremist political parties such as MAKI (the Communist Party of Israel); RAKAH (the New Communist List), a largely Arab-supported splinter group; SIAH (the New Israel Left); and anti-Zionist and extreme rightist organizations. The Department also investigates counterfeiting, blackmarketing, the smuggling of money and goods in and out of the country, and violations of the economic control laws. It is responsible for tapping telephone lines and intercepting domestic and diplomatic telephone conversations.

The Non-Arab Affairs Department is responsible for foreign liaison and handles all correspondence by Shin Beth with other foreign intelligence and security services. The interrogation of immigrants from the USSR and Eastern European nations is also undertaken by this department.

The Protective Security Department is responsible for the protection of Israeli Government buildings and embassies, El Al and Zim installations and craft, defense industries and scientific establishments, and leading personalities. This department is also charged with the security of all important industrial plants, especially those of actual or potential military value,

and is engaged in the prevention of leakage of industrial secrets such as patents, processes, statistics, etc. It also carries on liaison with security officers throughout the Israeli Government. Although guards and security officers are paid by the institutions to which they are assigned, their recruitment, training, and control is a Shin Beth responsibility. The Protective Security Department controls the security of internal communications and the secrecy of information. A small unit within the department, for example, handles all matters concerning espionage with the Office of Mail and Telegraph Censorship.

The Protective Security Department directs Shin Beth security activities overseas including the protection of Israeli personnel, diplomatic and transport offices, facilities and equipment. Although Mossad has responsibility for unilateral operations and liaison on intelligence matters and Military Intelligence controls the attaché system and military liaison, Shin Beth handles protective security and liaison with local security services abroad to safeguard Israeli personnel and property. For instance, there is a regional Protective Security office in Paris which is concerned primarily with El Al and Zim security.

The Operational Support Department is responsible for assisting the operational departments with surveillance, observation, airport security, censorship, listening devices, special tasks and counteraudio support. This department has tactical components, which aid in counterintelligence operations, VIP protection and telephone taps. The Department provides support in running a highly developed intercept operation from a switchboard installed in Shin Beth offices. This enables the service to avoid having to make taps either across pairs in a local box or even in the telephone centrals under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Communications Telephone Services; and also avoids any possible compromise by leftist employees of the Telephone Services.

The Technology Department lends support to the operating departments in electronics, mechanics, and chemistry. It provides technical support to operations in the following areas: audio and visual surveillance, communications, photography, surreptitious entry, telephone taps, mail censorship, security devices, etc.

The Interrogation and Legal Counsel Department handles all counterintelligence and security interroga-

tions for Shin Beth operating departments not handed over to the Special Tasks Division of the police. This department makes selective use of the polygraph. It also checks the reliability of Mossad sources, fabricators, and suspect double agents. Personnel in this component travel to the field as required to give polygraph tests and conduct interrogations. The department also assists in preparing cases for trial and provides other legal assistance to operating departments as needed.

The Coordination and Planning Department has responsibility for coordination of counterintelligence and security methodology, training, security recruitment and the central registry. This department maintains the Shin Beth card files, with the exception of those on Arabs. In addition to ordinary carding procedures, there is an entry on every individual in the country who has a police record. This enables all government offices to make a quick check on the police record of present or potential employees through Shin Beth. All tracing procedures are channeled into this department, from name checks through neighborhood investigations. This registry uses a military computer. The registry on Arabs is not yet computerized because of the difficulty with Arabic names.


The Administration Department performs the usual functions of personnel management, finance, supply, transport, communications, and security.

A policy body within Shin Beth is called the Directorate of the Service. It normally meets once a month. Membership consists of department directors (including the regional directors), all of whom are of equal rank.

3. Administrative practices

The Director of Shin Beth is appointed by the Prime Minister who may seek advice for the appointment but needs no approval from either the cabinet or the Knesset.

Shin Beth is responsible for the security of all civilian intelligence and security personnel. Furthermore, it also recruits and selects personnel, according to specific requirements based on loyalty to the state, education, capability and potential, and subject to the approval of the individual civilian service. The military is somewhat more autonomous in regard to



security procedures relating to their personnel because military security components handle most of these cases. Shin Beth, however, sets the policies and standards for military security controls.

Among the 500 officers in Shin Beth are some 100 individuals who have been selected, screened, and trained to serve as security officers throughout the governmental structure. These officers are stationed in the Prime Minister's office, intelligence and security components including Mossad, scientific institutes, El Al installations, and foreign service posts.

Most career employees, a few of whom are women, have broad educational backgrounds and experience. About one-third of Shin Beth officers are assigned abroad early in their careers as security officers where they come under the operational and administrative control of Mossad. Upon return to Israel from foreign assignment, Shin Beth officers revert to the internal security service. Because senior Mossad and Shin Beth officers are given identical training in a combined advanced operational school, their *modus operandi* is similar.

There is a certain amount of personnel exchange among the services. Shin Beth may accept an army major or colonel on temporary assignment or recruit a retiring officer on a permanent basis. All recruits are subject to a thorough background security investigation culminating in a physical examination, polygraph tests, and psychiatric screening. Security checks on native born Israelis are relatively easy to do, for the young Israeli, whose life is well documented, rarely enjoys the luxury of privacy. Police files, school records, university professors, army records, youth movements, political affiliations, voting records, family history, political persuasions, and friends are scrutinized. If the applicant is foreign born, detailed immigration records may reveal pertinent information which can be cross-checked. Loyalty to Israel is the principal criterion. If the subject was a Zionist from early youth, he belongs to a special category; if he has never belonged to the leftist parties, MAPAM, MAKI and RAKAH, or to Herut, a rightist party, his employment opportunities are considerably enhanced. It is almost impossible for a Jew to disguise his past when he is once in the hands of the authorities since there are in Israel many thoroughly reliable persons from every country which has or had a Jewish community, who can be consulted for information on potential recruits.

The Director of Shin Beth is a civil service Class 1 officer. He has an expense and entertainment allowance. There is a rather insignificant differential between grades which is compensated by fairly impressive perquisites, including living quarters, transportation and travel, especially in the senior ranks.

4. Methods of operation

Shin Beth operations within Israel can be broken down into the four following categories: against foreigners in general, against Arabs, against Communists, and against Israelis. There appears to be little difference in the application of techniques, but a greater deal in intensity, much of which is directed against the Arabs.

The activities and opinions of diplomats both within and outside their diplomatic establishments in Israel are of primary interest to Shin Beth. Generally, the Israeli Government tends to regard diplomats as being there to ferret information rather than to promote cordial relations.

The degree of suspicion and intensity of operations against diplomats is conditioned by the prevailing relations between countries and their long-term diplomatic objectives. Shin Beth operations with the police and Military Intelligence are well coordinated. The Israeli police work very closely with Shin Beth in guarding foreign installations such as embassies and consulates, and in surveilling diplomats, foreign journalists, and tourists of special interest. Police officers maintain a 24-hour watch in front of all embassies, legations, consulates, and ambassadorial residences. They record the comings and goings of foreign personnel, especially diplomatic officers who

appear after regular office hours or on weekends. They also record the license numbers of vehicles in which the officers arrive and depart. Diplomatic license plates differ in color from civilian plates and carry a numerical prefix which identifies the country represented.

The security of the border areas and the occupied territories is mainly the responsibility of Military Intelligence, the Border Guard and Shin Beth. Through the use of informants, who may be local Arabs or Oriental Jews posing as Arabs, Shin Beth has

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penetrated subversive Arab elements including Communist cells and Arab nationalist groups. They have also picked up local Arab espionage agents on their way back to neighboring countries and doubled them in coordination with Military Intelligence. Shin Beth is continually active in the fight against terrorism.

Aside from the Arab target, Shin Beth is primarily concerned with the subversive elements of the left. MAKI and RAKAH owe their allegiance to the USSR but being legal parties, they have had representatives in the Knesset. Shin Beth has thoroughly penetrated the cells of the Communist apparatus, following its activities through informants, surveillance, and technical operations. Shin Beth agents attend many international Communist front meetings.

Since all foreigners, regardless of nationality or religion, including Jews, are considered potential threats to the State of Israel, Shin Beth employs a large number of informants among local Israelis who are in contact with foreigners by reason of their employment or activities. In this category are bartenders, hotel clerks, telephone operators, secretaries, taxi drivers, caterers, maids, prostitutes, chauffeurs, and waiters. It also includes trade unionists, scientists, and others in the educational field.

There is an Israeli law that authorizes the police and the security services to pick up and detain for questioning any Israeli citizen who is in contact with a foreigners without official permission or obvious reason such as employment or business. Since diplomats are subject to surveillance, Shin Beth soon becomes aware of their contacts with Israeli citizens. When a pattern develops, and suspicion is aroused, attempts are made to develop further information using wire tapping and other technical aids. It is not uncommon for representatives of Shin Beth to call on the Israeli and attempt to enlist his cooperation. If the individual refuses, the Penal Revision Law (State Security) is cited to him and he is threatened with dire consequences. This usually evokes compliance. The Israeli security authorities also seek evidence of illicit love affairs which can be used as leverage to enlist cooperation. In one instance, Shin Beth tried to

penetrate the US Consulate General in Jerusalem through a clerical employee who was having an affair with a Jerusalem girl. They rigged a fake abortion case against the employee in an unsuccessful effort to recruit him. Before this attempt at blackmail, they had tried to get the Israeli girl to elicit information from her boyfriend.

Two other important targets in Israel are the US Embassy in Tel Aviv and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) with headquarters in Jerusalem. There have been two or three crude efforts to recruit Marine guards for monetary reward. In the cases affecting UNTSO personnel, the operations involved intimidation and blackmail.

In 1954, a hidden microphone planted by the Israelis was discovered in the Office of the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv. In 1956, telephone taps were found connected to two telephones in the residence of the US military attache. In 1960, a microphone was discovered behind the wall plaster in what had been the office of the Operations Officer in the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Office.

Recently, the Director of the Shin Beth, in testimony before a judicial committee of the Knesset, stated that Shin Beth makes entries and taps telephones in Israel with some frequency. Reportedly, the only concern of the committee members was with the disposition by Shin Beth of acquired information which did not bear on national security. It is noted that these activities have no basis in law and are conducted on the authority of the Director of Shin Beth alone.

The Israelis have shown themselves to be most adept at surveillance and surreptitious entry operations. Men and women frequently are used together on surveillance teams in order to allay suspicion. If a person under surveillance stops to use a public telephone, the surveillance team reports the situation to the control center which immediately notifies the telephone tapping unit and an attempt is made to intercept the call. The conversation or pertinent information is then relayed to the team on street. Shin Beth personnel are experts at entering private quarters where they go through visitors' luggage and personal papers. Special portable camera equipment is used for this purpose and the results are processed in the Shin Beth laboratory. Shin Beth technicians have concealed radio transmitters in phonograph cases, in the false bottoms of coffee cans, and in the bottoms of portable cooking stoves which can be used as stoves without removing the communication equipment.

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D. Military Intelligence

1. Functions

Military Intelligence is charged with the collection, production and dissemination of military, geographic and economic intelligence, especially on the Arab nations, and security in the Defense Forces and Administered Territories. This component is an element of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and a part of the Defense Forces General Staff. The Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) is a member of Va'adat. Although Air Force and Navy Intelligence officers are subordinate to their respective commanders, they are members of the DMI's staff and attend his staff meetings.

2. Organization

Military Intelligence headquarters consist of the following departments: (1) Production; (2) the Intelligence Corps; (3) Foreign Relations; and (4) Field Security and Military Censorship. The DMI also directs Field Security Units, Territorial Command Combat Intelligence and Air Force and Navy Intelligence through coordination with their respective area commanders (Figure 7).

The Production Department is responsible for preparing the national intelligence estimates (versions of which appear as the *Middle East Review* or *Survey* for distribution to friendly liaison services). This department also produces daily finished intelligence reports and daily bulletins, which contains raw or partially analyzed information. Estimates are now prepared by Military Intelligence, Mossad and the Research and Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Production Department has about 40 percent (approximately 2,800) of the personnel in Military Intelligence. About 600, of whom 150 are officers and analysts, are involved in intelligence production. The number of analysts, however, varies, as specialists are coopted by the department for special studies in technical and economic matters. This department is under the command of a deputy director of Military

Intelligence.

The Production Department is divided into the following units: (1) Geographical (or Regional) Division; (2) Functional (or Technical) Division and (3) Documentation (or Registry and Records) Division. The Geographical Division evaluates information and compiles target studies on the Arab countries. It is divided into three area desks: the Western, consisting of Egypt, Sudan and Libya; the Eastern, consisting of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; and the Southern, consisting of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. Every effort is made in this division to create the narrowest type of specialist—a man who can devote himself to his material for over a period of years. For example, in the middle 1960s the Jordanian Desk Chief had held his job for 15 years and probably knew more about the Jordanian military than most Jordanian Army officers.

The Functional Division is broken down into substantive units which deal with such subjects as Near Eastern economics, inter-Arab relations, Palestinian affairs and international activities in the Near East. The division produces intelligence on technical and economic matters, including weapons and electronics and production, and area developments. The unit draws heavily on the knowledge of the IDF technical services. There is close cooperation between the geographical and functional divisions in producing accurate and timely intelligence. The existence of a desk concerned with international activities in the Near East, including Soviet affairs, indicates that the functional division deals with the policies of other nations as they affect the area.

The Documentation Division actually employs over half of the personnel in the Production Department. All reports are sent first to this component, which keeps a permanent record copy and numbers, cards, indexes and cross-references documents as necessary. It then forwards copies to appropriate offices. The Documentation Division reportedly has now installed computers to aid in the dissemination and research support process. The registry component of this unit services the entire Military Intelligence establishment. This Division is the repository for all Military

Intelligence reports and publications and is responsible for the dissemination of finished intelligence and also supervises the intelligence operations center, which operates 24 hours a day. This center is the terminal for all direct access field communications and presumably is designed to provide rapid review and dissemination of information in a crisis situation.

The Intelligence Corps is responsible for overt and covert collection operations, including all signal intelligence activities for the Israeli intelligence community, and for operational support functions. The Corps is subordinate to the DMI and is under the command of the Chief Intelligence Officer. This unit consists of a large headquarters staff which supervises subordinate operational field elements. Although it has no authority over area command assets, the Corps may levy requirements on these field elements. The Corps supervises the use of technical devices in operations. All requirements levied on the Corps must be validated by the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence.

The Corps is broken down into the following divisions: (1) Collection, responsible for signals intelligence, agent operations, overt sources and long distance observation units; (2) General Headquarters which is in charge of the military intelligence school, the Technical Development Institute, communications and cartography; (3) Training; (4) Organization, Logistics and Personnel; and (5) Research and Development.

The Signals Branch of the Collection Division, which includes communications and electronic intelligence and landline operations, collects communications intelligence for the entire intelligence and security community. The actual collection operation is performed by the IDF Signal Corps. The Israeli Air Force also participates and maintains liaison with other service components on electronic warfare. The Israelis have been very successful in their COMINT and ELINT operations against the Arabs. During the Six-Day War in 1967, the Israelis succeeded in intercepting, breaking and disseminating a tremendous volume of Arab traffic quickly and accurately, including a high-level conversation between the late




Figure 7. Organization of Military Intelligence, 1977

President Gamal Abd-Nasser of the UAR and King Hussein of Jordan. Over the years the Israelis have mounted cross-border operations and tapped Arab landline communications for extended periods. The Israelis have also on occasion boobytrapped the landlines.

The Agents Branch is in charge of all agent operations run by Military Intelligence. The Branch is not permitted to run agent operations abroad but it has sole jurisdiction over agent operations across the borders of Israel into neighboring states. The Agents Branch has executive authority over Shin Beth operations which are run against the intelligence service of a neighboring Arab State. Egypt and Syria are the prime operational targets. The Interrogation Unit of the Agents Branch controls POW interrogation teams which are especially trained and prepared to accompany any major IDF military operation beyond the ceasefire lines. These teams are keystones in Military Intelligence tactical operations. Interrogators use a variety of deception techniques in questioning prisoners. Although prisoners are usually treated well, interrogators may give the initial impression that other prisoners have been mistreated or even executed for failure to cooperate. Arabic-speaking IDF interrogators sometimes pose as Arab officers and circulate among prisoners to elicit information. These techniques usually produce a large quantity of information from captured enemy personnel.

The Open Sources Division collects and collates all material from overt sources. This component, however, does not evaluate the information.

The Long Distance Observation Units are primarily concerned with visual sightings of Arab activity along the borders and armistice lines. These units also provide support to agent cross-border operations and leads to signal intelligence units based on observations of Arab movements across the borders.

The General Headquarters Division runs the Military Intelligence School and the Technical Development Institute and is in charge of communications and cartography. DMI has the largest technical capability of any of the Israeli intelligence services. It has a highly competent RD&E component which produces equipment needed for military intelligence operations. Because it is the largest, and at one time the only, engineering shop in the Israeli intelligence community, it takes on some projects from other services.

The Communications Branch handles all matters involving wireless communication for agent operations. Officials in this branch train agent operators, draw up signal plans, and maintain radio contact with agents in place. From time to time this branch also provides support for Mossad and Shin Beth.

The Cartographic Branch has responsibility for map production and works in close cooperation with the Director of the Survey Department in the Ministry of Labor. There are approximately 300 personnel assigned to the Map Survey Office (Survey of Israel). Offices are located near the intersection of Lincoln and Yehuda Halevi streets in Tel Aviv.

The Training Division is responsible for the intelligence doctrine taught in the Military Intelligence School and in troop units. It has evidently absorbed the training responsibilities of Field Security and Combat Intelligence units. The Military Intelligence School curriculum includes combat intelligence, strategic intelligence and "special studies." The school may provide some training for personnel of other Israeli intelligence and security services.

The Organization, Logistics and Personnel Division is responsible for administrative tasks. The head of this division functions as the DMI's designee on all logistical and personnel matters. The division consists of three components: Logistics, Personnel and Finance.

The Research and Development Division is primarily concerned with computer operations and programming in support of Military Intelligence production, operations and requirements.

The Foreign Relations Department is responsible for liaison between the IDF and foreign military organiza-

tions and for Israeli Defense Attache affairs. This department is reportedly divided into two companies: the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division and the Attaches' Division. The Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division conducts liaison with representatives of foreign intelligence services which have agreements with Military Intelligence. This division also has control over visits by officers and training of troops from foreign countries in Israel. Foreign Intelligence Liaison is also the official point of contact for all foreign defense attaches in Israel. Activities such as

Tehran, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, Brasilia and Caracas. Several of these attaches are also accredited to adjacent countries. The true role of most defense missions and attache posts is to sell Israeli defense industry products and purchase defense equipment for the IDF. There are few posts which are actually attache offices in the traditional sense, the principal ones being in Washington, London, and Paris. Israeli defense attaches abroad advise their respective ambassadors, report on host country military matters, keep abreast of all research and development in the host

Ministry of Defense Missions and Israeli Defense Attaches are located in Washington, New York City, London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Ankara, Tehran, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, Brasilia and Caracas. Several of these attaches are also accredited to adjacent countries. The true role of most defense missions and attache posts is to sell Israeli defense industry products and purchase defense equipment.... There are few posts which are actually attache offices in the traditional sense, the principal ones being in Washington, London and Paris. Israeli defense attaches abroad advise their respective ambassadors, report on host country military matters, keep abreast of all research and development in the host country and in general, represent the IDF abroad. Attaches also do operational work for Mossad.

visits to installations, exchanges of routine information, briefing sessions, etc. must first be cleared with Field Security and submitted to the DMI for a policy decision, if necessary. Attaches accredited or otherwise working in Israel on intelligence matters can expect to receive select information concerning other Near East and foreign nations within perimeters set by the DMI; thus an attache seeking information on specific questions of Israeli capabilities and materials would receive the data through this division. It is considered a "violation" of IDF "unwritten" policy for foreign military personnel in Israel to collect this type of information in any other way. In the past, Military Intelligence has provided much information on technical equipment supplied to other Middle East nations by the Soviet Bloc. This was especially true in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, when the Israelis captured vast quantities of Soviet material from the Arabs. It is believed that Foreign Intelligence Liaison may be divided into at least two components: General Intelligence and Technical Intelligence.

Within or attached to the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division is a Secret Liaison unit which handles all operations outside the normal charter of activities previously described. This unit may be involved either directly or indirectly in bilateral intelligence operations conducted by Military Intelligence with other services. Thus when a special relationship between a foreign military establishment and the IDF is arranged, this unit supplies the officers and controls the activities. This unit was involved in the excellent liaison relationship which at one time existed with France. Further, if Mossad decides that an Israeli military officer is in the best position to carry out a specific foreign operation, this unit will handle the matter. Operations controlled from this office in all cases are coordinated with Mossad.

The Foreign Relations Department directs the activities of Israeli Ministry of Defense Missions and Defense Attaches abroad through the Attaches' Division. Ministry of Defense Missions and Israeli Defense Attaches are located in Washington, New York City, London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Ankara,

country and in general, represent the IDF abroad. Attaches also do operational support work for Mossad. Israeli military missions have been sent to some countries for training and support purposes, but those missions have not been officially accredited to the country concerned.

The Field Security and Military Censorship Department is responsible for counterintelligence within the IDF, and conducts physical and personnel security investigations. Field Security is also responsible for security clearances of all personnel assigned to Military Intelligence. This Department conducts daily liaison with Shin Beth, which is responsible for IDF reserve personnel on inactive status and has final responsibility in counterintelligence and security cases. In the middle 1960s the Security Department included a Personnel Security Division to assign personnel, supervise and coordinate clearances and conduct surveillance. A Counterintelligence Division had the responsibility of ensuring security regarding communications, documents and installations. An Education and Training Division was responsible for troop security indoctrination. A computerized document checking office was set up in the early 1960s to control distribution and disposal of all Top Secret documents originating within the IDF. The Field Security Department coordinates and monitors the activities of Field Security units attached to the IDF territorial commands to maintain order. Each territorial commander is responsible for security in his area and uses Field Security units to preserve law and order. Israel is divided into Northern, Central and Southern commands plus the Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa districts. Both Tel Aviv District and the Central Command, also located there, are separate from IDF General Headquarters which is located in Tel Aviv. The Gaza Strip, although not contiguous to the Central Command, has been placed under that Command because pacification and antiterrorist operations in the past few years have succeeded in bringing relative stability to the area. Sinai is under the Southern Command, which has two Field Security units. In the mid-1960s the Northern Command has three Field

Security units.

Field Security officers serve in the territorial commands where they direct the activities of the various Field Security units and serve as points of contact for the Commands Security Departments and the territorial commanders. Field Security units are responsible for implementing and supervising security directives, including instructions, guidance and inspections. In the Administered Territories, Field Security Units cooperate with Shin Beth and the Border Guard to preserve security, combat terrorism and run counterintelligence operations. At brigade level in the three area commands, Field Security has military intelligence majors serving as security officers (and known as such) under the command of the Operations

Military Intelligence training is professional and extensive. Officers and analysts are well-trained and competent in their fields. The Military Intelligence School is located north of Tel Aviv on the road to Sde Dov airport.... Approximately 150 instructors and 90 support personnel train between 2,000 and 3,000 students annually.

Section (C-3). Security officers at battalion and company level are "coopted" from the infantry but are known as security officers only to unit commanders on the battalion level. At the company level, security personnel are sergeants.

The Military Censorship Office within the Field Security and Military Censorship Department is responsible for all censorship. In addition this component, by law, has extremely wide powers in dealing with the Israeli press and other mass media. In practice, the IDF has found it advisable to operate on a gentleman's agreement basis and depend largely on the good intentions of editors and the like to refrain from publishing stories about Israeli military secrets. This office operates on behalf of the entire IDF. Directors of Military Intelligence in the past have referred to Military Censorship as part of the "ballast" that they would prefer to see in the Chief of Staff's own office. The Chief of the Censorship Office is a member of the "Committee of Three" which acts as a Board of Appeal and final arbiter in all matters relating to censorship. The two other members are a representative of the press and a representative of the public at large. The last named must be agreed upon by both other parties. In effect all information is broken down into three categories: (1) items that are permitted without question, (2) items that are not permitted under any circumstances, and (3) items that must be cleared before publication. Blank spaces are found only infrequently in the press owing to a regulation which forbids this practice; for example, an entire page must be reset if a single item must be withdrawn from publication. All IDF publications and press releases must be coordinated with and approved by the Censorship Office. All information media, foreign and domestic, must submit any item having a security or significant political implication to the Censorship Office prior to its release. Most press organizations have a teletype link with the IDF to expedite this process; others must handcarry their items to the office. In the mid-1960s, this office was staffed largely by female soldiers.

The Censorship Office is in charge of monitoring outgoing communications from Israel to ensure that no information of military value is transmitted. If the monitor hears a discussion involving matters of military importance, he will cut off the conversation. On one occasion a monitor reportedly listened in on a private conversation and reported gleefully to his colleagues in the room what he heard. The monitor was fired on the spot. Monitoring activity concentrates largely on international telephone calls from foreign media personnel in Israel to their home offices abroad.

The Public Relations Office of Military Censorship has responsibility for all IDF press releases and all official contacts with the public. The Office handles relations with the press and the public in coordination with the Censorship Office. The Office also hosts foreign defense attaches in Israel in conjunction with the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division. As in the case of the Censorship Office, Directors of Military Intelligence would prefer to see the Public Relations Office directly under the command of the Chief of Staff.

The intelligence process within Military Intelligence operates largely by means of three regularly scheduled meetings of the key intelligence officers. First, there is a meeting twice a week or every three days at which the Director of the Production Department holds a briefing for the DMI and other top officers. Depending on the nature of the intelligence discussed, other production officers may also be present. On the basis of this meeting, the DMI issues instructions for action or levies requirements for information to the assembled staff officers. One half day after each of these biweekly meetings, the directors of Production and the Intelligence Corps meet to work out detailed planning and tactics on what each should do to follow up the DMI's broad directives. Immediately after this, the Director of the Intelligence Corps gathers together his own division chiefs and gives them guidelines for carrying out their immediate responsibilities. The liaison officer assigned to Mossad sits in on this meeting.

The DMI is always given finished intelligence. Individual items are summarized in not more than half a page and broken down into three paragraphs: (1) the facts; (2) comments; and (3) evaluation. These are put together on a "reading board" for selected top Israeli Government officials with appropriate marginal comments from the DMI. There are in addition daily, weekly, and monthly intelligence summaries which are designed to provide a continuing insight into the development of events or trends of interest to the government. These summaries, together with spot reports on separate items, fill much of the DMI's

latter part of December. While a precis is drawn up beforehand, the presentation is oral and is attended by senior government officials headed by the Prime Minister. The DMI uses the weekly summaries to a great extent in preparing his material. At the end of his formal remarks, the DMI opens the floor to questions. The minutes of the meeting are then put into finished form and circulated to key government officers on a need-to-know basis.

The DMI's major aid in doing his job is a progress report drawn up every three months by each of his department directors. He also reads raw intelligence reports from time to time for the purpose of getting the actual flavor of information presented to him in the special item reports or to evaluate the usefulness or nature of agent operations.

Although the DMI has an elaborate computer capability to assist in collating information, there is a need for more effective automatic data-processing equipment for the storage and retrieval of information.

The DMI assigns intelligence officers to the three Area Commands, where they are attached to the various intelligence staffs down to brigade level. Territorial commanders direct the collection of intelligence in their geographical areas and for some distance across the border. The Northern Command is responsible for operations against Lebanon and Syria while the Central Command controls operations against Jordan, Egypt and perhaps Saudi Arabia. Information is collected through border observation, reconnaissance patrols and cross-border operations.

Air Force and Navy Intelligence are small, highly specialized units concentrating on items of immediate concern to only the Air Force and Navy commands. The Directors of Air Force and Navy Intelligence attend the staff meetings of the DMI. Officers from each of these services are detailed to attend the regular meetings of the Research Department in order to coordinate reporting responsibility. Officers from both services are also permanently assigned to the Collection Department to coordinate requirements which are of particular concern to them.

a. AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE—Israeli Air Force Intelligence is a relatively small but efficient organization. Its main functions are to conduct intelligence operations necessary to support air activities and to coordinate with the DMI regarding its collection efforts. Air Force intelligence is concerned almost exclusively with Arab air order of battle and the collection of Arab aerial target data. This information is largely collected by aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT, with supplementary information provided by agent reports and prisoner interrogations in hot war

Military Intelligence is responsible for cross-border operations into the neighboring Arab states. Its operations rely heavily on the exploitation of: Arabs within Israel and the Administered Territories; Arab students, who though residents of Israel, attend universities in the Arab nations; Arab travelers and visitors; Arabs in Israeli prisons; and Arab military deserters, defectors, Bedouins and smugglers.

responsibilities as the Prime Minister's staff officer for intelligence. The Production Department may also generate special research or "think" pieces. Special reports are also written in response to requirements levied by Israeli agencies other than military intelligence.

One of the DMI's most important functions is to present the annual intelligence estimate during the

situations. The IDF relies heavily on photoreconnaissance for order of battle information. The Air Force has two photointerpretation facilities, but probably does not have more than 20 imagery interpreters. In 1970, all Air Force Intelligence facilities were permanent, although the Israelis planned to acquire several mobile facilities. While Air Force Intelligence does not produce estimates, it does prepare intelligence studies on air order of battle, threats and

capabilities. The Air Force administers its own attaches abroad.

Air Force procedures for handling imagery intelligence are highly centralized yet flexible. Israeli photoreconnaissance capabilities, however, are limited. Photographic coverage is not possible below 7,000 feet, and camera systems are not capable of revealing, for example, whether SAM (surface to air missile) sites are occupied. Additionally, Air Force photolaboratory quality control is almost nonexistent. Air Force Intelligence, despite its high standards, did not have enough imagery interpreters at the time of the Yom Kippur War and the overall skill level of those few was rather low.

b. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE—Naval Intelligence is a small, centralized service of approximately 110 people operating in support of Navy units. Most of the personnel are located in the Navy headquarters building in Tel Aviv. The service deals mostly with naval order of battle, foreign capabilities and seaborne threats. Naval Intelligence operates as a semiautonomous unit of Military Intelligence and is not obliged to provide personnel at the national intelligence level. Naval Intelligence personnel are not subordinate to the DMI except to give consultative assistance in naval matters. In the table of organization, the Director of Naval Intelligence falls under the Officer Commanding the Navy for operational and reporting matters and supports the top navy commands. The service is patterned after the Military Intelligence structure but is geared to the requirements and scope of navy functions and missions. The organization has a deputy director and Collection, Targeting, Production (Research) and Security Departments. It assigns officers to the naval bases at Haifa, Ashdod, Elat, Sharm el Shaykh and a commando unit based in southern Sinai. There is also a Protocol Department, which deals with foreign naval attaches in Israel, and a small organization and administration department (Figure 8).

The Collection Department, with about 17 personnel, is one of the smaller components in the Naval Intelligence structure. It has few integral operational resources and support for most of its collection efforts must come from or be coordinated through the DMI. Exceptions to this arrangement are Collection Department control of Israeli naval attaché activities abroad, small boat coastal operations, COMINT, ELINT and aerial reconnaissance in cooperation with Air Force Intelligence, and a merchant marine program. The post-World War II Israeli endeavor in clandestine arms procurement and illegal immigration developed important commercial and shipping contacts, some of which may still be handled by or at least coordinated with Naval Intelligence.


The Targeting Department, with about 20 personnel, is divided into two divisions: Syria/Lebanon and Egypt/North Africa. These divisions are responsible for: (1) preparing coastal studies for naval gunfire missions; (2) preparing beach studies for amphibious assaults; (3) preparing special target studies to support commando operations; and (4) preparing and maintaining target folder on Lebanese, Syrian and Egyptian ports. The Department has access to all sources of information available to the DMI. In addition to levying requirements for collection on the Military Intelligence Collection Department, the Director of Naval Intelligence is on regular distribution for information obtained by the DMI related to naval affairs.

The Production Department, with a staff of about 40, is the largest component of Naval Intelligence. This unit is divided into two divisions: (1) Arab Navies; and (2) the Soviet Navy. The Production Department handles research, analysis, production and dissemination of information on all mobile forces associated with Arab Navies and the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. This component is the primary user of all source material which flows into Naval headquarters, especially SIGINT information. The work of this department is mainly in support of units operating out of the four naval bases and the commando unit in southern Sinai. Production is limited largely to studies on enemy order of battle and special weapons. Those studies and others, including target folders, identifica-

tion manuals and enemy tactics outlines, are disseminated to operational commanders and crews through the base intelligence officers. The base intelligence officer disseminates such information by briefing crews or updating a ship's intelligence library through additions, updates and changes.

The Security Department, which has a staff of about 12, performs a limited counterintelligence function within Navy headquarters at all naval bases.

training; however, if a woman shows an interest in a naval intelligence career, she will be enrolled in the enlisted course of the Military Intelligence School. Naval Intelligence enlisted men attend an abbreviated course, enrollment in an expanded course depending on motivation and intended utilization. There appears to be very little problem with the retention of naval intelligence personnel. The primary constraint on the Director of Naval Intelligence is the total number



Security Department personnel are navy officers and enlisted men who have been specially trained by the Field Security Department of Military Intelligence. They perform basic countersubversion and counter-sabotage tasks at headquarters and at subordinate bases. They do not, however, carry out base security or personnel investigations, which are done by Military Intelligence Field Security units.

The Organization and Administration Department with about six personnel assigned, provides secretarial support for the Director of Naval Intelligence. These personnel handle routine administrative duties.

Naval Intelligence, although small, is a well-trained and evidently highly efficient service. Recruiting of personnel into Naval Intelligence is done by means of a very efficient, informal system which identifies individuals and matches them to the needs of the Director of Naval Intelligence. (This system is apparently in force throughout Israeli military intelligence organizations.) Naval Intelligence officer personnel are recruited through several different channels. Most younger junior officers enter directly from the universities while others transfer within the Navy from naval operations units to the intelligence service. A third source is enlisted personnel who have displayed the necessary qualities and have indicated an interest in following a career in naval intelligence. Once identified, such people are sent to a university at Navy expense. Upon completion of their training they are commissioned and pursue careers in Naval Intelligence. Israeli Navy enlisted personnel, both male and female, are mostly volunteers who have been screened by the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Naval Intelligence women serve 20 months, while the men serve 36 months.

There are no special naval intelligence schools in Israel, and naval intelligence officers and key enlisted personnel are trained at the Military Intelligence School. In general women receive only on-the-job

(officer and enlisted) of slots assigned. The centralized system combined with primary area of intelligence interest lends itself very well to the Naval Intelligence personnel structure. The close knit intelligence support system also works well considering the lack of integral collection assets.

Intelligence, prior to and during the Yom Kippur War, was received in the Operations Center at Naval headquarters. During the war, the Director of Naval Intelligence worked very closely with the Officer Commanding the Navy in the Center during ongoing operations. Information from SIGINT and other sources was received in the Center as raw data. Correlation of all information was then done on the spot by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and passed on to the Officer Commanding the Navy. The information was disseminated in the form of orders or reports to operational commanders and units. Processing and dissemination of naval intelligence was accomplished in a highly professional manner with no major deficiencies or Arab naval surprises in the Yom Kippur War. Naval Intelligence also revealed a built-in flexibility when the service shifted quickly to a hot war situation and handled support for active naval operations including shore bombardment missions. One major area where Naval Intelligence has problems is the limited number of personnel. In case of continuous operations, similar to the Yom Kippur War, quality naval intelligence work would probably degenerate after a month of steady operations.

3. Administrative practices of the Directorate of Military Intelligence

There are approximately 450 officers plus a larger number of NCOs, enlisted personnel and civilian clerical personnel in the DMI. The service has priority in the selection of qualified military personnel for intelligence assignments. Military Intelligence prefers

to bring individuals into intelligence work while they are young and move them upwards as they acquire experience and can assume greater responsibility. Recruiters seek promising young people who are studying foreign languages or other subjects of interest to the service in secondary school. Prior to graduation, Military Intelligence officers contact selected young students—males and females—and offer them positions as interpreters during the two years of compulsory military service which follows at the completion of secondary education. Those who accept are assigned to Military Intelligence when they join the IDF. Promising young army personnel are then sent to the Military Intelligence School, following which they may be commissioned and assigned as assistants to intelligence officers in the field. When they attain the rank of captain, having served as intelligence officers, some are assigned to an area command headquarters or to the Directorate of Military Intelligence to expand their experience and qualify them for more responsibility and eventual promotion to higher rank. Thus, many of the officers now serving with Military Intelligence entered as young men and moved up through the ranks.

Most Military Intelligence personnel are regulars, not reservists because the IDF requires career intelligence officers. All personnel, including conscripts, join Military Intelligence voluntarily. Female enlisted members, who often serve as translators, usually serve only 20 months whereas male enlisted personnel serve 36 months.

Military Intelligence training is professional and extensive. Officers and analysts are well-trained and competent in their fields. The Military Intelligence School is located north of Tel Aviv on the road to Sde Dov airport. This school trains both officers and noncommissioned officers. Approximately 150 instructors and 90 support personnel train between 2,000 and 3,000 students annually. The school's usual course runs from September through February. This arrangement has been made to take advantage of new groups of high school graduates. This center is a relatively new facility which was established in the late 1960s. It was formerly part of the IDF Infantry School.

The commander of the Military Intelligence School is responsible to the DMI for intelligence instruction and to the Intelligence Corps for training in general. Course content is the responsibility of the DMI. The training staff supervises training aids and instruction methods. A Combat Intelligence Branch provides instruction for operational personnel and a General Subjects Branch trains specialists. The General Subjects Branch, for example, teaches courses in field security, censorship, military drafting, photo interpretation, research for order of battle analysis, collection, and aerial observation. Other special courses are taught as needed. Field Security counterintelligence personnel, Air Force and Navy students also take courses at the Military Intelligence School and Military Intelligence instructors are responsible to the DMI for intelligence training at the schools of other IDF branches. They are charged by the DMI for quality of intelligence teaching. These instructors usually have wartime assignments with tactical units. Military Intelligence personnel staff intelligence positions down through brigade level; line officers with intelligence training at the Infantry School staff the lower echelons.

Field Security personnel are selected on the basis of strict criteria regarding personal security and loyalty to Zionism and the Israeli State. They are trained by Shin Beth.

In general, Military Intelligence, although it has a good training program and tries to offer career inducements, has difficulty in retaining competent personnel because of low wages and slim opportunities for advancement.

4. Methods of operation

Military Intelligence is responsible for cross-border operations into the neighboring Arab states. Its operations rely heavily on the exploitation of: Arabs within Israeli and the Administered Territories; Arab students, who though residents of Israel, attend universities in the Arab nations; Arab travelers and visitors; Arabs in Israeli prisons; and Arab military

deserters, defectors, Bedouins and smugglers.

Military Intelligence collection requirements cover political and economic subjects as well as military information and uses the information acquired both for policymaking purposes and as basic intelligence. Military Intelligence is also active in collecting information from sources outside Israeli terrorist and subversive organizations and activities. Although SIGINT sources acquire some information on these subjects, Military Intelligence officers believe that only agent sources can really obtain the data needed on various terrorist groups' policies and plans, methods of operation, equipment, training and relations with other groups. Primary Israeli interest in terrorism is to obtain early warning of impending operations.

In each regional area of Israel, local citizens, in some cases Arabs, who are Israeli agents, act as spotters for Military Intelligence. Most of these spotters have long worked for Military Intelligence, which alerts them to

Liaison between Israeli Military Intelligence and foreign organizations have varied over the years from good to poor, depending on the exigencies of the situation and the demands of policy. In recent years the Israelis have provided military and security aid and train training to various African nations, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire.... The Israelis have maintained good relations with Turkey and Iran in military and security matters. While the Israelis do not have full diplomatic relations with Iran; they have an overt official mission whose members have diplomatic titles, including that of military attache.

the type of sources desired. Once a spotter has reported a potential source, he steps aside and leaves the rest to Military Intelligence officers. Military Intelligence contacts the potential source, assesses him and, if appropriate, attempts to recruit him as an agent. This is described as the "direct method" of recruiting agents for Military Intelligence. The "indirect method" refers to recruiting sources by or through agents outside Israel. Both Field Security and the police investigate the backgrounds of potential agents for Military Intelligence.

The motives of the spotters and local support people are either monetary or a desire for services in the form of aid in reuniting families or representation on behalf of the spotter in some problem with the Israeli Government. The basic agent motivation is generally economic gain in the form of salaries, loans (which are seldom repaid), and gifts. Another common incentive is a wish to move to Israel and rejoin relatives who

reside there. In some cases the agent may be a Palestinian refugee, who believes that he still has a claim to property in Israel and wants either recompense or a guarantee of the eventual return of his property. Other agents are members of Arab minority groups or opponents of Arab regimes.

Military Intelligence officers do have problems in handling Arab agents, who tend to exaggerate and often fail to report accurate details. Therefore, the Military Intelligence officers encourage their Arab agents to provide photographs, maps, and other corroborating documents. Military Intelligence officers also cross-check reports often by using other agents in the same region. Despite Israeli warnings during training, Arab agents tend to tell other members of their family about their association with Military Intelligence. Occasionally an Arab agent may recruit all the members of his immediate family as subagents and try to get his case officer to pay them salaries. The Israelis refer to these family subagents as "nonfunctionalists." These subagents sometimes compromise a whole operation as a result of boasting about their activities. Occasionally the Military Intelligence case officer will order these unwanted "nonfunctionals" across the border into Israel for security briefings but Military Intelligence has not solved this problem completely.

Military Intelligence trains its agents in tradecraft, collection methods, security and reporting procedures. Military Intelligence runs its agents in networks or as singletons; the latter are referred to as "lone wolves." For security reasons, Military Intelligence prefers that an agent with good access remain a "lone wolf." Agent networks consist of a primary source and subsources. Military Intelligence does not refer to sources as such, instead calling both primary and subsource "agents." Military Intelligence officers try to meet and train each agent personally on the Israeli side of the border. Networks usually include a radio operator and in some cases, a courier.

When possible, Military Intelligence case officers prefer direct meetings with all agents inside Israel in order to receive their reports personally, to check requirements and to formulate future plans. One aspect of the relationship between Military Intelligence officers and agents is unique when compared to the techniques employed by other services. In many operations Military Intelligence headquarters analysts accompany case officers to personal agent meetings, in order to clarify certain details of the agent's reports and give him guidance on certain points or problems. These meetings are usually held in safehouses with both the case officer and the analyst present but if an agent is pressed for time, the case officer and analyst may meet him during darkness at a prearranged spot along the border.

Military Intelligence also communicates with its agents by S/W letters posted in third countries, by agent radio and by deaddrops. Military Intelligence operations have been marked by flexibility, economy in the use of assets and by responsiveness to requirements; the system worked well prior to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Agents reported early warning information which, in retrospect, contained reliable indications of a coming Arab attack. Direct communication with agents, however, virtually ceased during hostilities and what little agent reporting there was during the war was of limited value to Israeli Military headquarters and field commanders. The principal problem faced by Military Intelligence in the acquisition and reporting of intelligence by agents is the lack of modern equipment. Although many of the agents have radios (mainly receivers) and cameras, and are familiar with secret writing, the sophistication level of techniques and equipment is low. This adversely affects the quality, security and timeliness of collection operations. Military Intelligence employs a SIGINT system that is modern, sophisticated and effective.

The DMI is responsible for providing technical support to other directorates, but the technical services of the various military intelligence directorates are inferior to the technical groups of Shin Beth. The DMI's technical equipment, such as that used in audio surveillance or that employed in work agent support is

generally high although it is less good in some special fields such as miniaturization. In the use and application of infrared devices, however, the DMI capability is usually good. Military Intelligence personnel are capable of making ad hoc modifications of existing equipment and are up to date on technical advances concerning remote control and activation of transmitters, and in the field of low-light photography. Military Intelligence relies heavily on aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT for timely order of battle information. Aerial reconnaissance is apparently a primary instrument for locating fedayeen groups, although such organizations are well penetrated by field agents.

Military Intelligence is capable of providing timely and detailed information on Israel's primary neighboring enemies through agent operations that are well planned and highly imaginative.

The main purpose of Military Intelligence Field Security units is to control the local Arab population in the Administered Territories and to minimize their participation in terrorism. In this endeavor, Field Security of the Administered Territories works closely with Shin Beth and the Border Guard. Residents are required to carry ID cards, curfews have been imposed, suspected resistors have been detained, and the houses in the area of persons presumed to know of terrorist activities have been demolished, even though the inhabitants were not directly involved. In the early 1970s it was estimated that the Israelis had some 900 residents of the Administered Territories under administrative detention. Personnel of Field Security units have carried out sweeps in searches for terrorists and arms caches through areas in the West Bank where terrorism has occurred. On some occasions Israeli operations have taken place at night, apparently intended at least in part to intimidate the populace.

In December 1969 the Defense Minister announced that 516 buildings had been demolished in the occupied territories since the 1967 war—265 in the West Bank, 227 in Gaza and 24 in Jerusalem. While these Israeli policies and actions have intimidated many Arabs who might otherwise have engaged in resistance activities or in terrorism, in many cases they have been counterproductive in that they have aroused deep and widespread resentment among the residents of the Occupied Territories. In areas where buildings have been destroyed, an atmosphere of personal anger and resentment has been added to the natural bitterness of a defeated people, particularly among the younger Arabs.

5. Relations with other services

There appears at the present time to be a very

harmonious relationship between Military Intelligence and the other Israeli intelligence and security services. Most Israeli intelligence and security personnel, especially on the policy and coordination level, realize that their very national existence depends on an effective and smoothly functioning intelligence and security community. In addition, officers at the department chief and even more so at the division chief level all have known each other personally for a long period of time. These relationships have been forged during troubled times seldom experienced by any other nation and now provide a framework for cooperative teamwork and coordination among the services.

Liaison between Israeli Military Intelligence and foreign organizations have varied over the years from good to poor, depending on the exigencies of the situation and the demands of policy. In recent years the Israelis have provided military and security aid and training to various African nations, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaïre. They have also engaged in military and security training and equipment exchanges with Latin American and Asian services.

The Israelis have maintained good relations with Turkey and Iran in military and security matters. While the Israelis do not have full diplomatic relations with Iran; they have an overt official mission whose members have diplomatic titles, including that of military attache.

E. Research and Political Planning Center

The Research and Political Planning Center, formerly the Research Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, prepares analysis based on raw intelligence for government policymakers. Its office is located in a separate fenced compound within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complex in Jerusalem. A guard at the compound gate prevents unauthorized entrance into the Center, and photo ID cards are required for admittance.

The Center presently employs fewer than 100 people, both analysts and support staff, who were recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Israeli universities. The Center has six divisions: North Africa; the Fertile Crescent; the Arabian Peninsula; other Geographic Regions; Economic; and Strategic. Some 70 percent of the Center's personnel are employed in the three Arab units. The Center prepares its analyses on the basis of raw intelligence data available to the Israeli intelligence community. The Center produces short papers on current intelligence and longer analytical memoranda, as required. The Center's products are disseminated to all minis-

tries of the government.

The Foreign Minister uses the Center as his personal braintrust to give him an independent means of judging the products of Military Intelligence and Mossad. Although its analyses are sent to Israel's top decisionmakers, the Center's role in the Israeli intelligence and security community probably is still a modest one. The Center reportedly has few problems arising from competition within the community, probably because of a lack of status in comparison with the established and larger intelligence and security organizations.

F. The National Police

The Israeli Police Force is a national organization headed by an Inspector General responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The national headquarters moved in mid-1968 from Tel Aviv-Yafo to Jerusalem. The force is comprised of the following departments: (1) Administration, which is responsible for transport, supplies, communications, property and finances; (2) Investigations, which is concerned with criminal and fraud investigations and special tasks in support of the intelligence and security community; and (3) Operations, which is in charge of training, patrols and traffic. There are also personnel, research, planning and development offices. The Prison Services and the Civil Guard are also part of the Police (Figure 9).

The force is divided territorially into districts, subdistricts, zones, police stations, and posts. The three police districts are: Northern, including Haifa; Tel Aviv; and Southern, including Jerusalem. Attached to the Haifa subdistrict is a small coast guard or marine police force, which is based in the port of Haifa and patrols the whole coastline to prevent smuggling, infiltration, and illegal fishing. This unit also has patrol craft on Lake Tiberias and at Elat on the Gulf of Aqaba. The Southern District includes a special unit at Ben Gurion (Lod) airport (Figures 10 and 11).

A special component of the national police force is the Border Guard, whose missions are to guard the ceasefire lines against Arab infiltration and detecting and running down terrorists. It works closely with the Army and patrols the Administered Territories and the border areas. The Border Guard also trains settlers in defense measures against infiltrators, and schedules guard duty in border villages. Military conscripts who elect to fulfill their term of service by joining the Border Guard are the principal sources of new recruits for this component. The Border Guard, which number about 6,000, is integrated into the Army in time of war.

The effective strength of the police force (not




Figure 9. Organization of Israeli National Police, 1977

including the Border Guard) reached about 12,000 at the end of 1969. Roughly 1,100 of the police, including 768 Arabs, were employed in the Administered Territories in 1969. Over half the police force are Jews of Oriental background and, in fact, the police force is a branch of government to which the assignment of Oriental Jews has been particularly encouraged.

The police force is capable of maintaining public order and safety under normal circumstances. It has, however, been troubled by a manpower shortage caused by resignations resulting from low pay, overwork and the attraction of higher paying jobs elsewhere. Despite the persistent shortage of manpower, police discipline is generally satisfactory and, in the case of the Border Guard, excellent. The public attitude toward the police has improved since the early days of statehood, despite scandals involving smuggling and the acceptance of bribes. The police force has worked hard to overcome the traditional Jewish fear of police authority stemming from the historic oppression of Jews. The Israeli Police Force in effect acts as a very important auxiliary to Shin Beth in the preservation of internal security throughout the country. The police support Shin Beth in investigations, by providing cover and making arrests.

G. Key officials

Achi-Tuv, Avraham

Achi-Tuv became Director of Shin Beth in the summer of 1974. He is a career security officer. His reputation was established as chief of Shin Beth's Arab Affairs Department, where he was responsible for conducting operations in the Administered Territories and within the Arab community in Israel. He served briefly as Deputy Director of Shin Beth prior to his appointment as Director. Achi-Tuv is of German background. He is married and has a daughter. He earned a law degree at the University of Tel Aviv in the early 1970s while serving in Shin Beth. He is extremely bright, hard-working, ambitious and thorough. He is also known to be headstrong, abrasive and arrogant.

Hoffi, Yitzhak

Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Hoffi became Director of Mossad on 1 September 1974. He was born in Tel Aviv on 25 January 1927. He joined the Haganah in 1944 and commanded a company in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. He continued to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces in a variety of command, staff and training posts, including the command of the Paratroop Brigade. Hoffi was Acting Chief of Staff for a brief period in April 1974, but retired from the IDF at that time, apparently because he was not appointed Chief of Staff. Hoffi attended the US Army Command and General Staff College in the mid-1960s. He has also visited the US on many occasions. In 1968 he inspected police units and participated in army exercises in Uganda. He traveled as a tourist to Hawaii, Japan, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tehran in 1970 and went to Singapore on undisclosed business. He inspected Israeli advisory efforts in Ethiopia in 1972 and also went to other parts of Africa. Although not an intelligence officer by background or training, Hoffi apparently demonstrated his flair for intelligence analysis as Commander of the Northern Command in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 by sensing the impending Syrian attack and requesting the Defense Minister to reinforce the Golan Heights with an armored brigade. Hoffi reportedly has expanded Mossad's role in the collection of intelligence on Arab capabilities and the interpretation of such information.

Hoffi is reserved and quiet but can be warm and genial among friends. He is married and has two daughters. He speaks English. Neither as flashy nor as imaginative as some of his predecessors in Mossad, he is reported to be meticulous and somewhat dour.

Sagi, Yehoshua

General Yehoshua Sagi, born 27 September 1933, Jerusalem, Palestine (Israel), entered the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in 1951 and was commissioned in 1953. From 1953 to 1964 he served in the Southern

Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Hoffi became Director of Mossad on 1 September 1974.... Hoffi attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the mid-1960s. He has also visited the U.S. on many occasions. In 1968 he inspected police units and participated in army exercises in Uganda.... He inspected Israeli advisory efforts in Ethiopia in 1972 and also went to other parts of Africa.... Hoffi reportedly has expanded Mossad's role in the collection of intelligence on Arab capabilities and the interpretation of such information. Hoffi is reserved and quiet but can be warm and genial among friends.... Neither as flashy nor as imaginative as some of his predecessors in Mossad, he is reported to be meticulous and somewhat dour.

Command, fulfilling field duties. During the Sinai Campaign he served as intelligence officer of the Armored Corps and as commander of a reconnaissance unit. Following the 1956 war, he served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Brigade and later as an assistant intelligence officer, Southern Command. In 1965 he graduated from the IDF Command and Staff College. Following his graduation he served as commander of an Intelligence Officer Training Course, and as an intelligence officer with the Southern Command before returning in 1971 as an instructor with the Command and Staff College. In 1972 he became commander of the Intelligence School but left in 1973 to become intelligence officer with the Armored Division, Southern Command. On 19 May 1974 Sagi was appointed Deputy Director, Military Intelligence, Production and Estimates. On 2 February 1979 he assumed the Directorship of Military Intelligence. Sagi is soft-spoken, direct and has a no-nonsense outlook. He considers himself an Arab expert. He is married and has three daughters. He speaks English.

H. Comments on principal sources

1. Source materials

Most of the information in this publication has been derived from a variety of sources including covert assets of the Central Intelligence Agency, publications of the Israeli Government and reports prepared by the United States Department of Defense. Research was basically completed in December 1976.

2. Supplementary overt publications

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- k. *Israel Government Year Book 5735-6 (1975-1976)*. Jerusalem, 1975.
- l. Lotz, Johann Wolfgang. *The Champagne Spy*. New York: Manor Books, 1973.
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Document 2

S E C R E T

SRF Memo #177
21 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Political Section

FROM : SRF

SUBJECT : Background Information on Israeli Trade Mission, Tehran

Following are SRF Headquarter's traces on members of the Israeli Trade Mission:

1. Uriel L U B R A N I, born 7 October 1926, has been unofficial ambassador to Iran since June 1973. Received BA (Honors) from University of London. Served in Haganah (Resistance) and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 1944-48. Entered Foreign Ministry (MFA) in 1950 and first served in Middle East Division, then as private secretary to Foreign Minister Sharett 1951-53. Assigned London 1953-56. 1957-61 Assistant Advisor, then Advisor, on Arabic affairs to Prime Minister (PM) Ben-Gurion. (During this period, his unsympathetic attitude toward Arabs drew criticism from Israeli Press at least twice.) When Ben-Gurion resigned in 1963, was appointed Ambassador to Burma, but never assumed his post. Stayed on as Political Secretary and Director of PM Eshkol's private office. 1965 resigned post because of loyalties to Ben-Gurion. 1965-68 Ambassador to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, during which time implemented Israel's Aid Program which placed advisors in Uganda Army, Air Force, and police; these contacts made him one of best-informed men in Uganda, and U.S. Embassy found him to be valuable and cooperative friend. 1968-71 Ambassador to Ethiopia. 1971-73 was on Koor Industries management board as Director of Joint Enterprises and Projects Abroad; this board determines basic policy for Koor Industries LTD, Israel's largest industrial corporation. Married to Sara nee L E V I; four children. Said to be a capable civil servant, but a rather colorless person.

2. Arie (or Aryeh) L E V I N, formerly named Lova Lewin, born circa 1927 in Iran, is suspected Intel officer. Apparently is former IDF officer (Lt. Col) on loan to MFA. 1963-65 First Secretary, Addis Ababa. 1966-unknown date Charge D'affaires, Kigali, Rwanda. Senior Foreign Liaison Officer since 1965. (One Arie Lewin, probably identical, was Chief Military Censor, IDF Intel Directorate 1968-69.)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

-2-

Counselor, Paris, 1969-70. Described as specialist on Iran, where he grew up. Educated in U.S. protestant mission schools. Speaks fluent Russian (Russian Jewish background), French, English, native Hebrew, and Arabic. Has reportedly traveled and lived in U.S. (no dates given). Very openly pro-U.S. while in Rwanda, was object of some Soviet interest.

3. Yoram S H A N I, born circa 1939, has been First Secretary, Tehran, since 1973. In MFA since circa 1965. Served in Jerusalem (dates unknown), and as Vice Consul, Sydney, Australia for four years (circa 1969).

4. Eliezer Y O T V A T (or YOTVATH) served at Israeli Consulate New York City 1960-61 where was in charge of archives and diplomatic couriers. Second Secretary (Admin), Rome 1968-72. In 1970 one Colonel Yotvat, Milatt in Tokyo, was reportedly traveling to Taiwan to discuss Israeli munitions purchases.

5. Abraham Luncz, aka Rami Luncz (or Luntz), born February 1931 in Tiberias, Israel, has been Milatt Tehran since 1975. Prior to this assignment, was Director of Naval

CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 55

Intelligence, IDF-Navy (since 1971). Described as highly intelligent and capable line officer, apparently has had no formal intel training. Experienced in comms and electronics, has served as Commander of Submarine Chaser (1964) and as Deputy Commander, Haifa Naval Base (1971). Received officer training at French Naval School, Brest, France (1950-53), and attended Royal Navy Navigation and Direction School, Southwick, England (1962). Speaks good French and English, possibly some Arabic. Wife Ada, born 1932 in Haifa, was formerly nurse in IDF (prior to 1963). His brother-in-law, Captain Emmanuel K L E M P E R E R, was Deputy Commissioner of Shipping in 1969. Lunz and his Deputy, Moshe Moussa Levi (below), were both known personally and professionally to Defense Attache's Office Tel Aviv in 1975 as outstanding intel officers.

6. (Lt Col) Moshe Moussa L E V I was Foreign Liaison Officer at IDF Hqs prior to Tehran assignment in 1974. In August 1966 one Major fnu L E V Y (possibly identifiable) was reportedly assisting Iranian instructor at newly-established intelligence school; apparently helped arrange training schedules and organize instructional material. This man, in Iran on loan, was then commander of the "Direct Secret Collection Agency" on Israel/Jordan border. Lt Col Levi, a multi-lingual specialist (speaks Arabic, French, English, Hebrew, and is studying Persian) was reportedly disillusioned when he first assumed his current post, because of lack of work. However, he soon created tasks for himself, including developing info on Iranian order of battle and cultivating Iranian officers. Wife is Ambassador's secretary and is also multi-lingual. Both have been described as personable and well-versed in developing contacts among foreign military circles, including U.S. military personnel.

S E C R E T

Document 3 (Excerpt)

NNNNVV ESA160BRA008
PP RUQMHR
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RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0725
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9102
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2214
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0972
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7716
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4502
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9247
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6090
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9395
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0912
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7056
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2262
RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8176
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4502
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1275
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4662
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0724
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7823
RUQMGG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6467
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOTT PRIORITY 7599
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2358
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1588
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2261
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3141
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8664
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3066
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 3678
RUEHDI/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0356
RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2108
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 118204/03

14. (C) YEMEN: THE F-5 PROGRAM IN THE YEMEN ARABIC REPUBLIC (YAR) USING US PLANES AND TAIWANESE PILOTS, ALL PAID FOR BY THE SAUDIS IS OFF TO A PROBLEM-FILLED AND EMBARRASSING START, ACCORDING TO OUR EMBASSY IN SANA. SIX OF THE 16 F-5S DESTINED FOR THE YAR HAVE ARRIVED ALONG WITH AN 81 MEMBER TAIWANESE TEAM OF PILOTS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THE F-5S HAVE NOT BEEN OFF THE GROUND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL APRIL 30. THE TAIWANESE TEAM HAS ENCOUNTERED NUMEROUS OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING MISSING EQUIPMENT AND LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES (THREE SPEAK ENGLISH AND NONE SPEAK ARABIC). NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS AND FLIGHT CONTROL PROCEDURES HAVE NOT BEEN INSTITUTED. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT TIME AND EXPERIENCE MAY CORRECT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS BUT IN THE MEANTIME, WORD ON THE SITUATION HAS SPREAD AND WILL BE AN INCREASING POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE US AND THE SAUDIS. SOVIET MIGS FLYING FROM THE YAR CITY OF HOEIDAH HAVE MADE DAILY PASSES OVER THE CAPITAL EVERY DAY SINCE THE F-5S ARRIVED AND HAVE, ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION, BUZZED THE F-5S' PARKING AREA, A DEMONSTRATION FOR AT LEAST SOME YEMENIS OF THE BENEFITS OF SOVIET VS. US MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAMS.

Document 4

Tehran, February 19, 1978

Dear Mr. Minister:

Enclosed is a brief account of the outcome of Foreign Minister Dayan's recent visit to Washington, which I would appreciate your bringing to His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr's attention at your earliest convenience. I shall be leaving Tehran for Washington the morning of February 20 to attend the U.S.-Iranian Joint Commission Meeting. If you or His Imperial Majesty have any questions regarding the enclosed, or any comments you wish conveyed to Washington, my Deputy, Jack Miklos, who will be in charge in my absence, is au courant and of course available. We are most appreciative to His Majesty for the continuing exchange on this matter and look forward to hearing the results of His Majesty's meeting with the important visitor expected later this week.

With high esteem and warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador

His Excellency
Amir Abbas Hoveyda
Minister of the Imperial Court
Tehran

S E C R E T

DCM:JCMiklos/sw

S E C R E T

Dayan's brief visit to Washington produced no new developments of any moment. He continues to believe efforts should be pursued to get a declaration of principles agreed with Sadat but was not interested in discussing specific language of declaration while here. He did ask our help in getting formal meetings of Political Committee resumed, on grounds that there was undesirable asymmetry in continued meetings of Security Committee in Cairo while Political Committee was suspended. We undertook to raise this with Egyptians but indicated we did not think he would be responsive until a declaration of principles had been agreed to. Dayan also, predictably, expressed Israeli concern over aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia (very little was said about proposed sale to Egypt).

Israelis have expressed unhappiness with our recent references to "withdrawal on all fronts" under UN Res. 242. Secretary pressed Dayan as to Israeli acceptance that 242 does require withdrawal on all fronts, assuming agreement can be reached on border adjustments, security arrangements and political linkage at West Bank to Jordan. Dayan avoided direct answer, saying only that Israelis have "their own plan" (i.e., the "Begin Plan") for the West Bank. From our recent exchanges with Israelis, it is apparent that Begin is not yet prepared to accept the principle of withdrawal from West Bank, understandable in view of his long-held ideological commitments, but of crucial importance if there is to be a successful solution to problem and any prospect of a peace settlement. We believe this will be the most difficult decision for Israelis to face in coming weeks. We are certain that His Majesty will recognize the significance of this particular point.

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Mossad Responds

A number of Israeli officials have reacted sharply to the Washington Post and Boston Globe articles on this document. A government spokesperson called the reports on Israeli operations against the United States "ridiculous, not worthy of comment." Intelligence sources quoted in Israeli papers said the CIA document was a Soviet disinformation effort. The Jerusalem Post, quoting unnamed Israeli and American sources, stated that the U.S. had conducted operations against Israel similar to those the document says Israel conducted against the U.S.

The most reliable response to the Post and Globe articles came from former Mossad chief Isser Harel, who in a Ma'ariv interview called the assertions of the document "malicious," "dilletantish," "distortions... but probably authentic." "The report is one-sided and malicious, it ignores Israel's special position in its struggle for survival," Harel said. He also complained about the CIA document's style, calling it anti-Semitic. He told Ma'ariv it was "shockingly irresponsible" for the CIA to keep a document like this "rolling around" in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Altogether, Harel concluded, publication of the document had been a "nightmare" for him.

AID in El Salvador

In January 1962, in response to the CIA's defeat at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, the U.S. government formed the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). The objective of this group, which included the Agency for International Development (AID), was "to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ('wars of liberation') is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare [and] to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in the political, economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted abroad by State, AID, USIA and CIA...."

In short, AID programs are coordinated in conjunction with U.S. counterinsurgencies to defeat wars of liberation. The role of the following AID contractors in El Salvador from 1980 to 1982 should be viewed in this context.

American Institute for Free Labor Development (\$2,600,000 for "a special three-months program to support land reform" and \$100,000 to "provide support for a program of union-to-community food distribution centers in urban El Salvador.")

Bill Kelly Chevrolet, Inc. (\$60,000 "to deliver ambulances...to ... El Salvador.")

Brazilian Institute Municipal Development (\$34,120 to "conduct a study to determine status of municipal development.")

Checchi and Company/Louis Berger International (\$94,461 "to prepare an analysis that will evaluate the design of Phase I of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform," and \$99,635 to "conduct an analysis of the private sector in El Salvador.")

Experience, Inc. (\$37,225 to "perform an in-depth assessment of the progress of the agrarian reform program.")

Johnson and Towers, Inc. (\$805,761 "to deliver generators to El Salvador.")

Holburn, Albert (\$29,797 to "write a report to organize for and initiate the implementation of [AID's] massive land-to-the-tiller reform activity.")

Moffett, J. Robert (\$7,450 to "provide assistance to further the implementation of the agrarian reform program" and \$10,200 "to perform research and analysis to the agrarian reform program.")

Practical Concepts, Inc. (\$127,176 for "food and nutrition - program development - El Salvador.")

Public Administration Service (\$31,725 "to assist FINATA organize for and initiate the implementation of land-to-the-tiller reform activity.")

Servicios Tecnicos del Caribe (\$452,434 "to assist in identifying and developing the agrarian reform credit project.")

Southeastern Bus Sales, Inc. (\$1,480,504 for "transportation restoration program.")

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Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, January 1982

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Walden Bello: "The Philippines and the CIA"
Dr. Arjun Makhijani: "CIA's Nuclear Pollution of the Ganges River Source"
- Tape 3: Joshua Cohen (MIT): "CIA and Chile"
Stephen Kinzer (Boston Globe): "CIA and the 1954 Coup in Guatemala"
Saul Landau (IPS): "CIA with Reference to Chile and Nicaragua"
Alejandro Bendana (Nicaraguan Ambassador to the U.N.): "U.S.-Nicaraguan Relations"
- Tape 4: Philip Morrison (MIT): "Intelligence and the Abuse of Covert Operations"
David Sobel (CPR): "Congressional Oversight"
- Tape 5: Jay Peterzell (CNSS): "Current CIA Covert Operations"
Ben Bradlee (Boston Globe): "The Wilson-Terpil Affair"
- Tape 6: John Kelly: "Operation CHAOS, New Executive Order on Intelligence"
Frank Deale (CCR): "New Executive Order"
Ken Lawrence (Anti-Repression Resource Team): "New Executive Order"
- Tape 7: Ken Lawrence, John Kelly: "Agent Identities Protection Act"
- Tape 8: Howard Zinn (Boston Univ.): "The Pentagon Papers"
Dan Bernstein (NLG): "FOIA"
Terri Taylor, Randy Goodman: "FBI and Iran Documents"
Robert Borosage (IPS): "U.S. Government Secrecy"
- Tape 9: Charles Allen: "CIA and the Nazis"

Order from: Jeff McConnell, Dept. of Linguistics and
Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139.

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Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea seems to pit equally important principles against each other. Are national sovereignty and self-determination more important than human rights? Does a commitment to socialism limit a state's right to pursue its own national interests? In issue 79 of the *Southeast Asia Chronicle* staff members commemorate the Center's tenth anniversary by considering some of the more complex issues and taking stands on what should be done in Kampuchea.

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